Jeff,
Many thanks for this and your other post from yesterday - both are very helpful, to me at least, in rethinking some core semiotic issues. I hope everyone who is following the Lowells is reading them carefully. 1903 was the year that Peirce made some major advances in semeiotics, and with your help I'm beginning to see more clearly how these advances developed out of his earlier work in logic, and how he fine-tuned them in the next few years. In particular, I may have to revise what I wrote in Turning Signs about "genuine and degenerate symbols." Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 9-Jan-18 12:22 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11 Gary F., List, Let me respond to one of the major points you've raised. You say: "This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies to triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the "Logic of Mathematics" (I assume you mean the c.1896 one, subtitled "An Attempt to Develop My Categories From Within"), according to your outline, some triadic relations are more "thoroughly" genuine than others, and your outline seems to be consistent with Lowell 3.11. But there are ambiguities lurking in your last sentence, which says that "thoroughly genuine triadic relations can be distinguished from triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the grounds that the latter [i.e. those not thoroughly genuine] take qualities, objects and/or facts as the first and second correlates--and not thoughts of those things." Lowell 3.11 says that in genuine Thirdness "Thought" can take all three categorial roles (as "mere Idea," as event and as "governing" events). But if we regard the "thought of a thing" as a reference to it, and consider "mere reference" to be a degenerate Secondness as in CP 1.535, then we'd be saying that genuine Thirdness must involve degenerate Secondness, which doesn't seem right. This is the kind of thing that makes it hard to judge whether Peirce's texts are consistent with each other or not - or whether we know what he's talking about or not, when he uses terms like "Thought." As far as I can tell, Peirce often uses the word "reference" in a very broad way. Having said that, I don't see a problem in saying that a genuine thirdness might involve a degenerate secondness. That is, I don't see any problem in saying, for example, that a symbolic argument involves a "mere reference" (e.g., the reference of an iconic, rhematic, qualisign to its ground) as a type of modal dyadic relation. After all, from early on in the lectures leading up to the "New List", Peirce is keen to point out that symbolic arguments involve a triple reference to (1) ground, (2) object and (3) interpretant. For my part, I don't believe that Peirce later rejects this key insight (e.g., as Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy have suggested to me in conversation). When it comes to the triple reference that is part and parcel of a symbolic argument, I think that only the first of the three relations is a "mere reference," because it is the only relation of the three that is based on a representation in the interpretant (i.e., the conclusion of the argument) of the rhematic qualisigns in the propositions that form the premisses standing in relations of similarity to the object. In fact, this very relation of "mere reference" is essential to the validity of some arguments--especially those that are abductive in form. The reason is that these argument rely heavily on the interpreter noting relations of similarity between the qualities that are represented in the predicates that are expressed in the premisses and conclusion of this type of argument. These last rather compressed suggestions are expressed in an attempt to indicate that I take the detailed points Peirce to be making about the kinds of relations that are involved in semiotic processes are not minor--even if I don't understand them very well just yet. Rather, I take them to be central for his explanations of what is essential for the validity of different kinds of arguments, and I'm trying to get a clearer grasp of why these points about the different kinds of relations that are involved are essential parts of the explanations. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 _____ From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > Sent: Tuesday, January 9, 2018 6:59 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11 Jeff, list, This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies to triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the "Logic of Mathematics" (I assume you mean the c.1896 one, subtitled "An Attempt to Develop My Categories From Within"), according to your outline, some triadic relations are more "thoroughly" genuine than others, and your outline seems to be consistent with Lowell 3.11. But there are ambiguities lurking in your last sentence, which says that "thoroughly genuine triadic relations can be distinguished from triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the grounds that the latter [i.e. those not thoughly genuine] take qualities, objects and/or facts as the first and second correlates--and not thoughts of those things." Lowell 3.11 says that in genuine Thirdness "Thought" can take all three categorial roles (as "mere Idea," as event and as "governing" events). But if we regard the "thought of a thing" as a reference to it, and consider "mere reference" to be a degenerate Secondness as in CP 1.535, then we'd be saying that genuine Thirdness must involve degenerate Secondness, which doesn't seem right. This is the kind of thing that makes it hard to judge whether Peirce's texts are consistent with each other or not - or whether we know what he's talking about or not, when he uses terms like "Thought." Another sidelight comes up in this bit from Turning Signs which quotes the Syllabus. (I've been reading "Sundry Logical Conceptions" in parallel with Lowell 3, hoping that they explain each other to some degree.) Here it is: [[ According to <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention> Chapter 7, a genuine symbol is one which actively and experientially connects an idea (or First) with some thing, event or fact (or Second), so that its Interpretant inhabits a more well-informed system. Peirce sometimes says that the symbol, 'defined as a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so interpreted' (EP2:307), is the 'genuine sign,' while the index is 'degenerate' and the icon doubly so (EP2:306). But he also sometimes distinguishes between genuine and degenerate symbols. In any case, the information conveyed by a symbol depends on the involvement of both icons and index in it. A Symbol is a law, or regularity of the indefinite future. Its Interpretant must be of the same description; and so must be also the complete immediate Object, or meaning. But a law necessarily governs, or "is embodied in" individuals, and prescribes some of their qualities. Consequently, a constituent of a Symbol may be an Index, and a constituent may be an Icon. A man walking with a child points his arm up into the air and says, "There is a balloon." The pointing arm is an essential part of the Symbol without which the latter would convey no information. But if the child asks, "What is a balloon," and the man replies, "It is something like a great big soap bubble," he makes the image a part of the Symbol. Thus, while the complete Object of a Symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine Symbol is a Symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate Symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. - Peirce (EP2:274-5) ]] In these matters of genuineness and degeneracy, so far I haven't seen a good reason to abandon my belief that Peirce is consistent with himself (unless he himself says otherwise) and that my glosses on Peirce, like those I'm posting here, are consistent with Peirce. But I also continue to believe in Peirce's fallibility, and even more strongly in my own fallibility. For instance, I'm not sure what to make of Peirce's saying here that the "Object of a Symbol" is "its meaning," since I'd be more likely to say that its Interpretant is its meaning. But I'm posting all this in the hope of further clarification of the nature of semiosis - and not as mere exegesis of Peirce. Gary f.
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