John, List: Not surprisingly, I agree completely with Francesco, but I still want to address a number of specific points for the record.
JFS: Claim #1: He later rejected that term [quasi-predicate] because he changed his mind. He decided that 'Seme' should be defined as "subject or predicate" or even just the single word 'subject'. I never claimed that Peirce "changed his mind" about "quasi-predicate." Instead, I consistently pointed out that he used it *exactly once* (CP 2.320; 1903), but used "Seme" in *every *known taxonomy of Sign classes on or after August 31, 1906, crossing out "Rheme" in that particular one. I also noted that his definition of "Seme" was extremely broad, such that there is absolutely no warrant from his writings to confine it to predicates and quasi-predicates. JFS: Whenever Peirce changed his mind on any point, he would usually discuss specific reasons for the change. But he never said that the word 'quasi-predicate' was inappropriate. He *did* discuss the specific reason for introducing "Seme"--the familiar word "Term" had to be "much widened." If he had thought that "Rheme" was still adequate, he would have used it rather than inventing a new word, in accordance with his ethics of terminology. He indeed never said that "quasi-predicate" was inappropriate--because he said *nothing at all* about it before or after 1903. JFS: In every occurrence of the word 'Seme', it's possible to replace 'Seme' with the phrase "predicate or quasi-predicate" without any change in meaning. That depends on how one *defines *"predicate or quasi-predicate." After all, the *subject *of a sentence is a Seme--Peirce said so in R 295, as Francesco and I have both pointed out--but it is (by definition) *not *a predicate. If "Term" is wide enough to encompass both subjects and predicates, and "Seme" is wider than "Term," then "Seme" obviously encompasses both subjects and predicates. As for "quasi-predicate," it is evidently not even wide enough to encompass "quasi-subject," since the *only *time that Peirce ever used *either *of these was in *the very same sentence* to name *different parts* of a Dicisign. JFS: Claim #1 introduces a triad that Peirce never mentioned or implied in any MS: Subject, Proposition, Argument. I tried out Subject/Proposition/Argument for a while, but *abandoned *it almost two weeks ago, stating plainly that "neither 'Subject' nor 'Predicate' (nor 'Quasi-predicate') will work as the 'much widened' replacement for 'Term' or 'Rheme,' since it has to encompass *both* of them." I have been consistently using Seme/Proposition/Argument ever since; as I have explained before, Peirce acknowledged that "Delome" is synonymous with "Argument," and elsewhere (EP 2:312; 1904) described propositions in a way that is consistent with Phemes as "Interrogative, Imperative, or Assertory" (CP 4.538; 1906). JFS: Claim #2 uses Peirce's own words in combinations that he himself wrote. Please provide a specific citation or quote where he *ever *gave predicate/proposition/argument or quasi-predicate/proposition/argument as the division of Signs according to the relation with the Final Interpretant or the Nature of the Influence. JFS: But a subject always maps to a predicate plus a line of identity in EGs (or an equivalent variable in algebraic notations). I addressed this already. A Spot plus a Line of Identity is a *proposition*, and a proposition *always *has two parts--subject and predicate, what it *denotes *and what it *signifies*. In algebraic notations, the variable is the subject, so it *cannot *be a predicate; likewise for the selective in standard predicate logic. JFS: More precisely, a predicate that has content may be converted to a continuous predicate, a line of identity, and another predicate that has a content that is derived from the content of the first one. That is just just a *different *(and less ultimate) analysis, and it still results in a *proposition*, which means that there *must *be a subject (non-predicate) of some kind. If we instead follow Peirce's late 1908 advice and throw *everything possible* into the subject--i.e., whatever requires Collateral Experience on the part of the interpreter in order to be understood--then a predicate *never *has content. There is *only *the continuous predicate, which is all that the proposition *itself* can convey; namely, the logical form of relation that "marries" its subjects (constituent Semes). JFS: As a synonym for "predicate or quasi-predicate", the word 'Seme' refers to more objects than the word 'predicate' by itself. Please answer the question that I have been posing over and over as my response to this kind of claim. *If Peirce considered "Seme" to be synonymous with "predicate" or "quasi-predicate," then why did he blatantly violate his own ethics of terminology by introducing it?* JAS: He needed a word encompassing not only "term," "predicate," and "quasi-predicate," but also "indexical," "selective," "subject," "quasi-subject," and any other Sign that is not a Proposition or an Argument. JFS: There is such a word. It's 'sign'. If you want to classify the many kinds of signs, see Peirce's 10 classes of signs. The topic here is a *specific class* of Signs--the counterpart of Proposition (or Pheme) and Argument (or Delome) when a Sign is a Possible, rather than an Existent or a Necessitant. Again, Peirce called it a "Seme" in *every known taxonomy* that he drew up after introducing that word. He *never once* called it a "predicate" or a "quasi-predicate." JFS: In every note in this thread, I have refuted every proposed claim for #1 and every proposed argument against #2. That is overwhelming evidence against #1 and for #2 Why employ such desperate and over-the-top rhetoric? We have each presented our cases (repeatedly), and everyone else can make up their own minds (or tune us out by now). