John, List: For the record, I have consistently referred to *my* Semeiotic Argumentation, and have never--*not once*--attributed it to Peirce. What I *have* said is that Peirce *affirmed *each of its *premisses*, and I have provided ample evidence from his *explicit* statements to support that claim. Moreover, the only time that I used the word "proof" was in response to *someone else *mentioning "logical proof of the reality of God," and I put quotation marks around it accordingly.
JAS: As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any *deductive *argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the premisses. If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of *that *premiss; but anyone who affirms *all *of the premisses is *rationally required* to affirm the conclusion, as well. On the other hand, Peirce himself used the word "proof" *without *such quotation marks in a passage that I have quoted a couple of times. CSP: ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict *what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought, as it were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 2:01 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Gary F, > > Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing > arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted. > > GF > > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of > > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which > > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because > > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity > > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in > > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that > > subject is collateral experience of it. > > I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such > as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the > individual is impossible (EP 2:493). For both of them, our only > source collateral experience is in what we read or hear. > > The same could be said about God. For most people, knowledge of > God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet > or Napoleon. Even people who can remember any definition from any > catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard. > > GF > > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis > > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible > > or provisional we take it to be. > > Yes. Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence > and actions of something that conforms to some definition. The > same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with > the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster. Benevolence is not a > prerequisite. > > GF > > I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the > > semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go > > any further into theology than I have here. > > I very strongly agree. And I'll repeat Stephen's point: > "Enough already." > > John >
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