BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list
The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.
JAS: As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses. If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well."
For example,
All dogs are animals/All cats are animals. BOTH these premises are
true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
How about:
The robber wears size 12 boots/ You wear size 12 boots. Both
premises are true. So, YOU are the bank robber.
All plumbers repair sinks/ Henry repaired this sink. [both premises
are true]. So- can we say that Henry is a plumber?
All men are rational animals/No woman is a man. [All true].
Therefore no woman is a rational animal.
And so on...
On Sun 19/05/19 11:09 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
John, List:
For the record, I have consistently referred to my Semeiotic
Argumentation, and have never--not once--attributed it to Peirce.
What I have said is that Peirce affirmed each of its premisses, and I
have provided ample evidence from his explicit statements to support
that claim. Moreover, the only time that I used the word "proof" was
in response to someone else mentioning "logical proof of the reality
of God," and I put quotation marks around it accordingly.
JAS: As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses. If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well.
On the other hand, Peirce himself used the word "proof" without such
quotation marks in a passage that I have quoted a couple of times.
CSP: ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to predict
what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though
we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His
Thought, as it were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 2:01 PM John F Sowa wrote:
Gary F,
Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by
attributing
arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
GF
> any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
> predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” —
which
> name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names
because
> it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
> who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
> some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
> subject is collateral experience of it.
I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
individual is impossible (EP 2:493). For both of them, our only
source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
The same could be said about God. For most people, knowledge of
God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
or Napoleon. Even people who can remember any definition from any
catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
GF
> If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
> inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
> or provisional we take it to be.
Yes. Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
and actions of something that conforms to some definition. The
same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster. Benevolence is not a
prerequisite.
GF
> I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the
> semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go
> any further into theology than I have here.
I very strongly agree. And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
"Enough already."
John
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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