Hi kirsti, list,
You said, Can you now just see what my aim now is? .. As such it always remains vague. But Peirce also said things like, I have worked out the logic of vagueness with something like completeness.. So then, where is it, who possesses it, and how shall we know it? Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy — it does not exist.. To which I would say Peirce would say, *'**This* - is now my way: where is yours?' answered those who asked me 'the way'. And to those who say For the way - does not exist!' I would say Peirce would say, *There* it is! *There*, do you see it? *There* is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, and brings them into relationship. Do you not see it, the rainbow and the bridges of the overman? With best wishes, Jerry R On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 4:07 PM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: > Jerry, list, > > CSP wrote: the meaning of anything lies in what it aims at. - This what > teleology is about. > > The problem lies in that we cannot just just look and see what the aims > are. - Can you now just see what my aim now is? - You may and most probably > do have thoughts and opinions on the issue, but how about finding out > whether they are true about this particular case? > > Putnam quote takes up only one side of the issue of finding out. Also the > other side, that of loosing one's way, finding oneself utterly confused, > loosing one's foothold etc. > > Reading Aristotle often does that. So does reading CSP, or Hegel etc.. > Wittgenstein even made it kind of his aim. > > CSP was quite clear in his critique of relying on the method of authority > only. But it is very often gone unnoticed that he did not just condemn it. > His advice was to try (whatever) out first, as best one can. And only if > one can find independent proof, not just once but repeatedly, THEN accept > some (or much) authority to the writer in question. > > These belong to the basics of scientific proof by empirical testing. No > results of a single experiment proves anything. There always has to be a > series of expreriments. > > Along with the common belief that single words carry a meaning which > simply can be defined (which does not fit with the just as common agreement > that all meanings are contextual), there goes the belief that scientific > facts are provided by results of any single empirical experiment. > > All and any empirical experiments may have methodical faults. Which may > undermine the results. - This is much more often the case than is commonly > believed. - CSP knew that very well. Having thoroughly explored the very > idea of probablity and its consequences. > > He also explicitely wrote that he does not wish to be a shepherd followed > by a pack of lambs. That he wished all and everyone to try out oneself. He > advised NOT TO BELIEVE just BECAUSE HE SAID so and so. > > So, you are quite right in questioning all BECAUSE types of grounds. > > It may be easy to read Aristotle, but it is not definitely not easy to > understand what he meant. Disputes on that have no end. > > I've had long discussions with most expert Aristotelians in Finland on > some issues. (The major works by Aristotle were translated into Finnish. A > huge project, a huge investment in our scale.) > > On the issue of ultimate aim the answer by CSP was very clear, oftentimes > repeated in various wordings. On this issue he said that, like THE TRUTH, > it cannot be known, but only foreseen as kinds of schetches. - All aims, > by their natur AS aims point at the future, and the future is never yet > here. As such it always remains vague. > > If there is no future, there cannot be any aims. But if there is no future > (the cosmos collapses ot so), there are no us to ponder about it. > > We humans just have to live with this. Faring as well and best as we can. > > Best, Kirsti > > P.S. I do not put refererences to CSP's writings in my contributions to > the list, because anyone nowadays can find those by making an internet > search, just by combining some key words. - Let's have machines do what > they can do, and leave us humans to do what the machines cannot do. > > Sorry for typos, but I do not have time or energy to look this over. Those > who are interested in what I aim to convey, will look beyond trivialities. