Gary F,
Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
GF
any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
subject is collateral experience of it.
I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
individual is impossible (EP 2:493). For both of them, our only
source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
The same could be said about God. For most people, knowledge of
God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
or Napoleon. Even people who can remember any definition from any
catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
GF
If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
or provisional we take it to be.
Yes. Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
and actions of something that conforms to some definition. The
same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster. Benevolence is not a
prerequisite.
GF
I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the
semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go
any further into theology than I have here.
I very strongly agree. And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
"Enough already."
John
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