Jon, Yes, that’s what I see as a problem, that you regard “perfect Sign” and “Quasi-mind” as synonyms. “Quasi-mind” is an intentionally vague term, meaning “something of the general nature of a mind” (MS 283). “Perfect Sign,” on the other hand, is a very definite and distinctive kind of sign, one that “involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself.” Surely there must be signs, and quasi-minds, which are not perfect in this respect, but are determinable by other signs. Where does Peirce say, or imply, that a quasi-mind necessarily “involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself”?
Regarding “perfect sign” and “quasi-mind” as synonyms prompts you to assign the attributes of perfect signs to all quasi-minds. I don’t see Peirce doing this, and that is where I see you suggesting that “quasi-mind” is a more specific term than “mind.” Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 19-Feb-18 09:04 Gary F., List: I agree that "'quasi-mind' is a broader, more general term than 'mind,'" and that "a human mind is one kind of quasi-mind, not the other way round." Where do you see me suggesting otherwise? My reading of EP 2:545n25, taken as a whole, is that "perfect Sign" and "Quasi-mind" are synonyms.
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