List - I have a different view of a few concepts referred to in the
last few posts.
1] I consider that 'Degenerate Secondness' - or Secondness
functioning within the mode of Firstness is not a 'dyadic relation'
between the material object of a cat and the word 'cat' . To me,
that's a symbolic relation of two Signs [capital S, therefore, two
triads; one in a material format; the other in a symbolic format; one
is a material object; the other is a conceptual object].. What I
understand as Degenerate Secondness is a distinctive Form - since
Secondness is by definition, a mode of a clear perception of
Otherness - but a distinctive Form in which the focus is not on the
Whole Otherness of that Form but on its own inherent qualities.
As Peirce points out, Secondness as Firstness [degenerate
Secondness] "is the relation of a quality to the matter in which that
quality inheres" 1.527. "the mode of being of the quality is that of
Firstness". So, if one continue with the example of the cat, my view
is that the mode of 2-1 is not the symbolic word, but the 'quality'
of the cat: its softness, its fur, its purr.
Whereas Pure or Genuine Secondness is, as Peirce wrote, "a single
fact about two objects'. It would be the cat as differentiated from
'Not-Cat'; i.e., the chair on which it is sitting.
2] Gary F writes:
" we can say that the quality determines the matter to its
existence. "
I would instead define Secondness not as determined by Firstness but
as defined or determined by the spatial and temporal finiteness of its
qualities. It's the finiteness that I consider crucial to the mode of
Secondness. That's what gives Secondness its characteristic
'bruteness'.
Edwina
On Sat 06/01/18 9:34 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Gary R, I think that’s a good exposition of the “reference”
issues, including some aspects of the matter that I hadn’t thought
of.
This is heartening because I find it difficult to write about these
‘categorial’ issues as they are presented in Lowell 3 —
difficult because they take us back to the very basics of experience
itself, or to the elements of the phenomenon, which is the other side
of the same coin. The deeper we probe into this, the more vast the
implications and the applications, and the harder it is to illustrate
the conceptions with concrete examples, because any example that comes
to mind (like Spike the cat) brings irrelevant or misleading
associations along with it. Also, if the writer thinks about the
reader’s response, he’s apt to say (as Peirce did earlier in
Lowell 3), “ It must be extremely difficult for those who are
untrained to such analyses of conceptions to make any sense of all
this.” But then other readers (on a list like this one) are likely
to feel that they’ve heard it all before and want to skip ahead.
Hence the writer’s despair. But I might as well stumble on
regardless.
Before probing further into Lowell 3.11, and specifically CP 1.536,
I’d like to requote this bit from earlier in Lowell 3:
[[ The secondness of the Second, whichever of the two objects be
called the Second, is different from the Secondness of the first.
That is to say it generally is so. To kill and to be killed are
different. In case there is one of the two which there is good reason
for calling the First, while the other remains the Second, it is that
the Secondness is more accidental to the former than to the latter;
that there is more or less approach to a state of things in which
something, which is itself First, accidentally comes into a
Secondness that does not really modify its Firstness, while its
Second in this Secondness is something whose being is of the nature
of Secondness and which has no Firstness separate from this.… The
extreme kind of Secondness which I have just described is the
relation of a quality to the matter in which that quality inheres.
The mode of being of the quality is that of Firstness. That is to
say, it is a possibility. It is related to the matter accidentally;
and this relation does not change the quality at all, except that it
imparts existence, that is to say, this very relation of inherence,
to it. But the matter, on the other hand, has no being at all except
the being a subject of qualities. This relation of really having
qualities constitutes its existence. But if all its qualities were to
be taken away, and it were to be left quality-less matter, it not only
would not exist, but it would not have any positive definite
possibility — such as an unembodied quality has. It would be
nothing, at all.] (CP 1.527)]
Now, the very word “matter” has common associations that would
make this line of thinking hard to follow. We are often inclined to
think of “matter” as physical stuff, like the clay which an
artisan or artist might shape into a bowl or a sculpture, or like the
clay that God shaped into Adam in one of the Genesis stories. But
clay already has qualities that make it clay. Can we imagine
“quality-less matter” at all? Or an “unembodied quality”? If
not, we can’t imagine a pure First or a pure Second either. Neither
one could exist (as clay can exist) because existence is the “very
relation of inherence” of qualities in matter. So thinking of the
quality as First and the matter as Second, we can say that the
quality determines the matter to its existence.
