Edwina, Gary, list:
Here are (from Commens Dictionary) two quotes, the first corrobates Edwinas view, and the second Garys. In the first quote the sign involves the relation, in the second not ("for the purpose", not "with the purpose").
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1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R] 462:74
…a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object.
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1899-1900 [c.] | Notes on Topical Geometry | MS [R] 142:3
A sign is a thing which is a representative, or deputy, of another thing for the purpose of affecting mind.
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16. April 2019 um 22:33 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Gary R, list
I guess we'll just have to do our usual 'agree to disagree'.
I also don't see the sign/Representamen as a 'medium', but as an action of mediation. It mediates between the O and I - and 'brings about their connection' 1.328. It is best operative as the mode of Thirdness.
My understanding of 'medium' is more akin to a 'container' than a transformative process. I see the whole triad of O-R-I as a medium, as a morphological form in which matter-as-information exists.
Edwina
On Tue 16/04/19 4:06 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
Jon, List,You wrote:JAS: Personally, I do not find the notion of calling a Sign a function any more palatable than calling it a relation. A Sign is not composed of itself, its Object, and its Interpretant in any way; and it is certainly not like a mathematical function that merely transforms input into output. On the contrary, Peirce consistently maintained that the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are three distinct correlates of a triadic relation--which is not properly called "Sign," but rather "representing" or (more generally) "mediating"; and which results in the communication of a Form from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant. [Boldface added]For exactly the reasons you give, I also do not find calling a Sign a "function" or a "relation" acceptable. I think the Peirce quotation with which you concluded your post make this ineluctable. And especially this single snippet: " As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation. . ." nails it.So, as you wrote, a Sign is not 'composed'. That is, a Sign is not a triadic relation but, rather, is "essentially in a triadic relation" CSP [Emphasis added]I must remark that I really don't see the difficulty in grasping that, at least for Peirce, that this is an 'essential' semeiotic fact once one accepts that "a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form." (CPS, emphasis added)Best,Gary RGary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York
On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 3:08 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:Gary F., Helmut, List:As should be evident from my reply to Jeff, I agree with Gary that there is still no warrant for conflating the Sign as a correlate with the triadic relation that connects it with its Object and its Interpretant. I also agree with him that analyzing an individual Instance of a Sign, along with its Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant, is very much like marking a point on a line; as I have said before, it amounts to somewhat arbitrarily breaking up the (real) continuity of semeiosis into (fictional but useful) discrete steps. That is what leads to positing "infinite regression" and "another infinite series" in CP 1.339 (c. 1895), rather than recognizing--as Peirce himself did years later--that semeiosis originates with an Object and can terminate in Feelings, Exertions, and Habits rather than always producing additional Signs.Personally, I do not find the notion of calling a Sign a function any more palatable than calling it a relation. A Sign is not composed of itself, its Object, and its Interpretant in any way; and it is certainly not like a mathematical function that merely transforms input into output. On the contrary, Peirce consistently maintained that the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are three distinct correlates of a triadic relation--which is not properly called "Sign," but rather "representing" or (more generally) "mediating"; and which results in the communication of a Form from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant.CSP: For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form ...As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is active, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected ...The Form is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22; 1906)Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 12:29 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Supplement: But I prefer, that the term "functional composition" means, that a function of something is composed of the functions of other things for the something, so it would be ok to say "a sign functionally consists of S,O,I". It means, that f(S) = f(S) + f(O) + f(I). I think it is always so, that a general function of a specific function is the specific function, like: f(f1(A)) = f1(A). f(S) is the general function, so it is S (because S is a function too). The other three functions are specific (for S). So, very correctly, it would be: f(S) = S = fS(S) + fS(O) + fS(I).List,To solve this problem with "whole" or "composed of", I propose three kinds of composition: C. from traits (1ns), spatiotemporal c. (2ns), and functional composition (3ns). The kind of composition we are talking about is functional c.:The function of something is composed of the functions of... . I think that a sign is a function itself, as well as its object (though this is not completely clear), and its interpretant, so instead of saying "The function of a sign is composed of...), maybe we can say:"A sign is functionally composed of the functions of itself, its object and its interpretant", or even:"A sign is functionally composed of itself, its object, and its interpretant".But maybe, regarding the spatiotemporally external characters, like DO, DI, FI, we must say:"A sign is functionally composed of itself, and the functions of its object and its interpretant".To avoid more problems, I think, that in functional composition, a thing may be composed of itself plus other things (other than in spatiotemporal composition). I call this re-entry, and it is like a computer program code saying "Let A = A + B + C".This is not a contradiction to "relation": While "relation" is something objectively viewed, "function" is is the relation as it is viewed from the function for which the relation is a function, in this case the sign.Best, Helmut16. April 2019 um 13:32 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.caJeff,Even if we take your view that a sign (e.g. an argument) is a whole composed of three parts, and that the parts are the correlates of a genuine triadic relation, you can’t say that the whole is that triadic relation — which, I take it, is what you were trying to show — unless you are giving an entirely new meaning to the word “relation.” You can say that there is a relation internal to the sign, but it makes no sense to say that that relation IS that sign. The relation is abstracted from the internal structure of the sign, not identified with it.
Moreover, once you have analyzed an instance of semiosis into the three correlates (sign, object and interpretant), the correlates are not continuous with one another, because they are not of the same kind. The analysis itself has the same effect as marking a point on a continuous line: it interrupts the continuity (CP 6.168). Semiosis is a continuous process but the object-sign-interpretant relation is not continuous.
That’s how I see it, anyway.
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