Edwina, List, You wrote:
ET: I guess we'll just have to do our usual 'agree to disagree'. Apparently we will, as you wrote: ET: I also don't see the sign/Representamen as a 'medium' Please see my note just sent to Helmut. I concluded: A medium of communication is something, a *Sign*, which being acted upon by something else, its *Object*, in its turn acts upon something, its *Interpretant*, in a manner involving its determination by its *Object*, so that its *Interpretant* shall thereby, through a *Sign* and only through *Sign*, be acted upon by *Object*. (After Peirce in The Basis of Pragmaticism, 1906) You wrote: ET: My understanding of 'medium' is more akin to a 'container' than a transformative process. I see the whole triad of O-R-I as a medium, as a morphological form in which matter-as-information exists. So, we shall agree to disagree. I see the Sign as a medium (not like a 'container' at all) and, as I always have in these discussions past and present, I do not see the "the whole triad of O-R-I as a medium, as a morphological form in which matter-as-information exists." Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 4:33 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, list > > I guess we'll just have to do our usual 'agree to disagree'. > > I also don't see the sign/Representamen as a 'medium', but as an action of > mediation. It mediates between the O and I - and 'brings about their > connection' 1.328. It is best operative as the mode of Thirdness. > > My understanding of 'medium' is more akin to a 'container' than a > transformative process. I see the whole triad of O-R-I as a medium, as a > morphological form in which matter-as-information exists. > > Edwina > > > > On Tue 16/04/19 4:06 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: > > Jon, List, > > You wrote: > > > JAS: Personally, I do not find the notion of calling a Sign a function any > more palatable than calling it a relation. A Sign is not composed of > itself, its Object, and its Interpretant in any way; and it is certainly > not like a mathematical function that merely transforms input into output. > On the contrary, Peirce consistently maintained that the Sign, Object, and > Interpretant are three distinct correlates of a triadic relation--which > is not properly called "Sign," but rather "representing" or (more > generally) "mediating"; and which results in the communication of a Form > from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant. [Boldface added] > > > For exactly the reasons you give, I also do not find calling a Sign a > "function" or a "relation" acceptable. I think the Peirce quotation with > which you concluded your post make this ineluctable. And especially this > single snippet: " As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic > relation. . ." nails it. > > So, as you wrote, a Sign is not 'composed'. That is, a Sign is not a > triadic relation but, rather, is "essentially in a triadic relation" CSP > [Emphasis added] > > I must remark that I really don't see the difficulty in grasping that, at > least for Peirce, that this is an 'essential' semeiotic fact once one > accepts that "a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of > a Form." (CPS, emphasis added) > > Best, > > Gary R > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 3:08 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Gary F., Helmut, List: >> >> As should be evident from my reply to Jeff, I agree with Gary that there >> is still no warrant for conflating the Sign as a correlate with the >> triadic relation that connects it with its Object and its Interpretant. >> I also agree with him that analyzing an individual Instance of a Sign, >> along with its Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant, is very much like >> marking a point on a line; as I have said before, it amounts to somewhat >> arbitrarily breaking up the (real) continuity of semeiosis into (fictional >> but useful) discrete steps. That is what leads to positing "infinite >> regression" and "another infinite series" in CP 1.339 (c. 1895), rather >> than recognizing--as Peirce himself did years later--that semeiosis >> originates with an Object and can terminate in Feelings, Exertions, and >> Habits rather than always producing additional Signs. >> >> Personally, I do not find the notion of calling a Sign a function any >> more palatable than calling it a relation. A Sign is not composed of >> itself, its Object, and its Interpretant in any way; and it is certainly >> not like a mathematical function that merely transforms input into >> output. On the contrary, Peirce consistently maintained that the Sign, >> Object, and Interpretant are three distinct correlates of a triadic >> relation--which is not properly called "Sign," but rather "representing" or >> (more generally) "mediating"; and which results in the communication of >> a Form from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant. >> >> CSP: For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium >> for the communication of a Form ... >> As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its >> Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In >> its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its >> correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, >> the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the >> Interpretant the Sign is active, determining the Interpretant without >> being itself thereby affected ... >> The Form is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that >> conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which >> constitutes the Form, is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form >> may or may not be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied >> representatively, that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign >> produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object >> itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22; 1906) >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 12:29 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >>> Supplement: But I prefer, that the term "functional composition" means, >>> that a function of something is composed of the functions of other things >>> for the something, so it would be ok to say "a sign functionally consists >>> of S,O,I". It means, that f(S) = f(S) + f(O) + f(I). I think it is always >>> so, that a general function of a specific function is the specific >>> function, like: f(f1(A)) = f1(A). f(S) is the general function, so it is S >>> (because S is a function too). The other three functions are specific (for >>> S). So, very correctly, it would be: f(S) = S = fS(S) + fS(O) + fS(I). >>> List, >>> >>> To solve this problem with "whole" or "composed of", I propose three >>> kinds of composition: C. from traits (1ns), spatiotemporal c. (2ns), and >>> functional composition (3ns). The kind of composition we are talking about >>> is functional c.: >>> >>> The function of something is composed of the functions of... . I think >>> that a sign is a function itself, as well as its object (though this is not >>> completely clear), and its interpretant, so instead of saying "The function >>> of a sign is composed of...), maybe we can say: >>> >>> "A sign is functionally composed of the functions of itself, its object >>> and its interpretant", or even: >>> "A sign is functionally composed of itself, its object, and its >>> interpretant". >>> >>> But maybe, regarding the spatiotemporally external characters, like DO, >>> DI, FI, we must say: >>> >>> "A sign is functionally composed of itself, and the functions of its >>> object and its interpretant". >>> >>> To avoid more problems, I think, that in functional composition, a thing >>> may be composed of itself plus other things (other than in spatiotemporal >>> composition). I call this re-entry, and it is like a computer program code >>> saying "Let A = A + B + C". >>> >>> This is not a contradiction to "relation": While "relation" is something >>> objectively viewed, "function" is is the relation as it is viewed from the >>> function for which the relation is a function, in this case the sign. >>> >>> Best, Helmut >>> 16. April 2019 um 13:32 Uhr >>> g...@gnusystems.ca >>> Jeff, >>> >>> Even if we take your view that a sign (e.g. an argument) is a whole >>> composed of three parts, and that the parts are the correlates of a genuine >>> triadic relation, you can’t say that the whole is that triadic relation >>> — which, I take it, is what you were trying to show — unless you are giving >>> an entirely new meaning to the word “relation.” You can say that there is a >>> relation internal to the sign, but it makes no sense to say that that >>> relation IS that sign. The relation is abstracted from the internal >>> structure of the sign, not identified with it. >>> >>> Moreover, once you have analyzed an instance of semiosis into the three >>> correlates (sign, object and interpretant), the correlates are not >>> continuous with one another, because they are not of the same kind. The >>> analysis itself has the same effect as marking a point on a continuous >>> line: it interrupts the continuity (CP 6.168). Semiosis is a continuous >>> process but the object-sign-interpretant relation is not continuous. >>> >>> That’s how I see it, anyway. >>> >>> Gary f.p://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >>> >> >
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