Jerry,
In my opinion: Yours is a pretty good indication of what I would regard as the hard core of the research program, i.e. the three categories or a triadic approach. Best, Auke Van: Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> Verzonden: zondag 3 februari 2019 22:27 Aan: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl> CC: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate Auke, list, I appreciate what you are doing. As you say, you ignore D, E, F, G, H, I, J.. X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, etc.. .. these three kinds of consciousness are entirely unlike; .. that they are connected with the ideas of one, two, three which are the three elementary forms with which logical analysis has to deal. One being the form of a simple idea, two that of an ordinary relative idea, and three the only simple form of combination of a direct union of more than two ideas.. I don't pretend that my argument that there are only three kinds of consciousness does more than raise a presumption by the precision with which I succeed in defining a great variety of terms without calling in any fourth element. It will remain for those who question the conclusion to find a term I cannot define with this apparatus. (~ CP 8.304) one two three.. C A B.. already written. Best, Jerry R On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: List, Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues. 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves. I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes delome. If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade. I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John Sowa points in this direction: JAS: > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to > accept our disagreement and move on. John: That is certainly true. The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as a predicate or quasi-predicate. Continuity cannot have any effect on that definition. There is nothing more to say. (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue) Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the term argument? In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an example of differences in perspective: On the terminological level Peirce experimented He suggested: A (1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign, as an alternative trichotomy for B (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign, but he also introduced C (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a different angle With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective, With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our world, it opens up the sign structure perspective With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the phaneroscopic endeavour. A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right in his interpretation of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be taken as the same. For instance when we deal with the spoken and written forms. Familiarity may overcome differences in form by an established law; because two different forms raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign. Best, Auke van Breemen
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