Gary R., List: Gary F. just beat me to it, but I will go ahead and post my response anyway.
GR: That Peirce expresses the relation of the sign to the Interpretant and to the Object *adjectivally *is significant. Or, if one doesn't think it's significant, why not? Because *Peirce *evidently did not consider it to be significant. CSP: ... a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon ... it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a Rheme ... ... an Iconic Sinsign ... Being an Icon ... can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme ... ... a Dicent Sinsign is necessarily an Index ... ... an Iconic Legisign ... Being an Icon, it must be a Rheme ... ... a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme ... (CP 2.254-261, EP 2:294-295; 1903) He freely switched back and forth between adjectives and nouns, and explicitly equated "Rhematic Symbol" with "Symbolic Rheme." Whether we call a particular class "Rhematic Indexical Legisign" or "Rhematic Legisignic Index" or "Legisignic Indexical Rheme" makes no *substantive *difference whatsoever. I stand by what I said before--*every *Sign is either a Rheme (Seme), a Dicisign (Pheme/Proposition), or an Argument (Delome). Unlike Iconic/Indexical/Symbolic, I am not aware of *any *passage where Peirce suggested that one Sign can be more or less Rhematic/Dicent/Argumentative (or Semic/Phemic/Delomic) than another. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 4:30 PM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Gary R, Jon, list, > > GR: That Peirce expresses the relation of the sign to the Interpretant > and to the Object *adjectivally* is significant. Or, if one doesn't think > it's significant, why not? > > GF: Because Peirce does *not* express those relations adjectivally. One > may get this impression from looking at the triangle diagram alone, but the > text defining those sign types names them using nouns, just as it does with > the first trichotomy. > > > > [[ CP 2.250. According to the third trichotomy, a Sign may be termed a > *Rheme,* a *Dicisign* or *Dicent Sign* (that is, a proposition or > quasi-proposition), or an Argument. > > A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative > Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of > possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it > is not interpreted as doing so. > > 251. A *Dicent Sign* is a Sign, which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of > actual existence. It cannot, therefore, be an Icon, which affords no ground > for an interpretation of it as referring to actual existence. A Dicisign > necessarily involves, as a part of it, a Rheme, to describe the fact which > it is interpreted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of Rheme; and > while it is essential to the Dicisign, it by no means constitutes it. > > 252. An *Argument* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of > law. ]] > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* 28-Mar-19 16:45 > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic > (was Ambiguities... > > > > Helmut, Jon, Gary F, > For each and every of the 10 sign classes given at EP2:296, "Nomenclature > and Division of Triadic Relations," for example, the central sign class in > the triangle, Rhematic Indexical Legisign, the first term refers to the > relation of the sign to its Interpretant, the second to the sign in its > relation to the Object, and only the third to the Sign in itself. Peirce is > explicit about this. > > "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign > in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; > secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in > the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation > to that Object, or in its relation to an Interpretant; thirdly, according > as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility, or as a sign of > fact, or a sign of reason. > > "According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a > Sinsign, or a Legisign. > > "A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a > sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its > character as a sign. > > "A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning "being only once," > as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or > event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it > involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns > are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied. > > "A Legisign is a law that is a sign. This law is usually established by > men. Every conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but > a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every > legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be > termed a Replica of it." EP2:291 > > In the diagram of the 10 Classes of Signs Peirce reverse the above order > so that for each class the SIgn in itself is given last. > > We've taken this matter up several times on the list, for example, in > consideration of Peirce's saying that there are no pure icons: so, some > signs are 'iconic'. I would suggest that that is so for the 'indexical' > signs as well. > > That Peirce expresses the relation of the sign to the Interpretant and to > the Object *adjectivally* is significant. Or, if one doesn't think it's > significant, why not? As I see it Helmut has a point from this purely > theoretical standpoint (vs. the use of signs in, say, a proposition, or, > the placement of signs in a particular Existential Graph). > > Best, > > Gary R > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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