Supplement: But I still have the following suspicion:
To involve means to contain, the noun is involvement, and not involution, which I suspect to be a creationist antithesis to evolution. So, if a sign involves the triadic relation, it "is" it in the sense of adjective, like to say a flower is blue, which does not mean blue is a flower (not identity).
To say that a sign is merely a "thing", but not a relaition or function, implies, that a thing is not a relation or function. But that is not so. A thing is only a thing through its function, there is no thing-in-itself. A thing consists (composition) of matter, form, and function.
Jon, list,
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Ok then, I guess, to "involve" does not mean to "contain" in the sense of composition, as I had thought.
Best regards,
Helmut
16. April 2019 um 23:05 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Helmut, List:
On the contrary, the first quote below does not corroborate the view that the Sign itself is a triad; i.e., a triadic relation--especially once we examine the entire passage.
CSP: Conversely, every thought proper involves the idea of a triadic relation. For every thought proper involves the idea of a sign. Now a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object. (R 462:40[74]; 1903)
In other words, every thought proper involves the idea of a triadic relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object. The sign itself is a thing, a correlate of that relation, not the relation itself. As Gary R. and I have both pointed out, Peirce explicitly called it a medium of communication, not the relation of mediating or communicating.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 3:42 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Edwina, Gary, list:Here are (from Commens Dictionary) two quotes, the first corrobates Edwinas view, and the second Garys. In the first quote the sign involves the relation, in the second not ("for the purpose", not "with the purpose").----------------------1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R] 462:74…a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object.
----------------------
1899-1900 [c.] | Notes on Topical Geometry | MS [R] 142:3A sign is a thing which is a representative, or deputy, of another thing for the purpose of affecting mind.
---------------------
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