This is different from another kind of determination which is
involved in a triadic relation. Peirce explains the difference in CP
1.536:
[[ We have here a First, a Second, and a Third. The first is a
Positive Qualitative Possibility, in itself nothing more. The Second
is an Existent thing without any mode of being less than existence,
but determined by that First. A Third has a mode of being which
consists in the Secondnesses that it determines, the mode of being of
a Law, or Concept. Do not confound this with the ideal being of a
quality in itself. A quality is something capable of being completely
embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its character as a law except
by determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have
been. A law is how an endless future must continue to be. ]]
If I read this right, Peirce is saying here that a First can
determine a Second by being embodied here and now, and thus being
accidentally involved in a Secondness while retaining its essential
Firstness as a possibility; but a Third can attain or retain its
essential Thirdness only by continuously determining Secondnesses,
whenever the situation arises that makes this possible.
For me, this has an important bearing on the discussion we were
having last year on the list about the “order of determination”
in semiosis. Also on the question Stephen Rose asked the other day
about what Peirce means by “continuity.” Of course, whole books
have been and are being written on that subject, so I didn’t (and
still don’t) have the nerve to say anything more about it here. But
let’s go on the genuine Thirdness:
[[ Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third
are all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect
to one another they are First, Second, and Third. The First is
Thought in its capacity as mere Possibility; that is, mere Mind
capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The Second is Thought
playing the rôle of a Secondness, or Event. That is, it is of the
general nature of Experience or Information. The Third is Thought in
its rôle as governing Secondness. It brings the Information into the
Mind, or determines the Idea and gives it body. It is informing
thought, or Cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental
human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a
Sign. ] CP 1.537 ]
That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of
Peircean semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: Experience is our only
teacher in science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is
human experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the
psychological or accidental human element” from our comprehension
of the elements of the phenomenon, and specifically of semiosic
phenomena. Nominalists and others will say it can’t be done; Peirce
says “Why not?”
And that’s where I’ll have to leave it for today, though I
don’t suppose I’ve made a dent in the “endless future” of
this inquiry.
Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 5-Jan-18 20:40
Gary f, list,
All of this is very interesting both from the standpoints of
phenomenology and of semiotics (and, it would seem, how they
necessarily involve each other). I don't know whether I have anything
much to add to what you've already written, but first let me see if I
fully grasp your meaning. You wrote:
Gf: [H]ow is this specialized usage [of "Reference"] related to the
ordinary usage of the common noun “reference” rooted in the verb
“refer”? For instance, when I type the term “cat” to refer to
the cat who is curled up on the sofa nearby, is there a dyadic
relation between cat and word which is an instance of Degenerate
Secondness? Spike the cat (to give him his proper name) is certainly
an “existing individual,” and thus a Second, but does the common
noun belong to a different “category of being,” a First which
“is a mere First”? This may seem a trivial question, but it is
definitely asemiotic question, because a word is definitely a sign.
Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so what we are looking
into here is the role of degenerate Secondness in triadic relations.
I approached this topic several years ago in Chapter 7 of Turning
Signs, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention [1], and though I
still have my doubts about it, I haven’t come up with any
improvements. Regarding a sign, even a symbol like “cat,” as a
“First” is not really a problem in the light of Peirce’s
definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as “First
Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know what other
Peirceans think on this issue.
I certainly agree that seeing 'a symbol like “cat,” as a
“First” is not really a problem in the light of Peirce’s
definition of the sign. . . as “First Correlate of a triadic
relation" since from the standpoint of semiotics this is a case of
degenerate 2ns because an actual cat is an Object and the word "cat"
is but a sign. This seems clear enough, fairly obvious, I think. But
getting closer to the heart of the matter, you quoted Peirce:
[[ . . . I always left these references out of account,
notwithstanding their manifest importance, simply because the
algebras or other forms of diagrammatization which I employed did not
seem to afford me any means of representing them. I need hardly say
that the moment I discovered in the verso of the sheet of
Existential Graphs a representation of a universe of possibility, I
perceived that a reference would be represented by a graph which
should cross a cut, thus subduing a vast field of thought to the
governance and control of exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ] (1906)
In one sense the word "cat" is a mere possibility because there is
a "universe of possibility" as regards how the Object, 'cat,' might
be symbolized (e.g. by gatto, chat, Katze, etc.) as well as the name
given to any actual cat, in this case, Spike. Indeed, some actual
cats given one name by one owner are given another name by their next
owner. And there are other 'possibilities' as well.
Can we say that one loses the genuine 2ns of 'cat' unless one
experiences (say, actually looks at, pets, feels the claws of a cat
digging into his flesh, etc.) a real cat, say Spike? That "looking
at" grounds ones cat-reference in actuality==genuine 2ns (not just
facticity==degenerate 2ns). For example, one can imagine a person in
a place where there are no cats and, so, has never seen an actual
cat, but who has read extensively on cats, seen videos of cats, etc.
