Jon, All,
I vaguely remember about irreducibility and reducibility something like, that a triad is compositionally (or another adverb with "c") not reducible to dyads, but projectively is, usually, the triad being ABC, to AB, BC, and AC. Now, in the case of sign it is different: The (projective or whatever) reducibility goes SS, SO, SI. What is missing here, would be OI, at least in Peircean theory, while in Ogden/Richard´s theory a relation between object and interptretant does exist. I think it is called "meaning", obviously being some ontological thing, while with Peirce a meaning without a sign´s partaking can not exist. I hope I have not gotten it totally wrong now.
Anyway, I feel that a sign relation is a triadic relation, but a quite special kind of such. Its special way of being able to be projectively reduced to dyads opens ways of relations based on projection (or whatever) consisting of more than three: Six, to start with, but really as many as you will, as every secondness (DO, DI) may analytically be splitted into two more, and every thirdness (FI) into three more.
Is that probably so?
Best,
Helmut
Gesendet: Sonntag, 12. April 2020 um 15:36 Uhr
Von: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
An: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "robert marty" <robert.mart...@gmail.com>, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Categories and Speculative Grammar
Von: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
An: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "robert marty" <robert.mart...@gmail.com>, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Categories and Speculative Grammar
Jon, All ...
Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> - Every proposition is *collective* and *copulative*; as I stated in a recent post
> < https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-03/msg00028.html >,
> its dynamical object is "the entire universe" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906),
> which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903),
> while its immediate object is "the logical universe of discourse"
> (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903).
Thanks for calling attention to this point. I'm occupied with another train
of thought at the moment so I'll just stop to flag it for a later discussion.
Incidentally, or synchronistically, lack of care in distinguishing different
objects of the same signs, in particular, immediate and ultimate objects and
their corresponding universes or object domains, has been the source of many
misunderstandings in scattered discussions on Facebook of late.
Another issue arising here has to do with the difference between the
"dimension of a relation" and the "number of correlates". Signs may
have any number of correlates in the object domain without requiring
the dimension of the relevant sign relation to be greater than three.
This is one of the consequences of "triadic relation irreducibility".
Regards,
Jon
On 4/11/2020 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> Robert, List:
>
> My current understanding of Peirce's semeiotic is grounded mainly in his
> post-1903 writings. For one thing, he eventually abandons "representamen,"
> having decided that "there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193,
> 1905). For another, he ultimately identifies not just three, but six
> correlates--the sign itself (1), the immediate object (1/2), the dynamical
> object (2), the immediate interpretant (1/2/3), the dynamical interpretant
> (2/3), and the final interpretant (3). The "podium" diagram helpfully
> shows how the immediate object (1/2) and immediate interpretant
> (1/2/3) are *internal
> *to the sign (1), while the other three correlates are *external *to it.
> It also reflects how the dynamical interpretant (2/3) never fully captures
> the dynamical object (2) in its entirety--the latter "is something of which
> our knowledge can never be complete; so that there is always a difference
> between the experienced thing and our idea of it" (CP 7.281, c. 1895).
>
> Moreover, the relations of determination--in a third different sense,
> besides the two addressed on page 12 of the paper--among five of the six
> semeiotic correlates correspond to the two cylinders in the diagram. The
> dynamical object (2) determines the immediate object (1/2), while the final
> interpretant (3) determines the dynamical interpretant (2/3), which
> determines the immediate interpretant (1/2/3).
>
> CSP: Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the
> Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
> itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the
> Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant ... (EP
> 2:481, 1908)
>
>
> The sign itself (1) appears to be an exception--according to Peirce, it is
> determined by the immediate object and determines the final interpretant.
> As for the translation of "destinate" and "explicit" into "final" and
> "immediate," respectively, I have explained my reasons for that in the
> past. Briefly, the immediate interpretant is "explicit" in the sense of
> being "revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536,
> 1906), because it is "represented or signified in the Sign" (CP 8.434, EP
> 2:482, 1908); and Peirce often associated that which is "destined" with
> that which is "final," even doing so specifically with respect to habits of
> conduct and the ideal outcome of inquiry as the final opinion.
