Robert, List: My current understanding of Peirce's semeiotic is grounded mainly in his post-1903 writings. For one thing, he eventually abandons "representamen," having decided that "there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193, 1905). For another, he ultimately identifies not just three, but six correlates--the sign itself (1), the immediate object (1/2), the dynamical object (2), the immediate interpretant (1/2/3), the dynamical interpretant (2/3), and the final interpretant (3). The "podium" diagram helpfully shows how the immediate object (1/2) and immediate interpretant (1/2/3) are *internal *to the sign (1), while the other three correlates are *external *to it. It also reflects how the dynamical interpretant (2/3) never fully captures the dynamical object (2) in its entirety--the latter "is something of which our knowledge can never be complete; so that there is always a difference between the experienced thing and our idea of it" (CP 7.281, c. 1895).
Moreover, the relations of determination--in a third different sense, besides the two addressed on page 12 of the paper--among five of the six semeiotic correlates correspond to the two cylinders in the diagram. The dynamical object (2) determines the immediate object (1/2), while the final interpretant (3) determines the dynamical interpretant (2/3), which determines the immediate interpretant (1/2/3). CSP: Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant ... (EP 2:481, 1908) The sign itself (1) appears to be an exception--according to Peirce, it is determined by the immediate object and determines the final interpretant. As for the translation of "destinate" and "explicit" into "final" and "immediate," respectively, I have explained my reasons for that in the past. Briefly, the immediate interpretant is "explicit" in the sense of being "revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536, 1906), because it is "represented or signified in the Sign" (CP 8.434, EP 2:482, 1908); and Peirce often associated that which is "destined" with that which is "final," even doing so specifically with respect to habits of conduct and the ideal outcome of inquiry as the final opinion. CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct, the nature of which … does not depend upon any accidental circumstances, and in that sense, may be said to be *destined*; so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end … (CP 5.430, EP 2:342, 1905) CSP: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907) However, my own speculative grammar now deviates from Peirce's by no longer positing a linear order of all ten trichotomies to produce 66 classes of signs. As James Liszka convincingly argues <https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/semi/2019/228/article-p153.xml>, this approach is "premised on a reductionist framework of semiosis that is contrary to the irreducible triadic character of signs that Peirce otherwise espouses," and "the remedy ... is to re-emphasize the processual and functional view of semiosis, rather than to focus on particular classes of signs." I tentatively propose the following alternative accordingly. - The dynamical object is an actuality and the final interpretant is a conditional necessity, both pertaining to the sign itself. - The immediate object and immediate interpretant are possibilities pertaining to a *type* of a sign, which belongs to a particular system of signs with which the interpreter must already be acquainted (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909). - The dynamical interpretant is an actuality pertaining to an individual *token* of a type of a sign, which may be accompanied by different *tones *such as voice inflections or punctuation marks that result in different perlocutionary effects (CP 4.537, 1906). - According to its relation with its dynamical object, a sign is *iconic*, *indexical*, or *symbolic*; these are matters of degree, not distinct divisions, and "the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic, indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible" (CP 4.448, 1903). - According to its relation with its final interpretant--i.e., the nature of its influence (EP 2:490, 1908)--a sign is a seme, a pheme, or a delome; these are generalizations respectively of term, proposition, and argument (CP 4.538, 1906), but I will stick with the latter for the sake of familiarity. - According to its relation with its dynamical interpretant--i.e., its manner of appeal (EP 2:490, 1908) or illocutionary force--a token with its tones is *suggestive *when presented, *imperative *when urged, or *indicative *when submitted (CP 8.338, 1904). - According to the mode of being of its dynamical object, a term is either *abstractive* when denoting a quality or other *ens rationis*, or *concretive* when denoting a thing (EP 2:480, 1908); e.g., spots in existential graphs are abstractives, while lines of identity are concretives. - According to the mode of presentation of its immediate object, an abstractive term is *descriptive*, relying on an interpreter's past collateral experience (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909), while a concretive term is *designative*, relying on an interpreter's present collateral observation (EP 2:404-409, 1907). - Every proposition is *collective* and *copulative*; as I stated in a recent post <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-03/msg00028.html>, its dynamical object is "the entire universe" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906), which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903), while its immediate object is "the logical universe of discourse" (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903). - An argument *in itself* is a continuous inferential process (CP 2.27, 1902), while an argumentation *represents *an argument as a series of discrete propositions (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908) married by a logical leading principle (CP 3.168, 1880). - The final interpretant is a habit of feeling (association) for a term, a habit of conduct (belief) for a proposition, and a habit-change (persuasion) for an argument. I am still working on building my case for all this and would welcome constructive feedback to help me understand which aspects especially need further support. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 5:39 PM robert marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear colleagues hello, > > I submit for your review this preprint which is awaiting publication : > > https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474 > > Here is his abstract : > > "This article organizes Peirce's universal categories and their > degenerate forms from their presupposition relationships. These > relationships are formally clarified on the basis of Frege's definition of > presupposition. They are visualized in a "podium" diagram. With these > forms, we then follow step by step the well-known and very often cited > third Peirce Lowell Conference of 1903 (third draft) in which he sets out > his entire method of analysis based on these categories. The very strong > congruence that is established between the podium and the text validates > the importance, even the necessity, of taking into account these > presuppositions in order to correctly understand > Peirce's phenomenology" > > I would be very happy to read your comments. > > Best regards > > Robert Marty >
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