Dear Gary F,
Your comment concludes:
"That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of Peircean
semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: *Experience is our only teacher* in
science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is *human* experience
— yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological or accidental human
element” from our comprehension of the elements of the phenomenon, and
specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others will say it
can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”
As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements of
our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience,
rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices
need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
Nietszche said something that may speak to Peirce’s words, though
perhaps not completely parallel:
"Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the
real raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any
case accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can
be only your liberators." (Untimely Meditations III)
Gene Halton
On Jan 6, 2018 9:34 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
> Gary R, I think that’s a good exposition of the “reference” issues,
> including some aspects of the matter that I hadn’t thought of.
>
>
>
> This is heartening because I find it difficult to write about these
> ‘categorial’ issues as they are presented in Lowell 3 — difficult because
> they take us back to the very basics of experience itself, or to the
> elements of the phenomenon, which is the other side of the same coin. The
> deeper we probe into this, the more vast the implications and the
> applications, and the harder it is to illustrate the conceptions with
> concrete examples, because any example that comes to mind (like Spike the
> cat) brings irrelevant or misleading associations along with it. Also, if
> the writer thinks about the reader’s response, he’s apt to say (as Peirce
> did earlier in Lowell 3), “It must be extremely difficult for those who
> are untrained to such analyses of conceptions to make any sense of all
> this.” But then other readers (on a list like this one) are likely to feel
> that they’ve heard it all before and want to skip ahead. Hence the writer’s
> despair. But I might as well stumble on regardless.
>
>
>
> Before probing further into Lowell 3.11, and specifically CP 1.536, I’d
> like to requote this bit from earlier in Lowell 3:
>
> [[ The secondness of the Second, whichever of the two objects be called
> the Second, is different from the Secondness of the first. That is to say
> it *generally* is so. To kill and to be killed are different. In case
> there is one of the two which there is good reason for calling the First,
> while the other remains the Second, it is that the Secondness is more
> accidental to the former than to the latter; that there is more or less
> approach to a state of things in which something, which is itself First,
> accidentally comes into a Secondness that does not really modify its
> Firstness, while its Second in this Secondness is something whose *being*
> is of the nature of Secondness and which has no Firstness separate from
> this.… The extreme kind of Secondness which I have just described is the
> relation of a *quality* to the *matter* in which that quality inheres.
> The mode of being of the quality is that of Firstness. That is to say, it
> is a possibility. It is related to the matter accidentally; and this
> relation does not change the quality at all, except that it imparts
> *existence,* that is to say, this very relation of inherence, to it. But
> the *matter,* on the other hand, has no being at all except the being a
> subject of qualities. This relation of really having qualities constitutes
> its *existence.* But if all its qualities were to be taken away, and it
> were to be left quality-less matter, it not only would not exist, but it
> would not have any positive definite possibility — such as an unembodied
> quality has. It would be nothing, at all.] (CP 1.527)]
>
>
>
> Now, the very word “matter” has common associations that would make this
> line of thinking hard to follow. We are often inclined to think of “matter”
> as physical stuff, like the clay which an artisan or artist might shape
> into a bowl or a sculpture, or like the clay that God shaped into Adam in
> one of the *Genesis* stories. But clay already has *qualities* that make
> it *clay*. Can we imagine “quality-less matter” at all? Or an “unembodied
> quality”? If not, we can’t imagine a pure First or a pure Second either.
> Neither one could *exist* (as clay can exist) because *existence* is the
> “very relation of inherence” of qualities in matter. So thinking of the
> quality as First and the matter as Second, we can say that the quality
> *determines* the matter to its existence.
>
>
>
> This is different from another kind of *determination* which is involved
> in a *triadic* relation. Peirce explains the difference in CP 1.536:
>
> [[ We have here a First, a Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive
> Qualitative Possibility, in itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent
> thing without any mode of being less than existence, but determined by that
> First. A *Third* has a mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses
> that it determines, the mode of being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound
> this with the ideal being of a quality in itself. A quality is something
> capable of being completely embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its
> character as a law except by determining a habit. A quality is how
> something may or might have been. A law is how an endless future must
> continue to be. ]]
>
>
>
> If I read this right, Peirce is saying here that a First can *determine*
> a Second by *being embodied* here and now, and thus being accidentally
> involved in a Secondness while retaining its essential Firstness as a
> possibility; but a *Third* can attain or retain its essential Thirdness
> only by *continuously* determining Secondnesses, whenever the situation
> arises that makes this possible.