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 9:38 AM Francesco Bellucci < bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote: > John, List > may I be permitted to offer some further arguments in support of JAS's > view of semes. > > In R 295, a draft of the "Prolegomena", Peirce says: > > The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical Term, > the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it a man or > a scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will serve or is supposed to > serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for its Object. (R 295, p. 26ff) > > The subject of a sentence, for example "Hamlet" in "Hamlet is mad" is, > according to R 295, a seme. I know of no classification of signs after 1906 > in which "rheme" is used instead of "seme", and I know some (R 339, > p. 285r, R 795, EP 2, p. 490) in which "seme" appears in stead of "rheme". > This is some evidence that Peirce deliberately abandoned the word "rheme" > and used "seme", and that a "seme" covers both what "rheme" covered eralier > and also any other thing "supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a > substitute for its Object", including the subject of a sentence. Since it > is Peirce himself that gives us a definition of "seme", I fail to see how > there can be any doubt about whether the subject of a sentence is a "seme" > or not. > > Since "quasi-predicate" is the definiens, if any, not the definiendum, I > abstract from the question why he abandoned this expression. He never > abandoned it as a technical term of his semiotics, because it was not a > technical term. Thus, I refomulate Claims #1 and #2 as follows: > > Claim #1: every rheme is a seme, but not every seme is a rheme; the > subject of a sentence is a seme (R 295) but not a rheme (at least, not a > rheme in the sense in which rhemes were defined, e.g., in 1903). > > Claim #2: 'Seme' includes predicates and quasi-predicates, but not > subjects of sentences. The subject of a sentence is not a seme. > > I think that R 295, together with all the arguments already used by Jon in > previous posts, should make it clear that while Claim #1 may not be the > whole story, yet Claim #2 is textually false and fails to correctly > represent Peirce's logical ideas. > > Best, > Francesco > > On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 1:41 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> Gary F and Jon AS, >> >> GF >> > Peirce’s classification of sciences is itself ambiguous... >> > Hence the significance of Peirce claiming that logicians will have >> > to study “the physiology of signs” simply because nobody else is >> > going to do it (R 499 as quoted by Bellucci). This complicates the >> > traditional classification of logic as one of the three Normative >> > sciences. >> >> Anything can be classified in an open-ended variety of ways for an >> open-ended variety of reasons. Librarians have long ago realized >> that there is no unique classification of anything. They require >> cross-references, which are more complex than a simple tree. >> >> GF >> > John has a point in that Logic as Semeiotic shares with phenomenology >> > an emphasis on observation and analysis — which must indeed precede >> > any judgments of good or bad in the practice of science. >> >> Thanks. That's the reason for adding the node labeled Formal Semeiotic >> to the cspsci.png diagram. Some people may say that node is part of >> of phenomenology/phaneroscopy. Others may say that it represents >> a separate field by itself. But that is just a "turf battle". >> >> JAS >> > Peirce's manuscripts that included Seme/Pheme/Delome--an undated >> > one-page fragment (R 795), which Bellucci considers a "polished >> > and compact version" of that same scheme; and a Logic Notebook >> > entry dated "1906 Aug 31" (R 339:424[285r]), where they replace >> > the crossed-out Rheme/Dicisign/Argument. Interestingly, only >> > a day earlier he had written Term/Sentence/Movement of Thought >> > (R 339:423[284r]; 1906 Aug 30), so this was apparently when he >> > definitively decided that he needed the new words. >> >> My claim is that a Seme is either a predicate or a quasi-predicate. >> The above paragraph is consistent with that claim. Therefore, it >> is irrelevant to the debate. >> >> In evaluating these and other bits of evidence, it's essential to use >> Peirce's methodeutic to evaluate their contributions toward the goal >> of determining the truth or at least a reliable approximation. >> >> To illustrate methodeutic, let's consider our current debate. >> Following are the two claims. Yours is #1, mine is #2. If you >> wish to restate #1 and the arguments for it, please do so. >> >> In an MS around 1903, Peirce used his favorite prefix to talk about >> quasi-predicates. But he didn't use it later. Why? >> >> Claim #1: He later rejected that term because he changed his mind. >> He decided that 'Seme' should be