Jon, list, Thanks for your good wishes regarding my cataract surgery. As I noted earlier, I've pretty much run out of time before the Friday surgery and wanted to respond not only to you and Gary f, which I was able to do a few times recently, but I also wanted to respond to Jeff as I hadn't had that opportunity until today. So that's why I haven't been able, until now, to respond to your most recent post. I had to cancel a dental appt. today, which gave me a little more unexpected time to comment.
You wrote: "My main request was to identify the Signs that correspond to the Immediate Objects that you posited. My understanding of the triadic nature of semiosis is such that something *cannot *be an Immediate Object unless it serves as such *within *a particular Sign." To which I'd add that Peirce holds that both the immediate object and the emotional interpretant are "*subjective*." "In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both, too, appertain to all signs without exception." (EP 2:410; 1907) JS: "Socrates" and "vase" are indeed both Rhemes, but taking Bellucci's clue as I have applied it to the statue, their Immediate Objects as used in these examples correspond to different quantifications--"Socrates" is singular (Designative), while "vase" is general (Collective). GR: Firstly, I see no reason to take "Bellucci's clue," and there is much else I do not agree with in his interpretation. Secondly, you seem to leap to a wholly abstract way of analyzing *my* semiosic experience so that for you my 'vase' cannot be 'this vase' that I perceive and make an immediate object in my inner semiosis. It may be the case that at the moment of recognition of the vase *qua* vase that I unconsciously (via memory) take it to be an example of that Collective (general) 'vase'despite its bizarre shape, but it is *this* vase that is the dynamic object of my subjective immediate object. JS: Furthermore, I still maintain that when the Athenian says "Socrates" to himself, what he is *really *saying to himself is "that is Socrates"; i.e., he is making a perceptual judgment, either presenting (as hypothesis) or asserting (as fact) a proposition. It seems to me that only the vague thought of (absent) Socrates as generated by the imagination could be a true Rheme. GR: And I continue to disagree with you. Again, you seem to me to leap to *assertions* and *propositions* which, as I see it in the case of the example of the Athenian, would happen *de post facto*. I don't at all see why you find this logicizing essential and necessary to an individual's subjective semiosis. Closely connected to this, at times it seems to me almost as if you don't truly accept that there are real signs with immediate objects lower in the classification (although you've stated that you agree with all those quotes I gave where Peirce says or infers that all signs must have immediate object, even in order to be a sign, and analyze the Soldier Statue example *as* a Qualisign). Your example of "the vague thought of (absent) Socrates" almost confirms this for me. In short, what you're doing seems to me logical analysis after the fact of the subjective "experience" of the sign, rather ignoring EP2:410 above. So, perhaps we both need to further reflect on what Peirce means by saying that the immediate object is *within the sign* (rather than without, as the dynamic object is). GR: As I've already written more than I intended, I'll only briefly comment within your comments on the Common Soldier statue, relating it to my vase example where possible. You wrote: JS: As I noted previously, Peirce gave the somewhat surprising example of a statue of a common soldier in a town square as a Descriptive Potisign (Qualisign). Here is what he said about it. CSP: ... in the middle of this will be a stone statue, often of granite, representing a common soldier standing in his regulation overcoat and resting on his grounded musket. Nothing imaginable could be more devoid of imagination, less idealized, less artistically beautiful. They are eyesores to all cultivated people; but not to me. For I know that that means that almost every family in that place,—vulgar people. . . The very fact of their vulgarity, which the statue proclaims above all else, makes this universal self-sacrifice on the altar of the abstraction which we call the "general government" pathetically sublime. To each such family, that very realistic statue represents the mourned one who fell in the war. That statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is what we call a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many singulars. It is not *itself *General: it is its Object which is taken to be General. And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of implying a truth of the kind of "Any S is P"; it only expresses "Some S is P." This makes it *not *a //*Copulant/Copulative*// but only a *Descriptive*. This needs to be borne in mind. (EP 2:486; 1908) JS: The Dynamic Object of the statue is *general **[it is general because it is "representing a common soldier," whereas my vase in the unfamiliar room is a particular vase GR]* presumably the collection (or continuum?) of soldiers who