>
> CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing
> certain habits of conduct, the nature of which … does not depend upon any
> accidental circumstances, and in that sense, may be said to be *destined*;
> so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the
> fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be
> the same in the end … (CP 5.430, EP 2:342, 1905)
>
> CSP: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so
> far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which
> sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907)
>
>
> However, my own speculative grammar now deviates from Peirce's by no longer
> positing a linear order of all ten trichotomies to produce 66 classes of
> signs. As James Liszka convincingly argues
> <https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/semi/2019/228/article-p153.xml>,
> this approach is "premised on a reductionist framework of semiosis that is
> contrary to the irreducible triadic character of signs that Peirce
> otherwise espouses," and "the remedy ... is to re-emphasize the processual
> and functional view of semiosis, rather than to focus on particular classes
> of signs." I tentatively propose the following alternative accordingly.
>
> - The dynamical object is an actuality and the final interpretant is a
> conditional necessity, both pertaining to the sign itself.
> - The immediate object and immediate interpretant are possibilities
> pertaining to a *type* of a sign, which belongs to a particular system
> of signs with which the interpreter must already be acquainted (CP 8.179,
> EP 2:494, 1909).
> - The dynamical interpretant is an actuality pertaining to an individual
> *token* of a type of a sign, which may be accompanied by different *tones
> *such as voice inflections or punctuation marks that result in different
> perlocutionary effects (CP 4.537, 1906).
> - According to its relation with its dynamical object, a sign is *iconic*,
> *indexical*, or *symbolic*; these are matters of degree, not distinct
> divisions, and "the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic,
> indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible" (CP
> 4.448, 1903).
> - According to its relation with its final interpretant--i.e., the
> nature of its influence (EP 2:490, 1908)--a sign is a seme, a pheme, or a
> delome; these are generalizations respectively of term, proposition, and
> argument (CP 4.538, 1906), but I will stick with the latter for the sake of
> familiarity.
> - According to its relation with its dynamical interpretant--i.e., its
> manner of appeal (EP 2:490, 1908) or illocutionary force--a token with its
> tones is *suggestive *when presented, *imperative *when urged, or
> *indicative
> *when submitted (CP 8.338, 1904).
> - According to the mode of being of its dynamical object, a term is
> either *abstractive* when denoting a quality or other *ens rationis*, or
> *concretive* when denoting a thing (EP 2:480, 1908); e.g., spots in
> existential graphs are abstractives, while lines of identity are
> concretives.
> - According to the mode of presentation of its immediate object, an
> abstractive term is *descriptive*, relying on an interpreter's past
> collateral experience (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909), while a concretive term
> is *designative*, relying on an interpreter's present collateral
> observation (EP 2:404-409, 1907).
> - Every proposition is *collective* and *copulative*; as I stated in a
> recent post
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-03/msg00028.html>, its
> dynamical object is "the entire universe" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906),
> which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209,
> 1903), while its immediate object is "the logical universe of discourse"
> (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903).
> - An argument *in itself* is a continuous inferential process (CP 2.27,
> 1902), while an argumentation *represents *an argument as a series of
> discrete propositions (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908) married by a logical
> leading principle (CP 3.168, 1880).
> - The final interpretant is a habit of feeling (association) for a term,
> a habit of conduct (belief) for a proposition, and a habit-change
> (persuasion) for an argument.
