John, can you cite any Peirce text on EGs where he refers to a Spot with one Tail, or a Line of Identity by itself, as a "Medad"? I thought a Medad was (by definition) a graph with no loose ends.
Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> Sent: 20-Mar-19 09:34 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Jon AS and Gary F, JAS > We simply prefer different but equally valid (and equally Peircean) > analyses of a proposition--you throw everything possible into the > predicate, leaving only an indicated subject; I throw everything > possible into the subject, leaving only a continuous predicate. I agree that those two methods are logically equivalent. But the confusion about the meaning of Semes results from the ambiguity of the word 'subject'. There is a clear and definitive way to resolve that ambiguity: In every occurrence in any of Peirce's writings, ask precisely how the word 'subject' is related to an existential graph. > [CSP] every proposition contains a Subject and a Predicate, the former > representing (or being) an Index of the Primary Object, or Correlate > of the relation represented, the latter representing (or being) an > Icon of the Dicisign in some respect" (CP 2.316, EP 2:279; 1903). Note the context of that excerpt. The paragraph immediately before it contains several quoted sentences in English, each of which is called a proposition. Then look at the end of that paragraph: > [CSP] The system of Existential Graphs, which is capable of expressing > every proposition as analytically as may be desired, expresses an > assertion by actually attaching an individual replica to the > individual sheet; and such possible attachment is precisely what the > Interpretant of a proposition represents before the proposition is asserted. In this context, Peirce's statement "every proposition contains a Subject and a Predicate" is about grammar: every English sentence that states a proposition must have a grammatical subject and a grammatical predicate. JAS > This makes it frankly untenable to claim that "the logical subject is > a predicate" and "a grammatical subject ... is a proposition." That sentence is false. The syntax of EGs is defined by lines that connect monads, dyads, triads... Every EG in which all the pegs are attached to lines is a medad. Nothing in EG syntax is called a subject, a predicate, or a proposition. But every medad can be translated to an English sentence that states a proposition. JAS > by definition a grammatical subject cannot (by itself) be a > proposition, since it is only one part of a proposition; namely, > whatever is not the grammatical predicate. This is a statement about English syntax. A grammatical subject by itself is not a syntactically correct English sentence. But when you translate any sentence to an EG that expresses the same proposition, that EG will usually have many subgraphs that are also medads. Every one of them could be translated to a sentence that states a proposition. For example, the sentence "Some car is red" may be translated to the EG Car———Red. This EG has three subgraphs that are medads: The medad Car———, which represents the grammatical subject, may be translated to a different sentence "Something is a car', which states a proposition that is implied by "Some car is red." The second subgraph ———Red is also a medad. It may be translated to "Something is red", which states another proposition that is implied by "Some car is red." The third subgraph is just a line of identity ——— with nothing attached at either end. It is also a medad, and it states the proposition "Something exists." The medad and the sentence are implied by each of the other three medads and sentences: "Some car is red", "Something is a car", and "Something is red." For more examples of EGs and their mappings to and from English, see slides 16 to 18 of http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf After examining those EGs and their translations, note that every grammatical subject in every English sentence maps to and from a medad, which can be derived by deleting parts of the larger EG. Every medad can itself be mapped to a shorter English sentence, which states a proposition, which is a Dicisign, which is a Pheme. And this point is true of *every* language. You can map every medad to a grammatical sentence in any language you happen to know. > Seme," like "term," names a class of Signs; "subject" and "predicate" > name the two different functions that a Seme (or term) can perform > within a proposition, depending on how it is analyzed. The sentence up to ';' is OK. We agree that the class of signs called Terms is a subset of the class of signs called Semes. But the part that follows ':' is false for several reasons: 0. Before stating the reasons, I'll define a Seme as a Term or a Percept. (Jappy and I prefer the definition "predicate or quasi-predicate", but "Term or Percept" is OK for this example.) 1. Semes (terms and percepts) don't perform functions, but they can be represented by various symbols in various notations. 