fell in the Civil War* [but my vase doesn't represent vases in general, but is a unique example of one (and peculiar in its shape, etc. in my example), recognized by me (through my memory, etc.) as a vase (and that's the sum of the generality in it]*; so the Sign *[the statue, its DO representing something common, and *not* a unique DO as in the case of my vase]* is a Collective (he introduced this term later). However, its Immediate Object is *vague **[where, btw, do you *locate* this immediate object? Subjectively in that someone is observing it? If not, where? ]*, so the Sign is a Descriptive *[my immediate object is *not* vague, but is of *this* unique and peculiar vase--which, btw, may turn out *not* to be a vase at all, but a piece of sculpture]*; Peirce even said that it expresses a *particular *proposition (not a *universal *one) *[and I maintain that my vase expresses no proposition whatsoever, although you disagree]*, consistent with Bellucci's hypothesis [this statue is *loaded* with meaning; my vase is not]. But this entails that the statue, as a Sign, *must *be a Qualisign [do you mean that it* involves* a Qualisign? It seems to me that what is Qualisignific here would entail not one, but several Qualisigns], and thus an Icon and a Rheme; as such, it *cannot *be a proposition. Yet obviously it is *embodied *as a Sinsign, as all Qualisigns (and Legisigns) *must *be, and a Sinsign *can *be a Dicisign. Does the statue, as an embodied Qualisign, turn out to be a Dicent Sinsign of a peculiar kind? If so, what are S and P in the particular proposition that it expresses? *[I don't see at all why you are emphasizing what is Qualisignic about it.]* While it's kind of 'fun', I can't say that I find this kind of meta- on top of meta-analysis, heavy with problematic terminology, very helpful. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 1:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Best wishes on your upcoming procedure. I must admit to being > disappointed not to receive more feedback from you on my last couple of > posts, especially regarding my analysis of Peirce's statue example. > > "Socrates" and "vase" are indeed both Rhemes, but taking Bellucci's clue > as I have applied it to the statue, their Immediate Objects as used in > these examples correspond to different quantifications--"Socrates" is > singular (Designative), while "vase" is general (Collective). Furthermore, > I still maintain that when the Athenian says "Socrates" to himself, what he > is *really *saying to himself is "that is Socrates"; i.e., he is making a > perceptual judgment, either presenting (as hypothesis) or asserting (as > fact) a proposition. It seems to me that only the vague thought of > (absent) Socrates as generated by the imagination could be a true Rheme. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:59 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Jeff, Gary f, Jon S, list, >> >> Thanks for clarifying your position, Jeff. You wrote: >> >> JD: Turning to the substantive questions about immediate objects, I would >> hesitate to read too much into CP 4.583 about the nature of the >> immediate object and its possible bearing on icons such as qualisigns for >> the simple reason that the EG are designed as a tool for the logical >> analysis of symbols expressed in propositions that function as premisses >> and conclusions of arguments. As such, the EG may not be the best tool for >> shedding light on the character of qualisigns and the relations they bear >> to their objects and interpretants. >> >> >> I agree and have already commented on CP. 4.583 in this thread. >> >> Jeff also wrote: >> >> JD: . . .my initial impression after reading Bellucci's claims about the >> immediate object in his essays was--"that can't be right." It is a view >> that runs counter to the way I've been interpreting the classification of >> signs based on the manner of presentation of the immediate object. >> >> >> I think something similar to your comment on EG above may be said of >> Peirce's classification of signs. Although Peirce's writes voluminously of >> the various classes of signs (which writings I assume you're referring to >> above), I see the diagram of the 10-fold classification of signs as but an >> analytical tool, one which maximally abstracts each sign class and relates >> them to each other, a springboard for all sorts of experiments and >> analyses. Yet It seems to me that if we cleave too closely to these ten >> abstractions of sign classes that it is possible that we'll miss the* >> living character* of these several sign classes in actual semiosis such >> that, for example we begin to think along the wholly abstract and really >> reductive lines of: >> >> Rheme: "_ is" or Proposition: "_ is _" >> >> There is certainly a place for this kind of analysis in logic (e.g., in >> preparing for work in EG), and Peirce's own most abstract analyses (not to >> mention, say, Aristotle's) probably contribute to this extremely >> abstractive tendency. So, in the context of the 10-fold diagram, he gives >> as an example of a rheme a common noun (although elsewhere he >> quasi-necessarily includes proper nouns, singular