>
>
>
> For me, this has an important bearing on the discussion we were having
> last year on the list about the “order of determination” in semiosis. Also
> on the question Stephen Rose asked the other day about what Peirce means by
> “continuity.” Of course, whole books have been and are being written on
> *that* subject, so I didn’t (and still don’t) have the nerve to say
> anything more about it here. But let’s go on the *genuine* Thirdness:
>
>
>
> [[ Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are all
> three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one another
> they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its capacity as
> mere Possibility; that is, mere *Mind* capable of thinking, or a mere
> vague idea. The *Second* is Thought playing the rôle of a Secondness, or
> Event. That is, it is of the general nature of *Experience* or
> *Information.* The Third is Thought in its rôle as governing Secondness.
> It brings the Information into the Mind, or determines the Idea and gives
> it body. It is informing thought, or *Cognition.* But take away the
> psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we
> see the operation of a Sign. ] CP 1.537 ]
>
>
>
> That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of Peircean
> semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: *Experience is our only teacher* in
> science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is *human*
> experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological or
> accidental human element” from our comprehension of the elements of the
> phenomenon, and specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others
> will say it can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”
>
>
>
> And that’s where I’ll have to leave it for today, though I don’t suppose
> I’ve made a dent in the “endless future” of this inquiry.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 5-Jan-18 20:40
>
> Gary f, list,
>
> All of this is *very* interesting both from the standpoints of
> phenomenology and of semiotics (and, it would seem, how they necessarily
> involve each other). I don't know whether I have anything much to add to
> what you've already written, but first let me see if I fully grasp your
> meaning. You wrote:
>
> Gf: [H]ow is this specialized usage [of "Reference"] related to the
> ordinary usage of the common noun “reference” rooted in the verb “refer”?
> For instance, when I type the term “cat” to *refer* to the cat who is
> curled up on the sofa nearby, is there a dyadic relation between cat and
> word which is an instance of Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give
> him his *proper* name) is certainly an “existing individual,” and thus a
> Second, but does the common noun belong to a different “category of being,”
> a First which “is a mere First”? This may seem a trivial question, but it
> is definitely a*semiotic* question, because a word is definitely a sign.
> Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so what we are looking into
> here is the role of degenerate Secondness in triadic relations. I
> approached this topic several years ago in Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*,
> http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention, and though I still have my
> doubts about it, I haven’t come up with any improvements. Regarding a sign,
> even a symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light
> of Peirce’s definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as “First
> Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know what other Peirceans
> think on this issue.
>
> I certainly agree that seeing 'a symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not
> really a problem in the light of Peirce’s definition of the sign. . . as
> “First Correlate of a triadic relation" since from the standpoint of
> semiotics this is a case of degenerate 2ns because an actual cat is an
> Object and the word "cat" is but a sign. This seems clear enough, fairly
> obvious, I think. But getting closer to the heart of the matter, you quoted
> Peirce:
>
> [[ . . . I always left these references out of account, notwithstanding
> their manifest importance, simply because the algebras or other forms of
> diagrammatization which I employed did not seem to afford me any means of
> representing them. I need hardly say that the moment I discovered in the
> *verso* of the sheet of Existential Graphs a representation of a universe
> of possibility, I perceived that a *reference* would be represented by a
> graph which should cross a cut, thus subduing a vast field of thought to
> the governance and control of exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ] (1906)
>
> In one sense the word "cat" is a mere possibility because there is a
> "universe of possibility" as regards how the Object, 'cat,' might be
> symbolized (e.g. by gatto, chat, Katze, etc.) as well as the name given to
> any actual cat, in this case, Spike. Indeed, some actual cats given one
> name by one owner are given another name by their next owner. And there are
> other 'possibilities' as well.
>
> Can we say that one loses the *genuine 2ns* of 'cat' unless one
> *experiences* (say, actually looks at, pets, feels the claws of a cat
> digging into his flesh, etc.) a real cat, say Spike? That "looking at"
> *grounds* ones cat-reference in actuality==genuine 2ns (not just
> facticity==degenerate 2ns). For example, one can imagine a person in a
> place where there are no cats and, so, has never seen an actual cat, but
> who has read extensively on cats, seen videos of cats, etc. This person
> would not really have a 'sense' of catness at all, I don't believe (I also
> just recalled those fanciful European visual depictions of Amerindians in
> the years just following the 'discovery' of the New World based on verbal
> descriptions of First Nation peoples).
