John, I agree with your broadening up the seeming dichotomy to an open ended diversity. But I suggest to go all the way; also within a science we find different angles on the same subjectmatter. Semiotics not being excluded.
But, I think there is a second current to be aware of in our discussions. Peirce's text can be read as inspiration for semiotic research. In this case semiosis is the dynamical object, or some aspect of it. But they also can be used to decide debates. In this case Peirce's presumed view on semiosis is the dynamical object. This dichotomy probably can be best looked at as a continuum on which each of the listers score somewhere at some point in their dealing with peircean semiotics (or Peirce's semiotics of course). Best, Auke > Op 17 mei 2020 om 0:10 schreef "John F. Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>: > > Robert and Auke, > > I agree with the points you made. But I believe that a good way to put > an end to the "false debate" is to broaden the dichotomy to an open-ended > diversity. Every branch of the sciences (i.e., every branch in Peirce's 1903 > classification) has methods that are specialized for the subject matter. > For that reason, I changed the subject line to "Methodology" -- Methodeutic > would be an acceptable term, but Peirce's discussion of that term has too few > examples to support all the issues that need to be considered. > > For example, the methods for studying linguistics, archaeology, chemisty, > astronomy, and medicine are radically different. But they do have a common > foundation: observation, induction, abduction, deduction, testing, and > repeat. > > Although the theorems of mathematics are determined by deduction, > mathematical discovery is just as empirical as any other science. For > example, > > Euler: "The properties of the numbers known today have been mostly > discovered by observations... long before their truth has been confirmed by > rigid demonstrations." > > Laplace: "Even in the mathematical sciences, our principal instruments > to discover the truth are induction and analogy." > > Paul Halmos: "Mathematics this may surprise or shock some is never > deductive in its creation. The mathematician at work makes vague guesses, > visualizes broad generalizations, and jumps to unwarranted conclusions. He > arranges and rearranges his ideas, and becomes convinced of their truth long > before he can write down a logical proof... the deductive stage, writing the > results down, and writing its rigorous proof are relatively trivial once the > real insight arrives; it is more the draftsmans work not the architects. * > > * Halmos, Paul R. (1968) Mathematics as a creative art, _American > Scientist_, vol 56, pp. 375-389. > > There is, of course, much more to be said. > > John > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > >
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