John S., List: JFS: Every so-called Modified EG (MEG) is false.
As Gary F. already pointed out, only when someone insists on interpreting them as if they were *ordinary *EGs, rather than incorporating the very specific *modifications *(hence the M) that I spelled out--in particular, that *there are no Lines of Identity or Ligatures*, only a single branching Line of Relation. JFS: Peirce explained EGs in several different ways, but the first-order core, the rules of inference, and the translations from one version to another never changed. I have never denied this; on the contrary, I have freely (and repeatedly) acknowledged it. I fully agree with you that R 514 as reproduced in NEM 3:162-169 serves as an excellent "tutorial," although it omits a few helpful clarifications, such as the fact that a Line of Identity can always be branched at a Spot of Teridentity and then extended inward through a Cut. JAS: In Peirce's "proper" or "ultimate" analysis of Propositions, "pure" predicates are the only predicates. Anything that refers to content in the universe of discourse--i.e., anything that can only be understood by an interpreting Quasi-mind that has had previous Collateral Experience with it--is a Subject; it belongs to the Object of the Proposition. JFS: No. That claim is false for many reasons. First of all, The words 'proper' and 'ultimate' are both relative terms that depend on context. And the contexts for those two words have nothing in common. To clarify, are you only denying the first statement of mine that you quoted? Or are you also contending that discrete predicates (such as "killing") somehow belong to the *Interpretant *of the proposition, rather than its *Object*? I have freely (and repeatedly) acknowledged that "proper" and "ultimate" are *relative to a purpose*, and that mine is different from yours. Right now I am focusing on Peirce's concept of Experience as reflected in this careful distinction between Subjects as whatever *requires *Collateral Experience and the Continuous Predicate as whatever the Proposition *itself *conveys, the form of relation that "marries" the different Subjects. *This *sense of "ultimate" is quite "proper" for my purpose. JFS: To illustrate that point, let's turn to the MEGs. Each one has a teridentity or a ligature of multiple teridentities, which falsely state that some wildly different things are identical. No, again, MEGs cannot be interpreted as if they were EGs. There is *no such thing* as "a teridentity" or "a ligature" in MEGs, and in general they *do not* state that anything is "identical" to anything else. Discrete Points correspond to different Subjects, which are "married" by the branching Line of Relation that corresponds to the sole Continuous Predicate. JFS: For example, the MEG for "Brutus kills Caesar" has a teridentity, which states that there is a single entity in the universe of discourse, which happens to be identical to Brutus, Caesar, and the act of killing. That proposition is false. No, the MEG states nothing more or less than that Brutus stands in the relation of killing to Caesar, which is *true*. "Brutus," "killing," and "Caesar" are all Subjects represented by Points; while the Line of Relation represents the Continuous Predicate, "_____ stands in the relation of _____ to _____." JFS: The second EG in brutus.jpg has one more logical subject, which is the gerund 'killing' (a nominalization) with a line of identity that is also attached to a triad named Rel. I'm using the name Rel for the pure predicate that Peirce defined in NEM 3:886, 3rd line from the top. As Peirce said, Rel is a pure predicate. With Rel, the second EG states "Brutus stands in the relation 'killing' to Caesar." I agree, the second EG represents *exactly the same proposition* as the MEG, using a three-Peg Spot for the Continuous Predicate and three Lines of Identity for the Subjects. My *personal *opinion is that MEGs *better *represent the *Indexical *nature of Subjects as *denoting the Object *of the Proposition, as well as the *Iconic *nature of the Continuous Predicate as *signifying the* *Interpretant *of the Proposition. JFS: The Modified EGs are false, but most of them could be converted to correct EGs by using the pure predicate Rel. One more time--MEGs are *not *false when properly interpreted on *their own* terms, which are *different *from those of EGs. I agree that a multi-Peg Spot can be used to represent a Continuous Predicate in an EG, since that is essentially what Peirce scribed in his Logic Notebook. JFS: The sharp distinction between subjects and predicates implies that a seme could never refer to a logical subject or a quasi-subject. No, Peirce explicitly defined a Seme as "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906). That is *precisely *the function of a Subject, especially *within *a Proposition. JFS: When translated to an EG, every subject term has a line of identity, and every predicate term has the equivalent of an unattached peg. Yes; and when translated to a MEG, every individual Subject corresponds to a Point, and the sole Continuous Predicate corresponds to the Line of Relation. JFS: There are two possibilities: (1) he didn't find that step useful or relevant, or (2) you may have missed some relevant obstacle. I agree, and I recognize the possibility that (2) might turn out to be the case; but (1) does not entail that taking the additional step *cannot *be useful or relevant for *my *purpose. JFS: Peirce never wrote the triad subject/proposition/argument, and it contradicts both the Aristotelian term/proposition/argument and his own rheme/dicisign/argument. Peirce never wrote the triad (quasi-)predicate/proposition/argument, either; and if the one "contradicts" his other terminological combinations, then so does the other. JFS: By repeating it, you're claiming to know what Peirce would have or might have said. That puts words in Peirce's mouth that he would have spit out in disgust. Nonsense. In fact, you are the one now "claiming to know what Peirce would have or might have said" by asserting that "he would have spit out in disgust" what I am proposing--which, for the record, I am not dogmatically seeking to impose on anyone else. CSP: *Do not block the way of inquiry* ... The last philosophical obstacle to the advance of knowledge which I intend to mention is the holding that this or that law or truth has found its last and perfect formulation ... (CP 1.135-140, EP 2:48-49; 1898, bold in EP original) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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