This person would not really have a 'sense' of catness at all, I
don't believe (I also just recalled those fanciful European visual
depictions of Amerindians in the years just following the 'discovery'
of the New World based on verbal descriptions of First Nation
peoples).
This seems in line with what you wrote in Chapter 7 of your
book,Turning Signs http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention [2]
Gf: The reader of philosophy should be aware that ‘mere
reference’ is only a ‘degenerate Secondness’ (CP 1.535, 1903).
In order to fix her attention on a dynamic object within the sphere
of experience, she must translate an ‘abstractly expressed
proposition into its precise meaning’ – but since she can only do
so by drawing upon her prior experience with the terms translated,
her reading is at risk of getting trapped inside the bubble of
language. ‘All degenerate seconds may be conveniently termed
Internal, in contrast to External seconds, which are constituted by
external fact, and are true actions of one thing upon another’
(EP1:254). Nor is it only abstractions and fantasies which are
subject to this degeneracy: the representation of ‘facts’ in a
‘true’ story is equally degenerate, since it can only refer
symbolically to the dynamic object of the story, the external facts.
The difference between genuine and degenerate Secondness, or external
fact and internal reference, is the difference between living through
an event and imagining or recalling it.
So, if I have grasped you meaning in your comments on the Lowell
segment and your Chapter 7 of Turning Signs, I would tend to
strongly agree with your analysis of the distinction between genuine
and degenerate 2ns.
You closed that stimulating chapter of your book with this
observation and question, one which I'd like to discuss at some point
along the way (perhaps even in a separate thread).
Gf: ‘Experience’ itself is only a word, like other words: how
then do you reach the point where you can judge for yourself whether
experience is your only teacher or not?
Best,
Gary R
On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 5:58 PM, < g...@gnusystems.ca [3]> wrote:
List,
Peirce’s recursive application of the categories seems to reach a
climax with the Firstness of Thirdness here, as he tells us that the
“slight glimpse” into phenomenology given so far in this lecture
is intended “merely to lead up to Thirdness and to the particular
kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of logical
study.”
But before we plunge into that, I’d like to point out a couple of
questions raised by Peirce’s reference here to the term
“reference.” Summarizing his previous remarks, he says that
“genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second
are both true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from
them, while in Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is
a mere First never attaining full Secondness.” He did not use the
term “reference” earlier in this lecture, but he did use it in
the part of the 1903 Syllabus devoted to dyadic relations, CP 3.572:
“The broadest division of dyadic relations is into those which can
only subsist between two subjects of different categories of being
(as between an existing individual and a quality) and those which can
subsist between two subjects of the same category. A relation of the
former kind may advantageously be termed a reference; a relation of
the latter kind, a dyadic relation proper.”
This seems consistent with the identification of “Reference” as
“Degenerate Secondness” — but what is “advantageous” about
using the term “reference” in this way? And how is this
specialized usage related to the ordinary usage of the common noun
“reference” rooted in the verb “refer”? For instance, when I
type the term “cat” to refer to the cat who is curled up on the
sofa nearby, is there a dyadic relation between cat and word which is
an instance of Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give him his
proper name) is certainly an “existing individual,” and thus a
Second, but does the common noun belong to a different “category of
being,” a First which “is a mere First”? This may seem a trivial
question, but it is definitely a semiotic question, because a word is
definitely a sign. Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so
what we are looking into here is the role of degenerate Secondness in
triadic relations. I approached this topic several years ago in
Chapter 7 of Turning Signs, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention
[4], and though I still have my doubts about it, I haven’t come up
with any improvements. Regarding a sign, even a symbol like
“cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light of
Peirce’s definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as
“First Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know
what other Peirceans think on this issue.
There’s also a connection here with Peirce’s ‘epiphany’
about existential graphs in 1906, when he said that:
[[ in all my attempts to classify relations, I have invariably
recognized, as one great class of relations, the class of
references, as I have called them, where one correlate is an
existent, and another is a mere possibility; yet whenever I have
undertaken to develop the logic of relations, I have always left
these references out of account, notwithstanding their manifest
importance, simply because the algebras or other forms of
diagrammatization which I employed did not seem to afford me any
means of representing them. I need hardly say that the moment I
discovered in the verso of the sheet of Existential Graphs a
representation of a universe of possibility, I perceived that a
reference would be represented by a graph which should cross a cut,
thus subduing a vast field of thought to the governance and control
of exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ]
But I think this message is long enough already, and I’ll leave
commenting on the rest of Lowell 3.11 for later.
Gary f.
Links:
------
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention
[2] http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