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 3.1.2018 22:17: > >> Dear gary, list, >> >> If what Gary adds of John about Putnam is true, >> >> “I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle: >> >> >> "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has >> also become clearer." >> >> I would make that same comment about Peirce.” >> >> Then is it obvious to you that Peirce and Aristotle (among others) are >> talking about one great big thing that has relation to several similar >> things? >> >> it seems to me that the logician ought to recognize what our ultimate >> aim is. >> >> .. it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed >> the Supreme Good. >> >> Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great >> practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better >> enable us to attain our proper object, like archers having a target to >> aim at? >> >> If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events >> in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the >> sciences or faculties it is the object. >> >> That is, if nothing is complete which has no end and only one thing is >> the ultimate aim, >> >> then why do I find it so bizarre to justify our actions with: >> >> _ _ >> >> _because_ Peirce.. >> >> _because_ Aristotle.. >> >> _because_ ultimate aim? >> >> I would greatly appreciate someone explaining this joke to me so that >> I may >> >> _redirect my attention to the subject_, >> >> recognize that it is clear it has a reality, in _some_ mode of being, >> >> which is independent of what anyone thinks about it, >> >> “become clearer” and lead to a modification of those habits >> >> 3. Aristotle. Have read and thought more about Aristotle than about >> any other man. >> >> Best, >> Jerry R >> >> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 6:47 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >> John Sowa wrote, >>> >>> “I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about >>> Aristotle: "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that >>> Aristotle has also become clearer." >>> >>> I would make that same comment about Peirce.” >>> >>> Amen to that! And if I may clarify more minutely: >>> >>> Becoming clearer about a _subject_ begins with assuming — >>> provisionally at least — that it has a reality, in _some_ mode of >>> being, which is independent of what anyone thinks about it. This >>> reality involves the _possibility_ of perceiving the real difference >>> between true and false thoughts about it. >>> >>> Finding that Peirce has become clearer _about that subject_ means >>> perceiving the _real relations_ between its reality and Peirce’s >>> actual words about it. The reality _of those relations_ consists in >>> the fact that they are what they are independently of what anyone >>> thinks about them. But the increase in clarity which I find in >>> Peirce is a result of _my thoughts_ about the real subject coming >>> into greater conformity with _Peirce’s actual words_ about it. >>> >>> This clarity may turn out (upon further study of both the subject >>> and Peirce’s words) to be an illusion. But in any case, it results >>> from Peirce’s actual words _redirecting my attention to the >>> subject_, to some extent. Only in this way can my thoughts about the >>> >>> subject (or about Peirce’s thoughts) gain a measure of >>> independence from my own previous habits of language usage (or of >>> reading Peirce). To me, “becoming clearer” refers to a >>> modification of those habits. >>> >>> I know, it’s like explaining a joke, which takes all the fun out >>> of it. But what could be more Peircean? >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] >>> Sent: 3-Jan-18 03:04 >>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic >>> >>> On 1/1/2018 7:07 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote: >>> >>> I am quite sure Peirce felt rationally necessitated to be of the >>>> >>> >>> opinion that it is not allowed to favor his suggestions after they >>>> >>> pop >>> >>> up only on the basis that they are written by him. >>>> >>> >>> I agree. But Peirce would also insist that readers should make a >>> clear distinction between his exact words and anybody else's >>> interpretation. Note how strongly he objected to the version of >>> pragmatism by William James. He even replaced the word 'pragmatism' >>> with 'pragmaticism' to avoid any confusion. >>> >>> As I said in my note about ways of studying Peirce, the first is >>> trying to determine exactly what he said. But there may be 5, 7, or >>> indefinitely (infinitely?) many ways of interpreting, building on, >>> using, and extending his work. >>> >>> Filling in gaps tentatively due to inaccessible manuscripts offers >>>> >>> a >>> >>> chance to check our understanding at some future time, as well of >>>> >>> the >>> >>> text as of the object the text tries to understand. >>>> >>> >>> Yes, of course. There has been a century of developments that >>> Peirce could not have known. Even for those subjects he knew very >>> well, he did not provide an exhaustive analysis of every detail. We >>> must fill in those gaps, but we also have to be clear about the >>> sources. >>> >>> And by the way, I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made >>> about Aristotle: "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find >>> that Aristotle has also become clearer." >>> >>> I would make that same comment about Peirce. >>> >>> John >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] . >>> >> >> >> >> Links: >> ------ >> [1] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> > >
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