John and Auke
I think Auke has made a key comment - which is not merely the method
of discussion and analysis, but the focus. As he noted, there can be
two areas to focus on:
Area 1] Peirce's text can be read as inspiration for semiotic
research. In this case semiosis is the dynamical object, or some
aspect of it
Area 2] But they [Peirce's texts] also can be used to decide
debates. In this case Peirce's presumed view on semiosis is the
dynamical object
These are two very different areas of research - BOTH of which
legitimately rest within the framework of the Peircean corpus of
work.
A problem, as I see it, is that this list is indifferent to the
first area - and indeed, some on the list seem to consider that such
interests are secondary areas of semiosis [setting up a notion of
purity vs impurity re Peirce]. . And the vigilante focus on what is
the correct interpretation of the Texts leads to emotional assertions
of 'correct' vs 'incorrect' [too many occurrences to offer as
examples].
I wonder if the 'solution' is - and here we might bring in
Methodology- but could the solution be the Market approach - which
accepts both areas and leaves the forum open to discussions by the
population - with the Moderator remaining strictly neutral - ie, Let
the Market Decide - knowing that a Market is dynamic and never fully
conclusive.
And, the population itself must acknowledge that the Market is open
to both areas. And the Method of Argumentation is not Who Grabs the
Consumer Fast and Most [ ie with the loudest voice and most prolific
goods from The Text] but is also highly sensitive to what is going on
in the rest of the world. This brings in Area 1- where research in
other fields which use the conceptual infrastructure of Peircean
semiosis [without the text!] can inform the textual analysis of Area
2.
Edwina
On Sun 17/05/20 8:13 AM , a.bree...@chello.nl sent:
John,
I agree with your broadening up the seeming dichotomy to an open
ended diversity. But I suggest to go all the way; also within a
science we find different angles on the same subjectmatter. Semiotics
not being excluded.
But, I think there is a second current to be aware of in our
discussions. Peirce's text can be read as inspiration for semiotic
research. In this case semiosis is the dynamical object, or some
aspect of it. But they also can be used to decide debates. In this
case Peirce's presumed view on semiosis is the dynamical object. This
dichotomy probably can be best looked at as a continuum on which each
of the listers score somewhere at some point in their dealing with
peircean semiotics (or Peirce's semiotics of course).
Best,
AukeOp 17 mei 2020 om 0:10 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
Robert and Auke,
I agree with the points you made. But I believe that a good way to
put an end to the "false debate" is to broaden the dichotomy to an
open-ended diversity. Every branch of the sciences (i.e., every
branch in Peirce's 1903 classification) has methods that are
specialized for the subject matter. For that reason, I changed the
subject line to "Methodology" -- Methodeutic would be an acceptable
term, but Peirce's discussion of that term has too few examples to
support all the issues that need to be considered.
For example, the methods for studying linguistics, archaeology,
chemisty, astronomy, and medicine are radically different. But they
do have a common foundation: observation, induction, abduction,
deduction, testing, and repeat.
Although the theorems of mathematics are determined by deduction,
mathematical discovery is just as empirical as any other science.
For example,
Euler: "The properties of the numbers known today have been mostly
discovered by observations... long before their truth has been
confirmed by rigid demonstrations."
Laplace: "Even in the mathematical sciences, our principal
instruments to discover the truth are induction and analogy."
Paul Halmos: "Mathematics this may surprise or shock some
is never deductive in its creation. The mathematician at work makes
vague guesses, visualizes broad generalizations, and jumps to
unwarranted conclusions. He arranges and rearranges his ideas, and
becomes convinced of their truth long before he can write down a
logical proof... the deductive stage, writing the results down, and
writing its rigorous proof are relatively trivial once the real
insight arrives; it is more the draftsmans work not the
architects. *
* Halmos, Paul R. (1968) Mathematics as a creative art, _American
Scientist_, vol 56, pp. 375-389.
There is, of course, much more to be said.
John
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