>
> I am still working on building my case for all this and would welcome
> constructive feedback to help me understand which aspects especially need
> further support.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 5:39 PM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Dear colleagues hello,
>>
>> I submit for your review this preprint which is awaiting publication :
>>
>> https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474
>>
>> Here is his abstract :
>>
>> "This article organizes Peirce's universal categories and their
>> degenerate forms from their presupposition relationships. These
>> relationships are formally clarified on the basis of Frege's definition of
>> presupposition. They are visualized in a "podium" diagram. With these
>> forms, we then follow step by step the well-known and very often cited
>> third Peirce Lowell Conference of 1903 (third draft) in which he sets out
>> his entire method of analysis based on these categories. The very strong
>> congruence that is established between the podium and the text validates
>> the importance, even the necessity, of taking into account these
>> presuppositions in order to correctly understand
>> Peirce's phenomenology"
>>
>> I would be very happy to read your comments.
>>
>> Best regards
>>
>> Robert Marty
>>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> - Every proposition is *collective* and *copulative*; as I stated in a recent post
> < https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-03/msg00028.html >,
> its dynamical object is "the entire universe" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906),
> which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903),
> while its immediate object is "the logical universe of discourse"
> (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903).
Thanks for calling attention to this point. I'm occupied with another train
of thought at the moment so I'll just stop to flag it for a later discussion.
Incidentally, or synchronistically, lack of care in distinguishing different
objects of the same signs, in particular, immediate and ultimate objects and
their corresponding universes or object domains, has been the source of many
misunderstandings in scattered discussions on Facebook of late.
Another issue arising here has to do with the difference between the
"dimension of a relation" and the "number of correlates". Signs may
have any number of correlates in the object domain without requiring
the dimension of the relevant sign relation to be greater than three.
This is one of the consequences of "triadic relation irreducibility".
Regards,
Jon
On 4/11/2020 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> Robert, List:
>
> My current understanding of Peirce's semeiotic is grounded mainly in his
> post-1903 writings. For one thing, he eventually abandons "representamen,"
> having decided that "there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193,
> 1905). For another, he ultimately identifies not just three, but six
> correlates--the sign itself (1), the immediate object (1/2), the dynamical
> object (2), the immediate interpretant (1/2/3), the dynamical interpretant
> (2/3), and the final interpretant (3). The "podium" diagram helpfully
> shows how the immediate object (1/2) and immediate interpretant
> (1/2/3) are *internal
> *to the sign (1), while the other three correlates are *external *to it.
> It also reflects how the dynamical interpretant (2/3) never fully captures
> the dynamical object (2) in its entirety--the latter "is something of which
> our knowledge can never be complete; so that there is always a difference
> between the experienced thing and our idea of it" (CP 7.281, c. 1895).
>
> Moreover, the relations of determination--in a third different sense,
> besides the two addressed on page 12 of the paper--among five of the six
> semeiotic correlates correspond to the two cylinders in the diagram. The
> dynamical object (2) determines the immediate object (1/2), while the final
> interpretant (3) determines the dynamical interpretant (2/3), which
> determines the immediate interpretant (1/2/3).
>
> CSP: Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the
> Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
> itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the
> Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant ... (EP
> 2:481, 1908)
>
>
> The sign itself (1) appears to be an exception--according to Peirce, it is
> determined by the immediate object and determines the final interpretant.
> As for the translation of "destinate" and "explicit" into "final" and
> "immediate," respectively, I have explained my reasons for that in the
> past. Briefly, the immediate interpretant is "explicit" in the sense of
> being "revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536,
> 1906), because it is "represented or signified in the Sign" (CP 8.434, EP
> 2:482, 1908); and Peirce often associated that which is "destined" with
> that which is "final," even doing so specifically with respect to habits of
> conduct and the ideal outcome of inquiry as the final opinion.
>
> CSP: Now, just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing
> certain habits of conduct, the nature of which … does not depend upon any
> accidental circumstances, and in that sense, may be said to be *destined*;
> so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the
> fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be
> the same in the end … (CP 5.430, EP 2:342, 1905)
>
> CSP: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so
> far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which
> sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907)
>
>
> However, my own speculative grammar now deviates from Peirce's by no longer
> positing a linear order of all ten trichotomies to produce 66 classes of
> signs. As James Liszka convincingly argues
> <https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/semi/2019/228/article-p153.xml>,
> this approach is "premised on a reductionist framework of semiosis that is
> contrary to the irreducible triadic character of signs that Peirce
> otherwise espouses," and "the remedy ... is to re-emphasize the processual
> and functional view of semiosis, rather than to focus on particular classes
> of signs." I tentatively propose the following alternative accordingly.
