John: In For a six-page review of these issues with references, > see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf <http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf> > .
You wrote: Peirce considered three universes: actualities, possibilities, and the necessitated. He subdivided each universe in four ways to define 12 modes. In the universe of possibilities, for example, he distinguished objective possibility (an alethic mode), subjective possibility (epistemic), social possibility (deontic), and an interrogative mode, which corresponds to scientific inquiry by hypothesis and experiment. For the necessitated, he called the four subdivisions the rationally necessitated, the compelled, the commanded, and the determined. Most of his writings on these topics were unpublished, and he changed his terminology from one manuscript to the next. Peirce admitted that a complete analysis and classification would be “a labor for generations of analysts, not for one” (MS 478:165). It provides the subdivisions of two of the three universes. Can you provide the names of the four subdivisions of the universe of actualities? Thank you Happy New Year to All! Cheers Jerry > On Dec 31, 2017, at 9:04 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > Historical note: Aristotle claimed that necessity and possibility > are determined by the laws of nature. Leibniz introduced possible > worlds with necessity as truth in all possible worlds, and > possibility as truth in at least one. > > Carnap was a strict nominalist who followed Mach in claiming > that the laws of science are *nothing but* summaries of > observable data. He even considered *truth* to be outside > the realm of "scientific" method. But Tarski's model theory > convinced him that truth could be defined in observable terms. > Carnap later (1947) combined Leibniz and Tarski. > > Hintikka introduced "model sets", which consisted of sets > of propositions that are true of the possible worlds. He also > introduced an alternativity relation among model sets. > > Kripke went back to sets of worlds and related the accessibility > relation (identical to Hintikka's alternativity) to the axioms > for modality that C. I. Lewis had introduced. > > Nominalists preferred sets of worlds to sets of sets of propositions. > But Quine would not accept modality with either version. > > But in 1973, Michael Dunn introduced a beautiful solution > that Peirce would love, but the nominalists would hate: > treat each possible world as a pair (facts, laws). > > For a six-page review of these issues with references, > see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf <http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf> > . > > For more detail (26 pages), see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf > <http://jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf> .
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