Gary R., Helmut, List: GR: Modality will, I think, continue to be difficult to graph, and not only via EGs ...
Peirce acknowledged as much. I apologize for the long quotes, but the full context seems necessary. CSP: In selecting a mode of representing Modality, which I have not done without much experimentation, I have finally resorted to one which commits itself as little as possible to any particular theory of the nature of Modality, although there are undeniable objections to such a course. If any particular analysis of Modality had appeared to me to be quite evident, I should have endeavored to exhibit it unequivocally. Meantime, my opinion is that the Universe is a Subject of every Proposition and that any Modality shown by its indefiniteness to be Affirmative, such as Possibility and Intention, is a special determination of the Universe of The Truth. Something of this sort is seen in Negation. For if we say of a Man that he is not sinless, we represent the sinless as having a place only in an ideal universe which, or the part of which that contains the imagined sinless being, we then positively sever from the identity of the man in question. (CP 4.552n1; 1906) CSP: I may as well, at once, acknowledge that, in Existential Graphs, the representation of Modality (possibility, necessity, etc.) lacks almost entirely that pictorial, or Iconic, character which is so striking in the representation in the same system of every feature of propositions *de inesse*. Perhaps it is in the nature of things that it should be so in such wise that for Modality to be iconically represented in that same "pictorial" way in which the other features are represented would constitute a falsity in the representation. If so, it is a perfect vindication of the system, upon whose accusers, I suppose, the burden of proof lies. Still, I confess I suspect there is in the heraldic representation of modality as set forth in my paper on the System ["Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"] ... a defect capable of being remedied. If it be not so, if the lack of "pictorialness" in the representation of modality cannot be remedied, it is because modality has, in truth, the nature which I opined it has (which opinion I expressed toward the end of the footnote [quoted above] ...); and if that be the case, Modality is not, properly speaking, conceivable at all, but the difference, for example, between possibility and actuality is only recognizable much in the same way as we recognize the difference between a dream and waking experience, supposing the dream to be ever so detailed, reasonable, and thoroughly consistent with itself and with all the rest of the dreamer's experience. Namely, it still would not be so "vivid" as waking experience. (R 298, CP 4.553n1; 1906) I might have more to say in the future about "the difference between a dream and waking experience," perhaps in the other thread on "EGs and Phaneroscopy." For now, returning to the topic of *this *thread, note Peirce's statement that "the Universe is a Subject of every Proposition." This is consistent with my contention that anything within a Proposition that refers to the *contents *of the Universe--i.e., any member of any of the three Universes of Experience, of which an interpreting Quasi-mind can only have knowledge by means of previous Collateral Experience--is likewise properly understood as a logical *subject* (i.e., the Proposition's *Object*), not a logical predicate (i.e., its *Interpretant*). Speaking of which, in a 2014 paper, "Peirce and the Unity of the Proposition <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.50.2.201>," Franceso Bellucci cited yet another passage--the earliest discovered so far--in which Peirce described the concept of the Continuous Predicate, although he did not give it that or any other name. It is on pages 491-493 [331r-332r] of the Logic Notebook (R 339), which he dated October 17-20, 1908--just a few days before he wrote R 611, whose pages he dated October 28, 1908, where he used the term "Continuous Relation." Again, please forgive the long quotation. CSP: I need not tell you that any assertion is composed of *subject* and *predicate*; for grammar has taught you that. Grammar, however, looks upon these matters in a superficial way; and the traditional logic is scarcely better. Permit me to suggest your regarding the matter from a different point of view, from which I am confident that, as soon as you become familiar with it, you will agree with me that the true composition of an assertion is revealed much more distinctly than from that of grammar. In the first place, then, when I speak of the *subject* I do not mean the grammatical subject nominative, nor do I necessarily mean that thing which the subject nominative denotes. I cannot in a simple brief sentence give you a perfectly distinct idea of what I mean. I shall have to be a little vague at first. By the subject I mean that about which the assertion is made, whether the name of it be in the nominative or not. You must consider the *meaning*, not the linguistic expression merely ... Two remarks will serve to give you a clearer notion of what I mean by a dynamical subject of an assertion. The first is this. I have said that the subjects and predicate are the two parts of an assertion. (Abelard reckoned the copula as a third part; and in a certain sense, it is a part of an assertion, but not in the sense in which the subject and predicate are parts. It is nothing but a mark that the predicate is to be understood predicatively, that is, as conveying information, and not as limiting the denotation of the grammatical subject.) Now while the predicate may express a novel combination of [?] characters, such as the interpreter never dreamed of before of any subject possessing, no assertion can make us acquainted with its dynamical subject, but can only point it out among the things with which some collateral experience must make the interpreter acquainted before the assertion can convey its meaning to him ... The second remark about the subject of an assertion is that more or fewer objects may be regarded as subjects while the remainder of the assertion is the predicate. Moreover instead of regarding the subjects are plural one may regard the whole set as forming the *Collective Dynamical Subject*. The *Complete* Collective Dynamical Subject includes *all* that it is necessary to be acquainted with in order to understand the assertion, excepting the forms of connection between the different *Single Subjects*. Thus in the assertion "Every catholic adores some woman," the Complete Subject embraces 1st: The character of being catholic. 2nd: The character of the relation of adoring. 