I understand the omni aspect of Peirce's sense of semiotics - but it really needs to be made the basis of global pedagogy with some interpretation of how it all fits together that ordinary folk can understand. amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 7:39 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Stephen, list > > Peirce used the terms 'genuine' and 'degenerate' to refer to what we might > define as 'pure' and 'mixed' categories. > > I don't think that he confined his semiosis to human beings. I think that > his semiosis was an action of Mind - and Mind, as he wrote is not confined > to human beings. > > "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work > of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551. > > Is intentionality agapistic? I'd say ' yes'. > > Edwina > > > > On Tue 16/04/19 7:25 PM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent: > > Good to see intentionality and thirdness. Is genuineness his term? > > I would like to assume that Peirce built a philosophy whose end is indeed > intention and that the primary intenders are human beings. Is there any > instance where Peirce suggests this? If so is the intention agapaic? > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > > On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 3:50 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> Folks, >> >> The clearest test for a genuine Thirdness is the presence of some >> intentionality -- of some animate being or of some law of nature. >> I like the examples Peirce cited in CP 1.366 below. >> >> General principle: Intentionality by some animate agent is always >> a genuine Thirdness. That agent may be as simple as a bacterium >> swimming upstream in a glucose gradient. In CP 1.366, Peirce says >> that a law of nature is "intelligence objectified" -- that makes it >> the equivalent of an intention. >> >> If you do a global search of CP, you'll get about 148 instances of >> "intention" or some word that includes it as part. Representation >> is a special case of intentionality. In many of the examples, the >> intentionality is clear, but representation is less obvious. >> >> John >> _________________________________________________________________________ >> >> CP 1.366. Among thirds, there are two degrees of degeneracy. The first >> is where there is in the fact itself no Thirdness or mediation, but >> where there is true duality; the second degree is where there is not >> even true Secondness in the fact itself. Consider, first, the thirds >> degenerate in the first degree. A pin fastens two things together by >> sticking through one and also through the other: either might be >> annihilated, and the pin would continue to stick through the one which >> remained. A mixture brings its ingredients together by containing each. >> We may term these accidental thirds. "How did I slay thy son?" asked the >> merchant, and the jinnee replied, "When thou threwest away the >> date-stone, it smote my son, who was passing at the time, on the breast, >> and he died forthright." Here there were two independent facts, first >> that the merchant threw away the date-stone, and second that the >> date-stone struck and killed the jinnee's son. Had it been aimed at him, >> the case would have been different; for then there would have been a >> relation of aiming which would have connected together the aimer, the >> thing aimed, and the object aimed at, in one fact. What monstrous >> injustice and inhumanity on the part of that jinnee to hold that poor >> merchant responsible for such an accident! I remember how I wept at it, >> as I lay in my father's arms and he first told me the story. It is >> certainly just that a man, even though he had no evil intention, should >> be held responsible for the immediate effects of his actions; but not >> for such as might result from them in a sporadic case here and there, >> but only for such as might have been guarded against by a reasonable >> rule of prudence. Nature herself often supplies the place of the >> intention of a rational agent in making a Thirdness genuine and not >> merely accidental; as when a spark, as third, falling into a barrel of >> gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as second. But how does nature >> do this? By virtue of an intelligible law according to which she acts. >> If two forces are combined according to the parallelogram of forces, >> their resultant is a real third. Yet any force may, by the >> parallelogram of forces, be mathematically resolved into the sum of two >> others, in an infinity of different ways. Such components, however, are >> mere creations of the mind. What is the difference? As far as one >> isolated event goes, there is none; the real forces are no more present >> in the resultant than any components that the mathematician may imagine. >> But what makes the real forces really there is the general law of nature >> which calls for them, and not for any other components of the resultant. >> Thus, intelligibility, or reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness >> genuine. >> > >
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