2. In an EG, Semes are represented as monads with one peg that is not attached to any line of identity. That monad may be a single node with a label such as Car, Red, or Dormitive-Virtue. Or it may be an arbitrarily complex EG with one unattached peg. 3. In an English sentence, Semes are represented as common nouns or as nouns with arbitrarily complex modifiers, such as a string of adjectives that precede the noun and/or relative clauses or prepositional phrases that follow the noun. They may occur in any position in an English sentence where a common noun may occur. 4. But Semes cannot be used as grammatical subjects unless they are part of a complete noun phrase. That requires them to be preceded by an indexical word, such as 'a', 'the', 'some'. 'every', 'this', 'that'... > JFS: But a conjunction of Semes does not become a Pheme until, by some > judgment, it is asserted about something determined by some index. > > Yes--in your analysis, which treats all Semes except variables as > predicates. A variable is an Index. A Seme is a First, and an Index is a Second. A Second can never be a First. But the two parts Seme + Index can be combined to state a proposition, Dicisign, or Pheme. > In mine, a conjunction of Semes does not become a Proposition (Pheme) > unless and until they are "married" as subjects by a continuous > predicate, which is usually embodied as syntax; that is why "it is not > true, as ordinarily represented, that a proposition can be built up of > non-propositional signs" (CP 4.583; 1906). That statement is false for several reasons: 1. Most sentences in ordinary language state propositions without having any word (such as 'is' or 'has') that expresses a continuous predicate. 2. As Peirce said, no proposition can be built up of non-propositional signs that are somehow "married" to a continuous predicate. 3. But an index by itself maps to a line of identity, which is a medad that states the proposition "Something exists". That proposition can be built up by attaching monads at either end: Car———Red. 4. A Seme, by itself, describes a possibility (1ns). An index, by itself, indicates some existent (2ns). An index combined with one or more Semes adds more description about that existent. For more about percepts, images, and indexicals, please read or reread Jappy's article: https://www.ocula.it/files/OCULA-15-JAPPY-Peirce-rhetoric-and-the-still-image.pdf JAS > a single quotation from a single manuscript does not demonstrate that > Peirce was always thinking in terms of EGs In reply, I'll start with Gary's comment about your notes: GF > I think it would be better to go directly to Peirce if you want to get > a grip on how one does phaneroscopy … and I mean to a continuous text, > not a collection of quotes plucked from various contexts. Yes. And my comment about the centrality of Peirce's logic is based on the totality of everything he wrote from the 1860s to the end. He declared himself a logician at the age of 13, and logic inspired or explained every aspect of his philosophy. For some continuous text that demonstrates how his math and logic are always present behind his non-mathematical discussions, I recommend Peirce's late letters to William James (around 1909). As an example, see the attached copy of NEM 3:851. This page, as in other letters to James, is preceded by several pages of heavy math and followed by a two pages of EGs. Peirce apologized to James for all the math, and he explained that he included it for the benefit of other readers who may see it in the future. Note the passage that begins "Argument 3rd: I have long urged that, in itself considered, any one concept is just as simple as any other." After that, he mentions the very mathematical "barycentric calculus", which he presented in the previous pages. He used that complexity to explain simplicity. But James would have to take his word for it. As an example, consider a screen door. Even a child can recognize it, use it, and understand its purpose. The percept/Seme would be simple. But the predicate/Term/Seme would have to be rather complex to describe the wire mesh and other parts of the door. Lower on that page, Peirce wrote "the system of Existential Graphs is the only system that does to perfection that which all logical algebras have aimed to do..." Then the next two pages discuss EGs. This page illustrates several points: (1) Semes, as percepts or concepts, can be simple, even though the predicates that describe them may be rather complex. (2) Peirce was thinking in terms of math/logic, even when he was writing for readers like James who did not understand the math. (3) But it's important to remember and use the Bedrock of logic to analyze and explain the details of the passages that don't seem to be mathematical. Even when he wrote on "big picture" themes such as God, his math and logic influenced what he wrote and did. Note that he converted from Unitarian to Episcopalian because the concept of the Holy Trinity, as a triad, supported and was supported by his mathematical philosophy. John
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