Jon, Helmut, List, Jon wrote:
JAS: [T]he Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one *Correlate * (or *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant. I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction. I would strongly agree. One would think that in consideration of the cenoscopic science of *logic as semeiotics* that "the Sign itself. . . is one Correlate. . . of a triadic relation" would be seen as a settled matter however differently it might (correctly or incorrectly) be seen by some in, say, some idioscopic science. From what I can tell from decades of reading the secondary literature on this matter, with few exceptions amongst semioticians it is a settled matter. In any event, Peirce is emphatic that "the Sign *itself* is not a triadic relation." JAS: As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a *logical *representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the Sign *to *the Interpretant. I agree. In fact, for the directionality of semiosis the triangle with bent arrows works quite well. [image: image.png] In trichotomic, semiosis follows the directionality of the vector of determination, namely from the Object, 2ns (at the bottom vertex of the triangle) through the Sign, 1ns (at its top), to the Interpretant, 3ns (at the vertex on the right). Peirce uses both the turnstile, Y, and the triangle in various triadic diagrams in his discussion of semeiotics--but* for different purposes*. One is not 'right', the other 'wrong' as some assert. The triangle is also handy when considering trichotomic relations in Phenomenology and Metaphysics. For example (as it is analyzed categorially in "A Neglected Argument": [image: image.png] JAS: "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions." As I suggested above, Mats Bergman is hardly alone in maintaining that the directionality of semeiosis is essential in defining the Sign. JAS: "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907). Exactly. In other words: The Object is 'utterer' of the Sign; it mediates between the Object and the Interpretant (the Sign representing the Object to the 'interpreter'). O -> S -> I JAS: However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding. My understanding as well. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Helmut, List: > > No, the Sign *itself *is not a triadic relation; it is one *Correlate *(or > *Subject*) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the > Interpretant. I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental > distinction. > > As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a *logical > *representation > of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of > semiosis--*from *the Object *through *the Sign *to *the Interpretant. > > "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's > own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S > relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O > determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats > Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign > definitions." > > "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the > Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, > just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP > 2:404; 1907). > > However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S > represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, >> but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think: >> >> -"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show >> that there is a difference between O and I. >> >> -"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" would >> be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose: >> >> -"S represents O as I". >> >> Best, Helmut >> >
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