Jerry, list, Would you please explain why you posted this to the list, especially in this thread. I cannot see what pertinence it has to the discussion of quasi-minds?
Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 6:07 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear list, > > > > I wish to share this article, which I take to be topical given our > incomplete understanding of Quasi-minds: > > > > *We worked in a group of three where one played the part of a scoundrel, > the other one was a hero, and the third one kept a neutral position..* > > > > *He said he hated the work..* > > *The world in those comments was divided into black and white.. * > > *praised.. criticized.. That was the principle of the work..* > > > > *The posts and comments are made to form the opinion of Russian citizens > regarding certain issues, and as we see it works for other countries, too..* > > > > *The most important principle of the work is to have an account like a > real person..* > > > > *These technologies are unbelievably effective..* > > > > *She added that she learned how effective the troll farm's work was when > she saw regular people sharing opinions and information that she knew were > planted by trolls.* > > *"They believed it was their own thoughts, but I saw that those thoughts > were formed by the propagandists," she said.* > > http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-russian- > troll-factory-20180219-story.html > > > > *He begins in Letter 13 by affirming that “a third basic drive which could > mediate the other two is an absolutely unthinkable concept”; * > > > > *Or, finally, there must exist a power which comes between mind and matter > and unites the two… Is such a thing conceivable? Certainly not! * > > > > *~* "Aesthetic" for Schiller and Peirce: A Neglected Origin of Pragmatism > > Jeffrey Barnou, *Journal of the History of Ideas* > > > > Hth, > Jerry R > > > On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> List: >> >> I found three more potentially relevant quotes in an alternate draft of >> "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (R 193, NEM 4:313-330; 1906). >> It was a bit of a challenge to ascertain how much of the context I should >> include in each case, so please let me know off-List if you would like to >> see anything that comes right before or after any of these excerpts. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> >> 8. Now let us see how the Diagram entrains its consequence. The Diagram >> sufficiently partakes of the percussivity of a Percept to determine, as its >> Dynamic, or Middle, Interpretant, a state [of] activity in the Interpreter, >> mingled with curiosity. As usual, this mixture leads to Experimentation. It >> is the normal Logical effect; that is to say, it not only happens in the >> cortex of the human brain, but must plainly happen in every Quasi-mind in >> which Signs of all kinds have a vitality of their own. (NEM 4:318). >> >> >> 9. The System of Existential Graphs the development of which has only >> been begun by a solitary student, furnishes already the best diagram of the >> contents of the logical Quasi-mind that has ever yet been found and >> promises much future perfectionment. Let us call the collective whole of >> all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the >> *Phaneron*. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside >> Thought proper) will be a Consistituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being >> itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better >> method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of >> Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. (NEM 4:320) >> >> >> 10. Logic requires great subtlety of thought, throughout; and especially >> in distinguishing those characters which belong to the diagram with which >> one works, but which are not significant features of it considered as the >> Diagram it is taken for, from those that testify as to the Form >> represented. For not only may a Diagram have features that are not >> significant at all, such as its being drawn upon ''laid'' or upon ''wove" >> paper; not only may it have features that are significant but are not >> diagrammatically so; but one and the same construction may be, when >> regarded in two different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that >> to which it testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as >> testifying to in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential >> Graph of a Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical >> Universe, as it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that >> *account, be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It >> is like a telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which >> the instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the >> objective lens. (NEM 4:324) >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 9:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> List: >>> >>> Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my >>> own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the >>> mix. The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" >>> (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly >>> after it. The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the >>> Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and >>> provides the context for, Gary's second selection. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> >>> 1. I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, >>> the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the >>> Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a >>> Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536) >>> >>> >>> 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical, >>> and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because >>> considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and >>> because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so, >>> partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these >>> causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest >>> and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The >>> Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other >>> Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our >>> Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in >>> another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of >>> all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so >>> connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be >>> Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*. (CP 4.550) >>> >>> >>> 3. The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which >>> thereby becomes the *Quasi-mind* in which the Graphist and Interpreter >>> are at one, being a Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest >>> Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly >>> taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of >>> their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the *Phemic Sheet*, upon >>> which signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in >>> any manner (even though they be incised) *can *be erased. (CP 4.553) >>> >>> >>> 4. Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that >>> is, are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the >>> answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any >>> rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general >>> nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389) >>> >>> >>> 5. A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the >>> function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of >>> a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other >>> respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and >>> the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it >>> has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object >>> itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a >>> wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning, one knows what information or >>> suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what >>> words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed in words, when >>> in fact it was only conveyed in tones or in facial expressions. >>> >>> It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for >>> if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human >>> mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only >>> after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the >>> sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a >>> determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding >>> that determination as the sign. So, then, it is a determination that really >>> acts upon that of which it is a determination, although *genuine* >>> action is of one thing on another. This perplexes us, and an example of an >>> analogous phenomenon will do good service here. Metaphysics has been said >>> contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but >>> logical and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments. >>> For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion >>> without a peel. >>> >>> Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of >>> bottles which are in intricate connexion by tubes filled with the liquid. >>> This liquid is of complex and somewhat unstable mixed chemical composition. >>> It also has so strong a cohesion and consequent surface-tension that the >>> contents of each bottle take on a self-determined form. Accident may cause >>> one or another kind of decomposition to start at a point of one bottle >>> producing a molecule of peculiar form, and this action may spread through a >>> tube to another bottle. This new molecule will be a determination of the >>> contents of the first bottle which will thus act upon the contents of the >>> second bottle by continuity. The new molecule produced by decomposition may >>> then act chemically upon the original contents or upon some molecule >>> produced by some other kind of decomposition, and thus we shall have a >>> determination of the contents that actively operates upon that of which it >>> is a determination, including another determination of the same subject. >>> (EP 2:391-392) >>> >>> >>> 6. For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium >>> for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that >>> anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common >>> quality of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that >>> there should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds*, meaning things >>> capable of varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated. >>> >>> As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its >>> Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In >>> its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its >>> correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, >>> the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the >>> Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant without >>> being itself thereby affected. >>> >>> But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is >>> communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a >>> Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the >>> Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must >>> thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not >>> necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different >>> thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a Form >>> consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given >>> circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object, >>> entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or >>> following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is >>> literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be >>> embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, >>> in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the >>> Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under >>> favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22) >>> >>> >>> 7. Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which >>> its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and >>> we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the >>> present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of >>> itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well >>> suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a >>> second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are >>> tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a >>> sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we >>> call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes ... >>> >>> Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action >>> upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its >>> outlines becoming more indefinite. >>> >>> On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by >>> its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new >>> signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already >>> had, but which had lain dormant. >>> >>> In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the >>> kind we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua >>> sponte* but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth. >>> >>> Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of >>> Existential Graphs ... >>> >>> This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be >>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of >>> susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as >>> events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its >>> rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (EP >>> 2:545n25) >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Edwina, Jon S., list, >>>> >>>> OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on >>>> Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until sometime >>>> next week. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551 >>>> >>>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and >>>> one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the >>>> shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that >>>> unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic >>>> nominalism akin to Fichte’s. Not only is thought in the organic world, but >>>> it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances >>>> embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give >>>> “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within >>>> our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it >>>> may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs >>>> require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a >>>> *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one >>>> mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign >>>> they are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of >>>> human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of >>>> thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I >>>> admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It >>>> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this >>>> fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume - >>>> and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is >>>> only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of >>>> diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it >>>> be incorrect, the utmost *certain* effect will be a danger that our >>>> system may not represent every variety of non-human thought. >>>> 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 283:118 [variant] >>>> >>>> … quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be >>>> examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of >>>> susceptibility to determination. >>>> 1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195 >>>> >>>> I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I >>>> will try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I >>>> mean this in the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would >>>> remain what they are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were >>>> right or true. But a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be >>>> embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is >>>> necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the >>>> better considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as >>>> every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds >>>> must be a determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a >>>> sign, a determinable sign. >>>> >>>> >>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>> >>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>> *Communication Studies* >>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >>>> >>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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