List:
I think that Gary F is making a well-argued and logical case, based
around the key question of 'what exactly - is an Immediate Object'?
My understanding is: the IO seems to be 'the informational
content/data' to be found in Site B - as moved from Site A. That is -
we must consider two existential sites that interact and relate via
some means of communication. Site A is understood as the external
'real, actual Dynamic Object', and Site B - is understood as the site
of the Sign [the triad of IO-R-II]. The data/information from Site A
has been moved to Site B - but, some of its informational content is
lost in this relational interaction...and so, the Immediate Object is
different in informational content from the Dynamic Object.
But - what if there is no actual Dynamic Object? This, to my
understanding, is what Gary F is arguing - and his analysis is, in my
view, quite logical. This then brings up the question of: What is a
Dynamic Object? Is it necessarily an actual individual entity in
space and time, such as a barking dog - i.e., in a mode of
Secondness, an 'actuality'. Can it be a generality held among the
community in Thirdness, such as 'Hope' - which, according to Peirce
- is 'real' even if not actual. I think that both the actual and the
general are Dynamic Objects, are Site A's...and can move into various
Site B's as Immediate Objects. That is, I wouldn't confine the IO in
Site B only to that which is connected to an actual individual unit
in Site A. I'd include generalities - which, admittedly, are never
'on their own' as such but are always held within actual individual
units in Secondness.
But - what about, as pointed out, the rheme - which is an
Interpretant in the mode of Firstness. Does it have a Site A in its
history? What, even, is its source? Where did the informational
content that is interpreted as a rheme - come from? Can a rheme even
exist without a connection to a Sign that in itself, includes that
connection to a Dynamic Object? Can a feeling of heat - which
becomes existential in a nanosecond - can it exist as that feeling
without that connection to actual matter and mind - even if that
connection is by a secondary relation?
I think that Gary F has some strong points in his argument.
Edwina Taborsky
On Sun 24/06/18 9:13 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Gary R, list,
To clarify: I do think a debate over whether “every sign has an
immediate object” or “only dicisigns have immediate objects” is
pointless, for reasons I’ve already given regarding the importance
of context, but mostly because taking either side in the debate
presupposes a fixed opinion about what an immediate object is. The
real question for inquiry, in my view, is What is an immediate
object? — taking that to be a technical term, and an important one,
in Peircean semiotic. As Jeff has suggested, one fruitful approach to
that inquiry is to ask Why did Peirce find it necessary in 1904 to
make an explicit distinction between the dynamic and immediate
objects of a sign? That is the approach Bellucci has taken, and so
has Stjernfelt in Natural Propositions, 3.13 (p. 96 ff.) That is the
passage you (Gary) asked me to point to where Stjernfelt deals with
immediate objects. (There may be others, but I know you have a copy
of the book, and that passage will do nicely.)
You ask whether I agree “with Bellucci's characterization of
Peirce's dynamic object as being akin to Frege's Bedeutung
(reference) and his immediate object being akin to Frege's Sinn
(sense) ”. That of course is the interpretation that Bellucci is
arguing against in his paper; and I do accept that characterization
of “the Fregean interpretation,” and take it to be equivalent
with the position you and Jon are taking in the debate that I don’t
want to engage in. You may find, if you download and read the paper,
that it differs from your position in some respects. I just used it
as a convenient label for your position, that’s all — one that
you would recognize if you’ve read Bellucci on this issue.
Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote
(from the Syllabus) which I think could throw some light on the
distinction between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s
definition of the rheme:
[[ A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of
qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such
and such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford
some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]]
That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction,
because dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational
signs,” are interpreted as affording information, while rhemes are
not. The crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a
sign must have an actual object, i.e. must have breadth as well as
depth, extension as well as intension. The reason that a rheme is not
interpreted as affording information is that it is not interpreted as
directing attention to an actual object, as a dicisign is, by
definition. This point is closely related to one that Peirce makes in
the Lowell Lecture 5 when he introduces graphs of graphs:
[[ It is essential to a graph or any other expression of a
proposition that it should be represented by its interpretant sign to
be true. But to say that it is true implies that it really is affected
by its object; and in order that this object should have a real effect
upon it, this object must be a subject of force, which is an
individual. Consequently, an adequate interpretant of a graph must
represent it as a sign of an individual. How, then, can there be a
graph of a graph, considering that a graph is a legisign, or sign
which has the mode of being of a general type, just as any word is a
general type, and not a single individual object in a single definite
place at a single instant. The answer is that a graph can only have a
graph for its object indirectly. Directly, it can only refer to a
graph replica. But it can assert what it asserts of any graph-replica
you please so long as it be equivalent to a given graph replica. ]R
470 CSP 126-8]
The point about a rheme is that it is not interpreted as being
really affected by its object, but only “understood as representing
such and such a kind of possible Object.” Give it an actual object
by making it a part of a dicisign, and it will afford the depth
component of the information conveyed by that dicisign. But in the
absence of some part of the sign indicating what that information is
about, it can’t be interpreted as informational.
I take this as relevant background to an inquiry into the nature of
the “immediate object.” Whether you choose to make use of it for
that purpose is, of course, up to you.
Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond
Sent: 23-Jun-18 15:37
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
Gary F, Jon S, list,
I will respect your wish, Gary, not to engage in what you consider
not to be an inquiry concerning the status of the immediate object in
Peirce's various sign classes but a mere debate, and even though I
don't think the matter is at all settled. You have also stated that
you have nothing to add to what you've already written and that I
should at least read Bellucci's Chapter 8 in order to defend my
position (" If you feel that your position needs defending against
Bellucci’s) whereas I think Bellucci's/your position is the one
which needs defending.
For the record, I have read Chapter 8 of Bellucci's book and am
clearly not as swayed in this matter by it as you clearly are. On the
other hand, I began by reading the Peirce quotations in that chapter
out of context before re-reading them in the context of Bellucci's
discussion, and there is a great deal to be learned there, especially
in consideration of Peirce passages not readily available.
May I ask you a couple of questions even if you decline to inquire
together on this topic (including, I would imagine, further
explicating your/Bellucci's position)?
You and Bellucci claim that Stjernfeld holds your position that only
the Dicisign has an Immediate Object. Can you point to a passage where
Stjernfeld explicitly states that? The snippet at the conclusion of
your post today addressed to Jon S seems to be making a more general
statement about the DO and the IO. In any event, do you agree with
that Stjernfeld quote?
Belluci (on "that confusion between the object and the interpretant
of a sign against which Peirce warned us):
As far as I know, the only Peirce scholar who has fully recognized
that the immediate object of a sign has nothing to do with its
“meaning” is Frederik Stjernfelt: “neither the Immediate Object
nor the Dynamic Object is concerned with descriptive characters —
this is left to the meaning categories. Both deal with the identity
of reference" (2014, 98).
Also, do you agree, Gary, with Bellucci's characterization of
Peirce's dynamic object as being akin to Frege's Bedeutung
(reference) and his immediate object being akin to Frege's Sinn
(sense) as expressed in the Abstract of Bellucci's paper "Exploring
Peirce's speculative grammar: The immediate object of a sign?" That
he has "exposed" what he seems to suggest is a misunderstanding of
the nature of the two Objects?
The paper argues against what I call the “Fregean
interpretation” of Peirce’s distinction between the immediate and
the dynamic object of a sign, according to which Peirce’s dynamic
object is akin to Frege’s Bedeutung, while Peirce’s immediate
object is akin to Frege’s Sinn. After having exposed the Fregean
interpretation, I briefly reconstruct the genesis of Peirce’s
notion of immediate object in his semiotic writings of the years
1904–1909 and defend the view that, according to Peirce, only
propositions have immediate objects
Best,
Gary R
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