>
> - The dynamical object is an actuality and the final interpretant is a
> conditional necessity, both pertaining to the sign itself.
> - The immediate object and immediate interpretant are possibilities
> pertaining to a *type* of a sign, which belongs to a particular system
> of signs with which the interpreter must already be acquainted (CP 8.179,
> EP 2:494, 1909).
> - The dynamical interpretant is an actuality pertaining to an individual
> *token* of a type of a sign, which may be accompanied by different *tones
> *such as voice inflections or punctuation marks that result in different
> perlocutionary effects (CP 4.537, 1906).
> - According to its relation with its dynamical object, a sign is *iconic*,
> *indexical*, or *symbolic*; these are matters of degree, not distinct
> divisions, and "the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic,
> indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible" (CP
> 4.448, 1903).
> - According to its relation with its final interpretant--i.e., the
> nature of its influence (EP 2:490, 1908)--a sign is a seme, a pheme, or a
> delome; these are generalizations respectively of term, proposition, and
> argument (CP 4.538, 1906), but I will stick with the latter for the sake of
> familiarity.
> - According to its relation with its dynamical interpretant--i.e., its
> manner of appeal (EP 2:490, 1908) or illocutionary force--a token with its
> tones is *suggestive *when presented, *imperative *when urged, or
> *indicative
> *when submitted (CP 8.338, 1904).
> - According to the mode of being of its dynamical object, a term is
> either *abstractive* when denoting a quality or other *ens rationis*, or
> *concretive* when denoting a thing (EP 2:480, 1908); e.g., spots in
> existential graphs are abstractives, while lines of identity are
> concretives.
> - According to the mode of presentation of its immediate object, an
> abstractive term is *descriptive*, relying on an interpreter's past
> collateral experience (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909), while a concretive term
> is *designative*, relying on an interpreter's present collateral
> observation (EP 2:404-409, 1907).
> - Every proposition is *collective* and *copulative*; as I stated in a
> recent post
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-03/msg00028.html>, its
> dynamical object is "the entire universe" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906),
> which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209,
> 1903), while its immediate object is "the logical universe of discourse"
> (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903).
> - An argument *in itself* is a continuous inferential process (CP 2.27,
> 1902), while an argumentation *represents *an argument as a series of
> discrete propositions (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908) married by a logical
> leading principle (CP 3.168, 1880).
> - The final interpretant is a habit of feeling (association) for a term,
> a habit of conduct (belief) for a proposition, and a habit-change
> (persuasion) for an argument.
>
> I am still working on building my case for all this and would welcome
> constructive feedback to help me understand which aspects especially need
> further support.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 5:39 PM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Dear colleagues hello,
>>
>> I submit for your review this preprint which is awaiting publication :
>>
>> https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474
>>
>> Here is his abstract :
>>
>> "This article organizes Peirce's universal categories and their
>> degenerate forms from their presupposition relationships. These
>> relationships are formally clarified on the basis of Frege's definition of
>> presupposition. They are visualized in a "podium" diagram. With these
>> forms, we then follow step by step the well-known and very often cited
>> third Peirce Lowell Conference of 1903 (third draft) in which he sets out
>> his entire method of analysis based on these categories. The very strong
>> congruence that is established between the podium and the text validates
>> the importance, even the necessity, of taking into account these
>> presuppositions in order to correctly understand
>> Peirce's phenomenology"
>>
>> I would be very happy to read your comments.
>>
>> Best regards
>>
>> Robert Marty
>>
>
-----------------------------
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