nouns). >> >> With this in mind it is seems quite logical for Jon S to have written >> that (in consideration of one of my thought experiments) that it seemed to >> him "that the mere rheme, "vase," has no *particular *vase as its >> Dynamic Object, but a continuum of *possible *vases." >> >> I would tend to strongly disagree. Yes, the continuum of all *men* are >> mortal, but 'Socrates' is the particular man in a famous syllogism. And >> while he was living it seems altogether likely that a fellow Athenian >> seeing him just enter the Acropolis might say to himself, "Socrates" and >> not have any proposition in mind at all (although later we might analyzed >> this as *meaning*, upon reflection and in the flow of thought, "there is >> Socrates"). And *that*, I held in consideration of my thought >> experiment, would be a rheme in the, shall we say, *living sense *of the >> idea sign class 'rheme' in an actual semiosis. >> >> Now it is true that in EG that a rheme can only be analyzed as a part of >> a proposition--but that's "in EG," not in vital semiosis (and it is my >> personal experiments which lead me to a sense that one can 'experience' a >> rheme not in a proposition--so Jon and I will have to agree to disagree on >> this--although a proposition will most surely quickly follow that, shall we >> say, *pure rhematic moment*). If this is so, then something like this >> would seem to be the case for other sign classes (e.g, class three: >> rhematic iconic sinsign (the example Peirce gives is "a spontaneous >> cry"--there doesn't seem to me anything propositional there: the child >> cries out in pain) >> >> I doubt that we'll ever come to full agree on some points of Peirce's >> terminology, certainly not in this forum. Indeed, several of us on the list >> seem to be questioning ourselves--let alone others!--on their choice of >> terminology and what they take various terms to mean, including the context >> in which they are being employed. While I consider these sorts of >> discussions not only interesting but important, their locus is principally >> in the first and second branches of semiotic, not much in the third and >> final branch, theoretical rhetoric, where one finds Peirce's theory of >> inquiry, *perhaps *a theory of learning (in the logical, not >> psychological sense), and, of course, his pragmatism. I think that I need >> to spend some time now in considerations related to this final branch of >> semeiotic, especially since, it seems to me, that our discussions of the >> past couple of years have tended to center on theoretical grammar and >> critic such that I, at least, feel the need to return to a more (for me) >> balanced consideration of Peirce's logic as a whole and other important >> facets of his work. >> >> So, and especially as I'm about to have a second cataract operation this >> Friday and have much to do before hand, and will be visually challenged for >> a few days after, I've decided to drop out of this thread. Perhaps I am >> currently less interested in the first two branches of logic, while it is >> surely possible that my semeiotic terminology--for principal recent >> example, in my recent thought experiments--could use some fine tuning (some >> here might think, "To say the least!") so no doubt I'll get back to formal >> grammar and critic. But I think that it's time for me to return to my >> current principal interests, viz., phenomenology, pragmaticism, and >> classification of sciences. In February I hope to introduce a topic in >> pragmatism that I've been drafting a message regarding for a while now. >> (I'll be reading responses to this post--if any--but this will be my last >> message for about a week at least.) >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >> >> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> >>> Hello, >>> >>> Just to be clear about my own views, my initial impression after reading >>> Bellucci's claims about the immediate object in his essays was--"that can't >>> be right." It is a view that runs counter to the way I've been interpreting >>> the classification of signs based on the manner of presentation of the >>> immediate object. >>> >>> Having said that, my own views are vague and confused in a number of >>> respects. As such, I look to interpretations that are different from my >>> own--especially by those who are engaged actively in the research and have >>> given the matter considerable thought--as a source of challenge and >>> possible light. >>> >>> Turning to the substantive questions about immediate objects, I would >>> hesitate to read too much into CP 4.583 about the nature of the >>> immediate object and its possible bearing on icons such as qualisigns for >>> the simple reason that the EG are designed as a tool for the logical >>> analysis of symbols expressed in propositions that function as premisses >>> and conclusions of arguments. As such, the EG may not be the best tool for >>> shedding light on the character of qualisigns and the relations they bear >>> to their objects and interpretants. >>> >>> --Jeff >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> >>> >>
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