Robert, List: Thank you for sharing this very interesting paper. The "podium" diagram strikes me as an effective representation of the relations among Peirce's three categories, although his term was "involution" rather than "presupposition"--3ns *involves *2ns, which *involves *1ns. Coincidentally, I have been thinking about modes of being along similar lines recently, since "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896).
CSP: Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of being, and as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a Thing, an ens having Existence as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premise, reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an ens having a Reality, consisting in a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of being. The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the thing lies in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies in its bringing qualities and things together. (CP 1.515, c. 1896) Applying this to the "podium" diagram, 1=essence, 2=existence, and 3=reality. What about the inner portions? I suggest that 1/2=inherence, 2/3=persistence, and 1/2/3=governance. In NEM 4:292-300 (1904), Peirce adapts Aristotelian terminology to discuss the categories--form for 1ns, matter for 2ns, and entelechy for 3ns. He describes form as "whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else" (1=essence), matter as "all that it is in reference to something else than itself" (2=existence), and entelechy as "that which brings things together" (3=reality). He goes on to distinguish three relations--"the determination of Matter by Form" (1/2=inherence), "the reaction of Matter with Matter" (2=existence), and "a determination of a Matter to a Form" (1/2/3=governance). The first and third quotes reflect two subtly different meanings of "determination" as explained on page 12 of your paper. In CP 1.175 (c. 1893), Peirce states, "The reality [3] of things [2] consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition. ... Reality, then, is persistence [2/3], is regularity." Vincent Colapietro helpfully spells this out further in his 1989 book, *Peirce's Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity*. VC: Existence is the mode of being of an individual substance considered as a continuity of *reactions*; insofar as it is *actually *reacting against other things, it exists. Persistence is the mode of being of such a substance seen as a *continuity *of reactions; insofar as it endures throughout a series of reactions, it persists. In other words, existence (because it is an instance of opposition) designates the aspect of secondness exhibited by any individual substance, while persistence (because it is a case of continuity) designates one of the ways in which it manifests thirdness. (p. 83) Based on my immersion in Peirce's writings about time lately, another candidate for 1/2/3 is diversity--the *realization *of different states of things at different determinations of time, which involves both persistent things (2/3) and changing qualities (1/2/3). Peirce describes two different classes of possible states of things that may be realized at a lapse of time--*prolonged *states, which are realized at any instant within a lapse; and *gradual *states, which are realized only at an entire lapse during which a change occurs from one prolonged state to another, these two states being "logically incompossible" (see NEM 3:1074-1077, c.1905). Such diversity requires *real *qualities to be continuous (1/2/3), rather than isolated (1), and *real *things to persist (2/3), not merely exist (2). CSP: Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot exist unless there is something to undergo change [2/3] and to undergo a change continuous in time there must be a continuity of changeable qualities [1/2/3]. (CP 6.132, EP 1:323, 1892) This is one specific sense in which all three categories are always present within our existing universe. CSP: I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it indispensable fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate. (CP 6.202, 1898) I have a different take on the application of the "podium" diagram to semeiotic, but will start a new thread for that because it ultimately deviates significantly from the subject matter of your paper. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 5:39 PM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear colleagues hello, > > I submit for your review this preprint which is awaiting publication : > > https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474 > > Here is his abstract : > > "This article organizes Peirce's universal categories and their > degenerate forms from their presupposition relationships. These > relationships are formally clarified on the basis of Frege's definition of > presupposition. They are visualized in a "podium" diagram. With these > forms, we then follow step by step the well-known and very often cited > third Peirce Lowell Conference of 1903 (third draft) in which he sets out > his entire method of analysis based on these categories. The very strong > congruence that is established between the podium and the text validates > the importance, even the necessity, of taking into account these > presuppositions in order to correctly understand > Peirce's phenomenology" > > I would be very happy to read your comments. > > Best regards > > Robert Marty >
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