Edwina, List: It sounds to me like we are generally in agreement.
JAS: As I have said repeatedly in defense of our terminological discussions here, the goal is always to make our (and Peirce's) ideas clear; but that is not an end in itself--it is simply an indispensable step toward developing applications of those ideas in the sciences that are below normative Logic as Semeiotic in Peirce's classification, beginning with Metaphysics and then encompassing all of the Special Sciences. I do have one quibble to raise, though. ET: Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive examination of Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing observable instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the actual observable world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the reality of laws [3ns] ... Percepts are the subject matter of Phaneroscopy, while Reality is itself one of those very hypotheses that we develop to explain what we observe, which then serves as the subject matter of Metaphysics. CSP: What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all. As I have repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing anything. (NEM 4:343; 1898) Normative Logic as Semeiotic--including pragmaticism--comes *in between* those two other cenoscopic sciences, and enables us to ascertain the truth or falsity of the Propositions that we formulate (Retroduction), explicate (Deduction), and evaluate (Induction) after examining our Percepts--a judgment that is ultimately based on whether or not they are consistent with the *subsequent *Experience that is forced upon us. The goal is always "the *stable *establishment of beliefs" (CP 3.429; 1896, emphasis added), which are precisely *habits *of feeling, action, and thought. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 9:34 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > List > > In my view, terminological 'definitions' do not 'make our ideas clear'. > And pragmatism has nothing to do with definitions. > > JAS wrote: "According to Peirce, it [note: pragmatism] is "merely a > method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract > concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907). > > 1] If we are going to cherry-pick quotes, something I feel is a misuse of > Peirce, then, I can come up with "Now quite the most striking feature of > the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between > rational cognition and rational purpose; and that consideration it was > which determined the preference for the name 'pragmatism' 5.412 > > And in 5.196, 'pragmatism' "is nothing else than the question of the logic > of abduction. that is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, > must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses > to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena" > > ET: I understand the above to mean that pragmatism is focused on > developing hypotheses about the laws/rules governing observed phenomena > > 2] "There are two functions which we may properly require that Pragmatism > should perform...Namely it ought, in the first place, to give us an > expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear. In the second place, > it ought to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially > clear, but more or less difficult of apprehensions; and in in particular, > it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of thirdness" > 5.206 > > ET: Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive examination of > Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing observable > instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the actual observable > world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the reality of laws [3ns] - such > that Peirce could even refer to it as 'a species of prope-positivism' > [5.423. > > And "Pragmatism does not intend to define the phenomenal equivalents of > words and general ideas, but, on the contrary, eliminates their sential > element, and endeavors to define the rational purpose, and this it finds in > the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in question" 5.428. > > By this - I understand that the definition of the WORD is not the point; > the FUNCTION [purposive bearing] of the semiosic action and examining the > reality of 3ns in this function - that's pragmatism. > > 3] As he wrote, "Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing definitions" > [5.393]. Now, Peirce continues on, with "Nevertheless, our existing > beliefs can be set in order by this process". > > My view of the above is the limited scope of definitions, for they fail to > provide us with the real focus of thought -which is the examination of the > nature of Thirdness in the reality around us. > > 4] As Peirce writes, "the whole function of thought is to produce habits > of action" [5.400] and thought is therefore focused on discerning and > analyzing these 'habits of action' [Thirdness]. > > Edwina >
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