3rd: The character of being of woman; and the proposition is that, The character of being catholic determines anything to be in the relation of adoring to something having the character of a woman. To analyze an assertion into Subjects & Predicate, comes to making the Subjects to be all the single monads that can be imagined that with Predicates will make up the Assertion The Great Pyramid is white Its subjects are "The Great Pyramid" and "whiteness" The Great Pyramid *possesses* the character of whiteness Peirce then scribed a few different EGs to represent this proposition, and did likewise with "Brutus kills Caesar"; see attached. Notice that in each case, he experimented with making "is in the relation" the only Spot with multiple Pegs--one for the first correlate, whether "Pyr." or "Brutus"; one for the relation itself (labeled "of"), whether "possessing" or "killing"; and one for the second correlate (labeled "to"), whether "whiteness" or "Caesar." A potential advantage that I can see of this approach is the ability to insert a Cut around any of the four resulting Spots or combinations thereof. Only three additional Propositions can be represented by adding a single Cut to "Pyr.---white." - Enclose "Pyr." to represent "Something that is not the Great Pyramid is white." - Enclose "white" to represent "The Great Pyramid exists and is not white." - Enclose "Pyr.---white" to represent "It is false that the Great Pyramid is white." Six additional Propositions can be represented by adding Cuts to "Brutus---kills---Caesar," and the same is true in parallel fashion of "Pyr.---possesses---whiteness" as an alternative to "Pyr.---white"; i.e., twice as many. - Enclose "Brutus" to represent "Something that is not Brutus kills Caesar." - Enclose "kills" to represent "Brutus and Caesar exist, and Brutus does not kill Caesar." - Enclose "Caesar" to represent "Brutus kills something that is not Caesar." - Enclose "Brutus---kills" to represent "Caesar exists and is not killed by Brutus." - Enclose "kills---Caesar" to represent "Brutus exists and does not kill Caesar." - Enclose "Brutus---kills---Caesar" to represent "It is false that Brutus kills Caesar. Scribing "Brutus," "killing," and "Caesar"--or, for that matter, "Pyr.," "possessing," and "whiteness"--as Subjects (with one Peg each) and "is in the relation of/to" as the Continuous Predicate (with three Pegs) facilitates even more possibilities. - Enclose "is in the relation of/to" to represent "Brutus, killing, and Caesar exist, and Brutus does not kill Caesar." - Enclose "killing" to represent "Brutus is in the relation to Caesar of something that is not killing." - Enclose "Brutus---is in the relation of/to" to represent "killing and Caesar exist, and Brutus does not kill Caesar." - Enclose "is in the relation of/to---Caesar" to represent "Brutus and killing exist, and Brutus does not kill Caesar." - Enclose "killing" and "Caesar" to represent "Brutus is in the relation of something that is not killing to something that is not Caesar." - Enclose everything except "Brutus" to represent "Brutus exists, and Brutus does not kill Caesar." - Enclose everything except "is in the relation of/to" to represent "a dyadic relation exists, and Brutus does not kill Caesar." - Enclose everything except "killing" to represent "killing exists, and Brutus does not kill Caesar." - Enclose everything except "Caesar" to represent "Caesar exists, and Brutus does not kill Caesar." I welcome correction if I am not properly stating the implications of each proposed Cut. Regardless, these examples effectively illustrate how the standard Graphs of the original Propositions *conceal *Continuous Predicates *within *Spots, as I pointed out previously. It seems to me that a truly "ultimate" logical analysis should make them explicit, as Peirce evidently considered doing. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 4:01 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Helmut, list, > > I have nothing to add to JS's general comments on the sheet of assertion > which are clear enough. > > You wrote: > > Speaking of music, one subject likes gangsta rap and Wagner, and the other > subject finds both disgusting. So i was thinking, what if we just reverse > the inner/outer- direction of the graphs, and say, that the inside of the > smallest circle is the subjective universe, and what is outside is excluded > from it? > > > As I understand them, unlike classical first-order logic, which is read in > a linear manner from left to right, EGs are meant to be read from outside > in and interpreted by what Peirce calls the endopeuretic method. This is > not the time to discuss that, but it seems to me that your example doesn't > lend itself to being expressed in an EG no matter how it is read. > > On the other hand, I think that your idea itself is quite interesting such > that you might try experimenting on diagrams and graphs of your own > creation on a sheet of assertion for discourse concerning, for example, > ethical or aesthetic universes with the subject at the center of the graph, > observing experimental changes made to the graph, etc. > > Modality will, I think, continue to be difficult to graph, and not only > via EGs, although new technologies (for example, holographic and 3d ones) > might eventually afford breakthroughs in this matter. Peirce considered > several approaches to representing modality via Gamma graphs as I recall: > tinctures, threads through various sheets, etc. But, again, I'm not > sufficiently familiar with EGs to say much more. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 11:59 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > >> Gary, list, >> I am just beginning to get acquainted to the graphs. So far I think, that >> the sheet of assertion means to symbolize a universe with clear true/false >> rules. But what, if every subject (at least, if the subjects are organisms) >> has its own universe (speaking with Uexküll and the constructivists)? >> Speaking of music, one subject likes gangsta rap and Wagner, and the other >> subject finds both disgusting. So i was thinking, what if we just reverse >> the inner/outer- direction of the graphs, and say, that the inside of the >> smallest circle is the subjective universe, and what is outside is excluded >> from it? The sheet of assertion still is the universe of efficient cause, >> and the inner circles are the subjective universes of needs and volitions. >> I think, this way it is possible to elaborate gamma-graphs with special >> cuts-symbols like interrupted lines and so on (unidirectional, >> semipermeable membranes, things like in cells, like endoplasmatic >> reticulum, tunnels and pumps...), a whole graphic art system. Just dreaming. >> Best, Helmut >> >
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