BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - thanks for your post, but I think that my concern about the
tendency on this list:
ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop
an isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world
IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis!
I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and
strict terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me,
the term of 'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure
capable and active in explaining human cognition and human societal
organization. Terminology can't do that. What is required is an
analytic frame that examines the dynamic, yes, dynamic, nature of
human cognition and human societal organization. And these endless
discussions of 'who is right' about 'what X term means' can't
provide us with such an analysis.
As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic
framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis -
and terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal.
My focus is not simply on biosemiotics but on human cognition and
human societal organization - and I consider Peircean semiosis to be
an excellent analytic agent for such an examination - but find that
this list is either silent on such topics or, the few who do post,
confine themselves to back-and-forth arguments over who is right
about terminology.
Edwina
On Mon 18/02/19 3:20 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Jon, Edwina, list,
Jon wrote: I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word;
and if researchers today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of
Signs to be useful for their purposes, then far be it from me to
block the way of inquiry.
No need to apologize. As I've repeatedly said, your inquiry into
Peirce's late taxonomy of signs has been helpful to me and, I
believe, of potentially considerable value to those doing research
especially into the grammatical branch of logic as semeiotic.
Granted, "abandoned" may perhaps have been "too strong a word" to
describe Peirce's position apropos the late classification of signs
in considering the 1903 classification. Yet when one is working, as
you have been, within that late taxonomy based on Peirce's developed
notion of their being two objects and three interpretants, it is
understandable that an emphasis on the later one would take
precedence over that earlier classification.
Continuing, Edwina quoted me:
GR: I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom Short
for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he
finds himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly
state that along with his corrected view[. . .] Peirce is constantly
experimenting; but, in my opinion, one needn't take an experiment
late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier
and the principles derived from them.
Then commented:
ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop
an isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world.
I would not characterize the great effort by Peirce and others
(including John S, Jon S, Gary F, and Jeff D and others on this
list, and myriad others involved in Peirce studies for the past 6 or
7 decades) made in logic as semeiotic as an attempt "to develop an
isolate framework" for semeiotic. Indeed, Peirce did the vast
majority of his work in what we sometimes refer to as
'anthroposemiotic', that is, that logica docens which strictly is
logic as semeiotic (his pragmaticism is included here).
While logicians and others may argue as to what semeiotic
definitions are important, ought to be emphasized, their proper
relations to other definitions, etc., it seems to me that logicians
tend to find what you call "strict terminological definitions" not
only important, but quite essential for certain types of inquiry.
It is understandable that as a biosemiotician that you would be
especially concerned with semeiotics in "its capacity to analyze and
explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of
the real world." And, in truth, it is my opinion that the discoveries
of the normative science of logic as semiotics ought more and more
(according to "the principle of principles") be applied to
pragmaticism, metaphysics, and most all the special sciences,
including biosemiotics. I would only suggest--really a kind of
truism--that there are many kinds of semiotic inquiry, and that, for
example, the logic of semeiotic (semiotic grammar, critic, and
methodeutic/rhetoric) as the principal discovery science (pure
research science) ought to be allowed free reign in its inquiries,
and even if these naturally and necessarily principally deal with
anthroposemiotics. In sum: there are in fact many possible inquiries
and applications of Peircean semeiotics, but the first of these is
properly in theoretical science.
Perhaps, Edwina, you are frustrated by the tendency on this list to
concentrate from time to time on anthroposemiotics which, truly, can
at times seem all too abstract even to me! But this has not always
been the case. Consider, for example, the slow read here (and
concurrently on the Biosemiotics list) of Frederik Stjernfelt's,
Natural Propositions. The Actuality of Peirce’s Doctrine of
Dicisigns, a year or so long ago. Earlier slow reads also concerned
topics other than logica docens.
I have repeatedly urged folk here to take up on the list threads on
other topics than the first two branches of the normative science of
logic as semeiotic (semeiotic grammar and critical logic). But this
hasn't much happened. For example, it seems to me that the tendency
recently of some, perhaps most involved in the discussion here, to
bypass phenomenology as first cenoscopic science and to leap to its
relation to logic as semeiotic (notably, critical logic, esp. as
expressed in EGs) is unfortunate and, I'd say, counter-productive.
Will we ever discuss phenomenology as such? Will we ever get back to
discussing pragmaticism as such?
Nonetheless, one does not want to block the way of inquiry of those
who are especially interested in anthroposemiosis through inquiries
into philosophical (semeiotic) grammar and critical logic (logic as
logic, which includes discussions of EGs). One is always free to
introduce a thread here on any topic, but of late this has rarely
happened. Perhaps we need a new 'slow read'? Any suggestions?
