Supplement: My English is not too good: I have not read about projective reduction "at" Jon Awbrey´s (restaurant?), but in a post of his. Also my use of terms is neither perfect: Is involution / involvement the same as projective reduction outcome? To call the involved things "parts" is problematic too: The "parts" do not "make" the involver, but the function of the involver functionally consists of the involved´s functions, but additionaly of itself, in the sense like a system is more than its parts. This way it is not (really, compositionally...) reducible, but merely projectively reducible. I think, that the nature of the sign is the same like the relation of the sign with itself, but I am not sure if it is justified to say so, maybe in pure Peircean terms it is not, but in modern mathematical relation concept it is (?).
Jon, List,
Maybe what I have called projective reduction (a term I have read at Jon Awbrey´s sometime) is the same as involution. I think, that e.g. the dynamic object involves two aspects or parts of its: The immaterial and the material, or in case of concept, the concept´s intension and extension. In case of "dog" it is easy: The immaterial or intensional DO-part is all doggishness conceptually existing externally to the sign, and the material or extensional DO-part is all dogs now and in the past. When the sign is over, its IO will have become part of the DO-intension. In the case of unicorn, I guess the extensional DO-part is e.g. horses, teeth of narwhales etc. This is my understanding, I have no quotes to corrobate.
Best,
Helmut
12. April 2020 um 22:54 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Helmut, List:
Every genuine triadic relation involves three dyadic relations but is never reducible to them. There is no "sign-sign" relation in Peirce's speculative grammar, any more than there is an "object-object" relation or an "interpretant-interpretant" relation. Claiming otherwise would indicate confusion regarding the three trichotomies in the 1903 taxonomy--the first (qualisign/sinsign/legisign) is not for sign's relation with itself, but for the nature of the sign in itself.
CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law ... (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903)
On the other hand, the second and third trichotomies are indeed for relations--object-sign (icon/index/symbol) and sign-interpretant (rheme/dicent/argument), respectively. In fact, the three correlates have exactly the same three dyadic relations with each other that one would expect--object-sign, sign-interpretant, and object-interpretant. The reason why the last of these never comes up in Peirce's writings about semeiotic is because it is the same as the object-sign relation, at least when the interpretant is another sign.
CSP: Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. (NEM 4:20-21, 1902)
CSP: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant.A Sign is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903)
CSP: A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object. (CP 8.332, 1904)
There are hints here of Liszka's alternative to reductionism, especially in the second quote where the chain of signs determining interpretants that serve as signs of further interpretants is implied to be endless, or at least continuous rather than really having the discrete steps into which analysis parses it. Peirce later proposed that the object-interpretant relation is approximated instead by the sign-interpretant relation, encompassing cases when the interpretant is a feeling or exertion rather than another sign (CP 4.536, 1906).
CSP: ... the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. (EP 2:391, 1906)
CSP: ... the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22, 1906)
He eventually summarized this as the sign mediating between the object and interpretant.
CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907)
That is why the sign is the first correlate of the triadic relation--it is what does the mediating between the object and interpretant, the representing of the object as the second correlate to the interpretant as the third correlate. Moreover, for Peirce the interpretant itself is the meaning of the sign, rather than the object-interpretant relation.
CSP: But, in the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same object with the same signification or meaning. Any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine ... I call an interpretant of A. (EP 2:304, 1904)
Expanding to six correlates, I suggest that the immediate interpretant is a type's range of possible meanings (for a term, its definition) within a particular system of signs, the dynamical interpretant is a token's actual meaning in a particular instance, and the final interpretant is the sign's necessary meaning under ideal conditions--namely, a habit of conduct.
CSP: But that the total meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept consists in affirming that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of the predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way,--that is, that it either would, or would not, be true that under given experiential circumstances (or under a given proportion of them, taken as they would occur in experience) certain facts would exist,--that proposition I take to be the kernel of pragmatism. More simply stated, the whole meaning of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, once in so often, in the course of experience, under certain kinds of existential circumstances. (EP 2:402, 1907)
Finally, I disagree that analysis can distinguish "as many [correlates] as you will." Robert's "podium" diagram clearly shows that in accordance with Peirce's three categories, there can only be six--sign (1), immediate object (1/2), dynamical object (2), immediate interpretant (1/2/3), dynamical interpretant (2/3), and final interpretant (3).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
On Sun, Apr 12, 2020 at 2:21 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Jon, All,I vaguely remember about irreducibility and reducibility something like, that a triad is compositionally (or another adverb with "c") not reducible to dyads, but projectively is, usually, the triad being ABC, to AB, BC, and AC. Now, in the case of sign it is different: The (projective or whatever) reducibility goes SS, SO, SI. What is missing here, would be OI, at least in Peircean theory, while in Ogden/Richard´s theory a relation between object and interptretant does exist. I think it is called "meaning", obviously being some ontological thing, while with Peirce a meaning without a sign´s partaking can not exist. I hope I have not gotten it totally wrong now.Anyway, I feel that a sign relation is a triadic relation, but a quite special kind of such. Its special way of being able to be projectively reduced to dyads opens ways of relations based on projection (or whatever) consisting of more than three: Six, to start with, but really as many as you will, as every secondness (DO, DI) may analytically be splitted into two more, and every thirdness (FI) into three more.Is that probably so?Best,HelmutGesendet: Sonntag, 12. April 2020 um 15:36 Uhr
Von: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
An: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "robert marty" <robert.mart...@gmail.com>, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Categories and Speculative GrammarJon, All ...
Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> - Every proposition is *collective* and *copulative*; as I stated in a recent post
> < https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-03/msg00028.html >,
> its dynamical object is "the entire universe" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906),
> which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903),
> while its immediate object is "the logical universe of discourse"
> (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903).
Thanks for calling attention to this point. I'm occupied with another train
of thought at the moment so I'll just stop to flag it for a later discussion.
Incidentally, or synchronistically, lack of care in distinguishing different
objects of the same signs, in particular, immediate and ultimate objects and
their corresponding universes or object domains, has been the source of many
misunderstandings in scattered discussions on Facebook of late.
Another issue arising here has to do with the difference between the
"dimension of a relation" and the "number of correlates". Signs may
have any number of correlates in the object domain without requiring
the dimension of the relevant sign relation to be greater than three.
This is one of the consequences of "triadic relation irreducibility".
Regards,
Jon
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