>
> This seems in line with what you wrote in Chapter 7 of your book,*Turning
> Signs* http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention
>
> Gf: The reader of philosophy should be aware that ‘mere reference’ is only
> a ‘degenerate Secondness’ (CP 1.535, 1903). In order to fix her attention
> on a dynamic object within the sphere of experience, she must translate an
> ‘abstractly expressed proposition into its precise meaning’ – but since she
> can only do so by drawing upon her prior experience *with the terms
> translated*, her reading is at risk of getting trapped *inside* the
> bubble of language. ‘All degenerate seconds may be conveniently termed
> Internal, in contrast to External seconds, which are constituted by
> external fact, and are true actions of one thing upon another’ (EP1:254).
> Nor is it only abstractions and fantasies which are subject to this
> *degeneracy*: the representation of ‘facts’ in a ‘true’ story is equally
> degenerate, since it can only *refer* symbolically to the dynamic object
> of the story, the external facts. The difference between genuine and
> degenerate Secondness, or external fact and internal reference, is the
> difference between living through an event and imagining or recalling it.
>
> So, if I have grasped you meaning in your comments on the Lowell segment
> and your Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*, I would tend to strongly agree
> with your analysis of the distinction between genuine and degenerate 2ns.
>
> You closed that stimulating chapter of your book with this observation and
> question, one which I'd like to discuss at some point along the way
> (perhaps even in a separate thread).
>
> Gf: ‘Experience’ itself is only a word, like other words: how then do you
> reach the point where you can judge for yourself whether experience is your
> only teacher or not?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 5:58 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
> List,
>
> Peirce’s recursive application of the categories seems to reach a climax
> with the Firstness of Thirdness here, as he tells us that the “slight
> glimpse” into phenomenology given so far in this lecture is intended
> “merely to lead up to Thirdness and to the particular kind and aspect of
> thirdness which is the sole object of logical study.”
>
> But before we plunge into that, I’d like to point out a couple of
> questions raised by Peirce’s reference here to the term “reference.”
> Summarizing his previous remarks, he says that “genuine Secondness was
> found to be Action, where First and Second are both true Seconds and the
> Secondness is something distinct from them, while in Degenerate Secondness,
> or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never attaining full
> Secondness.” He did not use the term “reference” earlier in this lecture,
> but he did use it in the part of the 1903 Syllabus devoted to dyadic
> relations, CP 3.572: “The broadest division of dyadic relations is into
> those which can only subsist between two subjects of different categories
> of being (as between an existing individual and a quality) and those which
> can subsist between two subjects of the same category. A relation of the
> former kind may advantageously be termed a *reference;* a relation of the
> latter kind, a *dyadic relation proper.*”
>
> This seems consistent with the identification of “Reference” as
> “Degenerate Secondness” — but what is “advantageous” about using the term
> “reference” in this way? And how is this specialized usage related to the
> ordinary usage of the common noun “reference” rooted in the verb “refer”?
> For instance, when I type the term “cat” to *refer* to the cat who is
> curled up on the sofa nearby, is there a dyadic relation between cat and
> word which is an instance of Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give
> him his *proper* name) is certainly an “existing individual,” and thus a
> Second, but does the common noun belong to a different “category of being,”
> a First which “is a mere First”? This may seem a trivial question, but it
> is definitely a *semiotic* question, because a word is definitely a sign.
> Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so what we are looking into
> here is the role of degenerate Secondness in triadic relations. I
> approached this topic several years ago in Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*,
> http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention, and though I still have my
> doubts about it, I haven’t come up with any improvements. Regarding a sign,
> even a symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light
> of Peirce’s definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as “First
> Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know what other Peirceans
> think on this issue.
>
> There’s also a connection here with Peirce’s ‘epiphany’ about existential
> graphs in 1906, when he said that:
>
> [[ in all my attempts to classify relations, I have invariably recognized,
> as one great class of relations, the class of *references*, as I have
> called them, where one correlate is an existent, and another is a mere
> possibility; yet whenever I have undertaken to develop the logic of
> relations, I have always left these references out of account,
> notwithstanding their manifest importance, simply because the algebras or
> other forms of diagrammatization which I employed did not seem to afford me
> any means of representing them. I need hardly say that the moment I
> discovered in the *verso* of the sheet of Existential Graphs a
> representation of a universe of possibility, I perceived that a
> *reference* would be represented by a graph which should cross a cut,
> thus subduing a vast field of thought to the governance and control of
> exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ]
>
> But I think this message is long enough already, and I’ll leave commenting
> on the rest of Lowell 3.11 for later.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
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