defined as "subject or predicate" >> or even just the single word 'subject'. >> >> Claim #2: He decided that the 14-letter word was inconvenient. >> A 4-letter word from Greek roots was too tempting for him to ignore. >> That led him to the euphonious triad Seme, Pheme, Delome, with 'Seme' >> as a synonym for the phrase "predicate or quasi-predicate". >> >> Which claim is a more accurate explanation of Peirce's usage? >> >> The case for #1: He changed his mind. In CP 4.538, he said that >> the triad Term, Proposition, Argument should be widened to Seme, >> Pheme, Delome. Therefore, a Seme is a widening of the word Term, >> and a Term may be used as a subject or predicate. >> >> The case for #2: Whenever Peirce changed his mind on any point, he >> would usually discuss specific reasons for the change. But he never >> said that the word 'quasi-predicate' was inappropriate. In every >> occurrence of the word 'Seme', it's possible to replace 'Seme' with >> the phrase "predicate or quasi-predicate" without any change in meaning. >> >> Observation: Claim #1 introduces a triad that Peirce never mentioned >> or implied in any MS: Subject, Proposition, Argument. Claim #2 uses >> Peirce's own words in combinations that he himself wrote. >> >> The case against #1: Peirce's triads are central to his semeiotic, >> and introducing the new triad requiresclear, unequivocal evidence. >> But every point cited is indirect or ambiguous. The word 'Term' from >> Aristotle to the present has referred to a word or phrase that maps >> to and from a predicate in existential graphs and other versions of >> logic. But a subject always maps to a predicate plus a line of identity >> in EGs (or an equivalent variable in algebraic notations). That is a >> sharp distinction. No simple widening of the word 'predicate' could >> cause it to become a subject. >> >> As I always do, I'll refute the other arguments in your recent note. >> >> > any "discrete" predicate can be analyzed further into >> > a subject and a continuous predicate. >> >> More precisely, a predicate that has content may be converted to >> a continuous predicate, a line of identity, and another predicate >> that has a content that is derived from the content of the first one. >> Both of the content predicates may be called Semes. There is no >> reason to claim that the line of identity is part of either Seme. >> >> > The proposition "something is white" means "something possesses the >> > character of whiteness"; the proposition "Cicero is Tully" means >> > "Cicero is identical to Tully"; and the proposition "something is a car" >> > means "something belongs to the class of car." >> >> Consider the first example: the adjective 'white' and the noun >> 'whiteness' both map to monadic predicates in EGs. Both predicates, >> which may be called Semes, map to the same "object" in the physical >> world. But they do so by different syntactic and logical patterns. >> There is no reason for including the line of identity in the Seme. >> >> The same observation may be made about each of the other examples: the >> Seme (predicate) in the result is derived from the Seme (predicate) in >> the result. Neither Seme is a subject. >> >> The so-called evidence is irrelevant. >> >> > what did he mean by "widening" a definition? Increasing its logical >> > breadth, such that the newly defined word refers to more Objects >> >> Yes. As a synonym for "predicate or quasi-predicate", the word >> 'Seme' refers to more objects than the word 'predicate' by itself. >> >> > He needed a word encompassing not only "term," "predicate," and "quasi- >> > predicate," but also "indexical," "selective," "subject," "quasi- >> > subject," and any other Sign that is not a Proposition or an Argument. >> >> There is such a word. It's 'sign'. If you want to classify the >> many kinds of signs, see Peirce's 10 classes of signs. >> >> > I have never claimed "superiority" [to H & W], only disagreement. >> >> You have every right to disagree. And I have every right to say >> that you have not shown the slightest reason for disagreeing. >> >> > Peirce himself used "Seme" in every taxonomy of Signs that he >> > attempted after he introduced it in 1906. He never used "predicate" >> > or "quasi-predicate" >> >> He most definitely never used the word 'subject' in the first >> position of any triad. But a term has always been a predicate. >> A rheme is either a synonym for or a widening of a predicate. >> And a Seme is a widening of a term or a rheme. >> >> Peirce had a good reason preferring the shorter word 'Seme' as a >> synonym for "predicate or quasi-predicate". Defining a new word as a >> combination of two older words does not make the old words obsolete. >> >> > So what exactly are you characterizing here as "unsubstantiated >> > conjecture"? What specific "evidence against it" are you claiming >> > is "overwhelming"? >> >> My claim is that case #1 is false, and #2 is the best available >> interpretation of the word 'Seme'. >> >> In every note in this thread, I have refuted every proposed claim >> for #1 and every proposed argument against #2. That is overwhelming >> evidence against #1 and for #2 >> >> Therefore, the ethical response is to reject #1. If you wish to revise >> case #1, please do so. But ethics would require strong evidence for >> the revised version. >> >> John > >
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