Edwina, List: ET: That is, as JAS does, to maintain the reality of God as exo-Universe, by setting up a purely theoretical argument that begins with the Peircean statement that 'the Universe is composed of Signs' - and then, regress to the Peircean claim that 'since semiosis is continuous then, all signs are ONE sign'..and then, regress further to say that 'A Sign must have an object external to itself' -....to then reach the conclusion that the Universe is A Sign and has an external Object to itself, which JAS names as 'God' -
I sincerely appreciate this mostly accurate restatement of my Semeiotic Argumentation, as well as the acknowledgement that at least the first two premisses are Peircean. The second one should really be that any system of connected Signs constitutes one Sign, from which (along with the first) it follows that the Universe is a Sign; and the use of "regress" is a bit odd in this context. ET: I think that such a purely intellectual argument as 'logical proof of the reality of God' is extremely weak as an argument in itself ... As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any *deductive *argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the premisses. If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of *that *premiss; but anyone who affirms *all *of the premisses is *rationally required* to affirm the conclusion, as well. ET: ... and in addition, it ignores two factors of the basic Peircean framework - that there is NOTHING external to the Universe, and to declare that a Sign must have an external Object ignores that this external Object must also function as a Sign - and thus, must be *within* the semiosic process; ie within the Universe - which operates as a semiosic process. The problem here is the inconsistency of those two propositions with the premisses listed above. If there is *nothing *external to the Universe, or if every Object *is *a Sign and every Sign (hence every Object) is *within *the Universe, then the Universe *cannot *be determined by an Object *external *to itself; and therefore, the Universe *cannot *be a Sign. But if the Universe is *not *a Sign, then either the Universe is *not *composed of Signs, or a system of connected Signs does *not *constitute one Sign--and both of these *necessary *conclusions would *directly *contradict *explicit *statements by Peirce. Hence I disagree that those two propositions are "factors of the basic Peircean framework." ET: All we can comment with regard to the reality or not of 'God' is, of course, a purely theoretical argument - since we all acknowledge that there is no empirical evidence of either God's reality or non-reality ... I, for one, *do not* "acknowledge that there is no empirical evidence of either God's reality or non-reality." The truth of such a blanket statement hinges entirely on what one means by "empirical evidence." My position is that it is not a matter of whether there *is *such evidence either way, but rather how one *evaluates *the evidence. "A Neglected Argument" expresses one sense in which *Peirce *affirmed that there *is *empirical (i.e., experiential) evidence for the Reality of God. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 8:56 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > List > > I don't think the problem is a binary conclusion. The problem I have with > these arguments is that they are strictly that - intellectual > arguments. Without pragmatic evidence or even, universality. Therefore - > there can be no valid conclusion. > > That is, as JAS does, to maintain the reality of God as exo-Universe, by > setting up a purely theoretical argument that begins with the Peircean > statement that 'the Universe is composed of Signs' - and then, regress to > the Peircean claim that 'since semiosis is continuous then, all signs are > ONE sign'..and then, regress further to say that 'A Sign must have an > object external to itself' -....to then reach the conclusion that the > Universe is A Sign and has an external Object to itself, which JAS names as > 'God' - > > I think that such a purely intellectual argument as 'logical proof of the > reality of God' is extremely weak as an argument in itself and in addition, > it ignores two factors of the basic Peircean framework - that there is > NOTHING external to the Universe, and to declare that a Sign must have an > external Object ignores that this external Object must also function as a > Sign - and thus, must be within the semiosic process; ie within the > Universe - which operates as a semiosic process. Does this mean > transcendence or immanence? > > All we can comment with regard to the reality or not of 'God' is, of > course, a purely theoretical argument - since we all acknowledge that there > is no empirical evidence of either God's reality or non-reality; and thus, > of course, of the binary transcendence or immanence. > > My concern is the use we make of Peirce to substantiate our beliefs. JAS > and I interpret Peirce's framework in two totally different ways. > > Edwina >
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