Best,
Gary (writing, in part, as list moderator)
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
On Sun, Feb 17, 2019 at 3:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary R., Auke, List:
I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word; and if
researchers today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of Signs to
be useful for their purposes, then far be it from me to block the way
of inquiry.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
On Sat, Feb 16, 2019 at 11:11 PM Gary Richmond wrote:
Auke, Jon, List,
Your post, Auke, did indeed help clarify your earlier one for me. It
having done that, it makes me further doubt your hypothetical project
of diagramming phenomenon based on an Existential Graph model.
I most certainly think that "optimally iconic" (Stjernfelt) diagrams
and graphs (EGs being a prime example) are far preferable to those
which are merely "operational" (characteristically, discursive). See,
for example: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11787181_6 [5]
There are good reasons for this, notably that it is valuable to be
able to observe, modify, and otherwise experiment on graphs, and the
more iconic a graph is, the easier it is to do this. For logic, EGs
would appear to be "optimally iconic."
However, it seems to me that one remains squarely in the realm of
logic as semeiotic when one is working with EGs because, as now
repeatedly noted: " All that existential graphs can represent is
propositions, on a single sheet, and arguments on a succession of
sheets, presented in temporal succession." CSP
Consequently, I strongly doubt that EGs can be useful in
phenomenology qua phenomenology.
GR: EGs seem to me capable only of (a) helping to clarify those
logical moves by Peirce which served to reveal the connection between
types of propositions and the three categories [I would add now that
this is principally, if not exclusively, a logical matter], or (c)
explicate the findings of phenomenological research in graphic form
[again, a project in logic GR].
Phenomenology/phaneroscopy is not concerned at all with propositions
or arguments. It asserts nothing, but merely observes what appears in
the phaneron.
Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy,
or cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think
involves three kinds of elements (1903, Lowell Lectures, in
Commens).
Nevertheless, both via our every day logic ( logica utens) as well
as by the 'principle of data' (earlier discussed), phenomenology can
use logic docens (i.e., logic as semeiotic, further down in the
Classification of Sciences than phenomenology) to further
describe/explicate its findings.
So, I remain confused as to why you argue:
AvB: What I would argue for is that the most fruitful way to proceed
is to try to conceptually co-ordinate the different perspectives on
each other. The key to that is the process of semiosis expressed as a
sign process.
But, again (in what also, btw, sounds to me tautological) when you
write that "The key. . . is the process of semiosis expressed as a
sign process," then you're still considering semiotic and not
phenomenology.
Even while I remain open to the notion that some sort of 'sheet' may
be helpful, no doubt even necessary, in creating "optimally iconic"
diagrams appropriate to phenomenology, it seems to me that it cannot
be a "sheet of assertion" as described here:
A certain sheet, called the sheet of assertion, is appropriated to
the drawing upon it of such graphs that whatever may be at any time
drawn upon it, called the entire graph, shall be regarded as
expressing an assertion . . . CP 4.432 (c. 1903, in Commens, emphasis
added).
Phenomenology doesn't assert anything whatsoever. From what you've
written so far, I do not see you meaning to diagram anything but
"semiotic" process.
I fervently believe that there are ways to diagram especially
trichotomic relations (and complexes of these) more iconically (my
trikonic diagrams are a first stab at that), but I'm now fairly
certain that EGs will not prove to be a useful model for those
diagrams. Nonetheless, creating more iconic diagrams of all sorts of
phenomena and relations ought, in my opinion, be much further
explored including, of course, those suitable to phenomenology.
Turning to another topic which I'll have to respond to in the thread
in which it appears, you quote Jon:
JAS: It further puzzles me that so many researchers still focus on
the three-trichotomy, ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903, since Peirce himself
abandoned it almost immediately--once he recognized the distinctions
between the different Objects and Interpretants of the same Sign.
And reply:
AvB: I provided a locus in the Welby correspondence in which the
small classification is part of the Welby classification. Bernard
Morand did a great job in showing how the later trichotomies append
on the former.
At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is
no good reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the
three-category, ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903." See, for example:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249933979_On_diagrams_for_Peirces_10_28_and_66_classes_of_signs
[6]
Indeed, it is possible that such complexifications could prove to be
an obstacle in optimally disseminating Peirce's work more broadly.
Having said that, within the realm of Peirce scholarship, especially
in anthroposemiotics, such work that Jon has been engaged in may
prove of some considerable value. I am finding that I am grasping his
project better than I was at first, especially as Peirce's novel
terminology (the kindest way of putting it) becomes more and more
familiar to me. Indeed, Jon's work is helping me in that regard as he
seems to have mastered it.
But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom
Short for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And
when he finds himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to
explicitly state that along with his corrected view (in years past
I've offered several examples of this). Peirce is constantly
experimenting; but, in my opinion, one needn't take an experiment
late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier
and the principles derived from them.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
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