Jeff, list,
To answer your double question at the end, for me your analysis hits pretty close to the 'sweet spot' between the obvious and the dubious, or between the already-known and the incomprehensible. But it's complex enough that I will have to experiment some more with applying it to current readings of Peirce texts. So all I give here is some preliminary comments. Your diagram of dichotomies below is based on the 1896 "Logic of Mathematics" and I haven't looked closely at that for awhile; but at first glance, it's a bit startling to see "chemistry" given as a subdivision of Laws of Psychics (rather than Physics), even if you're only referring to organic chemistry. (or to neurochemistry, even.) I'll have to take a closer look at how "chemistry" is defined in this context. Your third class of genuine triadic relations adheres closely to the Lowell 3 text: "3. Representations: the first correlate is thought playing the role of a first, the second correlate is thought playing the role of a second, and the third correlate is thought playing the role of a third, and the first mediates the relationship between the second and third--and so on in an iterative pattern." But the last part is startling at first because we have a first rather than a third doing the mediation; but as Lowell 3 says, Mediation is a (more or less adequate) name for the Firstness of Thirdness. It is First in respect to the other two correlates, but it is nevertheless Thought, or Thirdness. I remember when Vinicius Romanini pointed out to me that in the manuscript of NDTR, Peirce at first had written that the Sign was the Third correlate of the triadic relation, but then crossed it out and wrote "First" correlate instead. It's confusing because the Firstness of Thirdness is both Firstness and Thirdness, but in different respects. I think your "iterative pattern" idea has the potential to clear up this kind of confusion. I didn't know what you meant by it at first, and I'm still not sure, but it reminds me of a fractal pattern, which of course is generated iteratively - and your "and so on" refers to the process continuing with discrete iterations. And that's about as far as I've taken the idea. I'll have to stop here for now, as the grandson just arrived for a visit and that will make it hard to keep a line of thought on track. I also want to have a closer look at Gary R's post in this thread . not right now though. Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 10-Jan-18 14:19 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11 Gary F, John S, List, all, I'm glad to hear some of the suggestions might have been helpful--at least to Gary F. The same goes for the transcriptions he has been posting of the Lowell Lectures and the thoughtful comments that he, John and many others have been making about the contents of those lectures. Reflecting on the classification of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt..." in light of the essays and lectures written around 1903, including NDDR, NDTR, and the Lowell Lectures, I wanted to venture an interpretative hypothesis about how we might understand his account of the relations that are involved in the different classes of genuine triadic relations that he characterizes. Peirce distinguishes between three main classes of genuine triadic relations. We can separate the three based on what is serving in the place of the first, second and third correlates of such relations. As such, we have: 1. Laws of quality: the first and second correlates are qualities, and the third correlate is a law governing the relations between those qualities (e.g., Newton's laws of color). 2. Laws of fact: the first and second correlates are facts, and the third correlate is a law governing the relations between those facts (e.g., the nomological laws of dynamics, the classificatory laws of chemistry, etc.) 3. Representations: the first correlate is thought playing the role of a first, the second correlate is thought playing the role of a second, and the third correlate is thought playing the role of a third, and the first mediates the relationship between the second and third--and so on in an iterative pattern. Up until now, I've largely thought about these three general classes separately and have tried to understand each on its own terms. Given the complexities involved in his account of the different classes of triadic relations involved in the laws of fact, it has been difficult to get a clear sense of what Peirce is drawing on as a basis for the classificatory system. Here is a diagram of part of the classification that he provides for genuine triadic relations under the laws of fact in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt...". Looking back at "A Guess at the Riddle" and the drafts that formed lecture 7 in the 1898 Lowell Lectures, I'm beginning to see a pattern that was not obvious to me before our recent discussion of the 1903 Lowell Lectures. The general idea is straightforward enough. If we focus our attention on the classes of genuine triadic relations involved in the laws of fact that govern contingent connections between substances, then I see the following pattern as we move from (a) the nomological laws of dynamics through (b) the laws of chemistry to (c) the law of psychics and (d) up to the law of mind, then we can understand the classes in terms of the character of the three correlates. a) In the case of the laws of dynamics, the law is a necessary rule that serves as the third correlate, and it governs the relations between brute facts that serve as the first and second. b) In the case of the laws of organic chemistry, the law has the character of a general habit, and it governs the relations between brute facts and general facts that serve as the first and second correlates c) In the case of the law of psychics, the third correlate has the character of a general habit, and it governs the relations between general facts and other habits as the first and second correlates. d) in the case of the law of mind, the third correlate has the character of a general habit, and it governs the relations between general habits as the first and second correlates. As such, I am trying to establish a pattern in which the "general rule" that functions as the third correlate goes from a necessary law to a growing habit, and the first and second correlates go from brute facts to general facts to habits. If this is a coherent explanation of the general pattern, then let me add the following complications. First, each of the three correlates can be considered as having various components. That is, general facts involve brute facts which, in turn, involve qualitative facts. Second, the various relations involved can be organized around three strata as layers of possibles, existents, and necessitants. This was a key suggestion that Peirce makes in his discussion of sign relations, and I'm exploring the idea that it can be fruitfully applied to all genuine triadic relations. In this fashion, I think we can apply the idea that some correlates are determined by other correlates in a particular kind of pattern. If this is on the right track, then I think it provides a pattern that naturally fits with his account of representations as thoroughly genuine triadic relations. Here are two questions: i) Does any of this make sense as an interpretation of Peirce's classification of genuine triadic relations in these essays and lectures written between 1896-1903--focusing on the kinds of correlates that are involved? ii) If it does, then was the general idea already obvious to others? --Jeff
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