Edwina, List:

Responding to your second message first ...

   1. A (logical) Quasi-mind does not necessarily correspond to a person;
   it might instead be a bird, a hive of bees, a group of crystals, or a
   Phemic Sheet.
   2. As I stated, a Sign is "a Medium for the communication of a Form"; I
   am deliberately avoiding the word "Representamen," because Peirce only used
   it as a generalization or synonym of "Sign."
   3. This particular example only concerns semiosis in which all DIs are
   further Signs, not feelings or exertions.
   4. Signs X, Y, and Z all have the *same *DO; Sign X is internal to
   Quasi-mind A, Sign Z is internal to Quasi-mind B, and Sign Y is external if
   these are two "separate" Quasi-minds.

Furthermore, each IO and II is internal to a *Sign*, not internal to a
person (or Quasi-mind); and "existence" is not coextensive with "objective
reality," since a DO can be a Possible or a Necessitant, not just an
Existent.  All of this is "basic Peirce" on my reading; please do not
impose your terminology on my posts, since we both know that many of your
definitions are quite different from mine.  If you cannot set aside your
own model of semiosis in order to evaluate the alternative that I am
proposing, then further dialogue between us will almost certainly be
fruitless.

This thread is intended to be an *inquiry *for which I am seeking the
assistance of the List community.  I am by no means "asserting that the IO
and II are the same," only *tentatively suggesting* that one Sign's II is
the subsequent Sign's IO.   If this is correct--and I am still very much
open to being *persuaded *that it is not--then the change in information
("mediation and transformation") occurs during the *transmission *of the
Sign from one Quasi-mind to another.  The Form that Sign Y *signifies *(IO)
is not identical to the Form that Sign Y *communicates *(II), which is
precisely why its DI (Sign Z) is not identical to Sign Y itself.

I have been experimenting with some speculative diagrams of semiosis.
Attached is one that attempts to illustrate the example that I verbally
described.  The DO initiates a *continuum *of Signs that (ideally and
ultimately) *would *terminate in the FI.  Each Sign *actually *determines
the subsequent Sign that is its DI, at least in part by determining its own
II that serves as the next Sign's IO.  This is an analytical snapshot of
one intermediate stage in the process, analogous to a marked point on a
continuous line--the instance when Quasi-mind A utters Sign Y to Quasi-mind
B.

Of course, the diagram does not and cannot capture everything.  For
example, missing are all of the *other *Signs that have previously
determined each Quasi-mind, and therefore affect how each one interprets *these
*Signs--another reason why Signs X, Y, and Z are not identical.  In
addition, this model appears to require that the II determines the DI,
which determines the FI; and although this strikes me as the correct *temporal
*sequence of the three Interpretants, my recent contemplation of them has
led me to suspect that it might not be the correct *logical* sequence when
ordering the corresponding trichotomies for Sign classification.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 11:51 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:

> Jon, list - I'll try again
>
> I know that the Immediate Object and Imm. Interpretant are internal to the
> triadic Sign - that's my point. You seem to clarify your example as
> referring to only ONE person over two time periods. But that doesn't really
> change the problem which is that your model doesn't acknowledge that
> the actual complex nature of the triadic Sign enables and indeed functions
> - to permit CHANGE in the nature of the information between the IO of
> Person A and the II of Person B [and that includes a temporal succession in
> one Person A]. After all - you seem to be asserting that the IO and II are
> the same!
>
> By 'individual closure of the triadic Sign itself' - I mean the [IO-R-II]
> of Person A which is individual to him and his cognition; and the [IO-R-II]
> of Person B, which is equally individual to him and his cognition.
>
> The Representamen isn't simply a 'medium' or conveyor belt; it's a
> mediation - i.e., it transforms the informational content of the IO to the
> II. [And yes, I can find quotations from Peirce for both terms of mediation
> and transformation]. That's the basic power of the triadic Sign; its
> capacity to enable information growth and adaptation. Your model doesn't
> permit this.
>
> The 'existential nature of the Dynamic Object'?? That refers to its
> existence as an objective reality - regardless of what you or I or any
> person thinks of it. Again, that's basic Peirce.
>
> Edwina
>
On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 3:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
> And I continue puzzling over your statement below:
>
> JAS: "Suppose that Quasi-mind A utters Sign Y, which determines Quasi-mind
> B to a further Sign Z as its Effectual or Dynamic Interpretant.  The
> Communicational Interpretant of Sign Y is simply its Immediate
> Interpretant--the Form that Sign Y communicates from Quasi-mind A to
> Quasi-mind B as a determination of their overlap, the Commens (A  ∩ B).
> The Intended or Intentional Interpretant is Sign X, the preceding 
> determination
> of Quasi-mind A by the same Dynamic Object, such that Sign Y is the
> Dynamic Interpretant of Sign X.  Let me also tentatively suggest that the
> Immediate Interpretant of Sign X serves as the Immediate Object of Sign Y,
> and the Immediate Interpretant of Sign Y serves as the Immediate Object of
> Sign Z."
>
> 1] Could we dispense with the Quasi-Mind term and simply say: Person A,
> Person B. We can assume that both have a mind.
>
> 2] My first confusion comes - immediately. What do you mean by Sign Y?  Do
> you mean what I term the Representamen? Or do you mean the triad of
> [IO-R-II]? Or do you mean the Peircean simple: O-R-I? For example, the
> person utters a spontaneous cry: STOP! This is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
>
>  I view this triad, in this example: functioning as a Dynamic Object
> shouted by Person A. Person B hears it...as [IO-R-II]. And, he may stop
> [DI].
>
> 3] But you don't say it like this so I'm unsure of YOUR meaning.  Do you
> mean that the DI is ALSO a (a) Representamen; or a triad [IO-R-II]? Or do
> you mean that the original shout of STOP which I see as functioning as a DO
> in Person A, has become a DI in Person B?
>
> 4] Sorry- but the next half of your paragraph is too convoluted for me to
> figure out. You've added a set of Signs, eg, X, which you say is an
> Interpretant of a previous Dynamic Object.....and..Z and...it gets too
> muddy for me to deal with.
>
>  How can an 'Immediate Interpretant of Sign Y serves as the Immediate
> Object of Sign Z". How can two internal Signs be interactive without the
> work of a Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant - which moves the
> internal to the external??????
>
> Edwina
>
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