Auke, List: AvB: I do not even need to read te second and third alinea of your post ... And to be frank I think it is better to leave your 'explanation' in the 2nd and 3th alinea undiscussed in all detail.
Okay, but those two paragraphs are quite relevant to my overall theory of semeiosis and forthcoming analysis of an example for comparison with Robert Marty's parable. JAS: The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could* signify within the system of signs to which it belongs ... AvB: Do you claim this (within, etc) to be Peirce's addition? As I have repeatedly stated, my speculative grammar is not *identical *to Peirce's, but I believe that it is still recognizably *Peircean*. In this case, I have in mind the following passage. CSP: I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is *not *COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) The immediate interpretant is "the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily called the *meaning *of the sign" (CP 4.536, 1906). For a term, this is simply its definition, and someone who is not acquainted with the system of signs to which the term belongs will be unable to get any idea signified by it. Since propositions and arguments *involve *terms, the same is true for those classes of signs, as well. Even knowledge of definitions may not be adequate by itself to understand terms as they are being employed in a particular context, something that I have personally experienced when reading explanations in the peculiar lingo of mathematical category theory. AvB: How do you delineate this system for any given sign? Since "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906), every sign is part of *some *system of signs. The most obvious examples are human languages, such as English and French. One difference that I have with Peirce is that I consider the written and spoken versions of the same language to be two distinct systems of signs. A type is "a definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537, 1906), and the form of the type "man" as written is very different from the form of the type "man" as spoken, even though they are equivalent in meaning and isomorphic in the sense that each written letter corresponds to a certain spoken sound. "Homme" is yet another type of the same sign, although it presumably has slightly different connotations within French; and in this case, the written form has three letters (h, extra m, e) that have no spoken counterparts. AvB: The dynamical interpretant that eventually follows a sign, is this one of the possibilities contained in the immediate interpretant, or can it be altogether different? Any *actual *interpretant is obviously a *possible *interpretant, but in my view the immediate interpretant pertains to a general sign *type *while each dynamical interpretant pertains to an individual sign *token*. One reason why misinterpretations happen is because a token can determine someone to a dynamical interpretant that is *not *within the corresponding type's immediate interpretant. For example, if I say out loud in German, "Hier ist ein Gift," the English translation is, "Here is a poison"; but an English-speaker who does not know German might think that I am saying, "Here is a gift." The potentially deadly error is misidentifying the system of signs to which the utterance belongs, and thus the type that the token embodies. The final interpretant of the proposition is the true belief (habit of conduct) regarding what I am really holding, which involves the correct association (habit of feeling) of "Gift" in German with what "poison" means in English. This is one reason why I find it problematic to claim that the immediate interpretant *logically *determines the dynamical interpretant, even though there is a sense in which the immediate interpretant of a type *temporally *precedes each dynamical interpretant of one of its tokens. Moreover, systems of signs are not static; they are constantly evolving, such that the forms (e.g., spellings or pronunciations) and definitions of terms change over time, with archaic ones dropping out and new ones being introduced. Dictionary definitions tell us how each word (as a type) is being used (as tokens) and understood (as dynamical interpretants) within a particular system of signs at a particular time in history, so in *that *sense it seems to be a collection of dynamical interpretants that *both *logically determines and temporally precedes the immediate interpretant. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 4:15 AM <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > Jon Alen, > > I do not even need to read te second and third alinea of your post. Of > course Short is right in this view. But that is trivial and not in conflict > with my statement. It simply follows from the difference in viewpoint: type > vs process. > > And to be frank I think it is better to leave your 'explanation' in the > 2nd and 3th alinea undiscussed in all detail. I restrict myself to the > first sentence, look at the boldened text. > > The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could* > signify *within the system of signs to which it belongs*, > > Question 1: Do you claim this (within, etc) to be Peirces addition? > > Question 2: How do you delineate this system for any given sign? > > Question 3: The dynamical interpretant that eventually follows a sign, is > this one of the possibilities contained in the immediate interpretant, or > can it be altogether different? > > Best, > > Auke > > Op 24 mei 2020 om 2:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > >: Auke, List: > I agree that the relationship between the immediate/dynamical/final > interpretants and emotional/energetic/logical interpretants has been the > subject of considerable and ongoing debate. As we discussed recently, I > subscribe to the view that the two sets of terms are orthogonal to each > other, as follows. > > The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could* > signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical > interpretant is whatever a sign token *actually does* signify on an > individual occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself > *necessarily > would* signify under ideal circumstances. An emotional interpretant is > one that is in the universe of possibles as a *feeling*, an energetic > interpretant is one that is in the universe of existents as an *exertion*, > and a logical interpretant is one that is in the universe of necessitants > as a further *sign *(cf. CP 4.536, 1906). Hence the immediate > interpretant is a range of *possible *feelings, exertions, or signs; the > dynamical interpretant is an *actual *feeling, exertion, or sign; and the > final interpretant is a *habit *of feeling (association), a *habit *of > conduct (belief), or a *habit-change* (persuasion). > > Every energetic interpretant (2ns) involves an emotional interpretant > (1ns), and every logical interpretant (3ns) involves both an energetic > interpretant (2ns) and an emotional interpretant (1ns). An iconic sign > (1ns) can only determine an emotional interpretant (1ns) , while only a > symbolic sign (3ns) can determine a logical interpretant (3ns), although it > might determine merely an energetic interpretant (2ns) and/or an emotional > interpretant (1ns). Likewise, an indexical sign (2ns) can determine an > energetic interpretant (2ns) but might determine merely an emotional > interpretant (1ns). A sign that determines merely an emotional > interpretant (1ns) can only be a term (1ns), while a proposition (2ns) > always determines at least an energetic interpretant (2ns) and an argument > (3ns) always determines a logical interpretant (3ns). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 12:51 PM < a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > > Edwina, list, > > That is a debated issue. Bergman did summarize the main positions: > Fitzgerald, Short and Zeman. > > In my opinion the logical interpretant of the emotional, energetic, > logical sequence is a placeholder for the other triplet. Van Driel was the > first to write this, but without argumentation and alas in a Dutch language > dissertation. The energetic in my opinion must also be looked at as a > placeholder for the icon (mental interpretant) and sinsign (the here and > now of the icon) aspect respectively. i didn't however find direct > evidence for this. > > Auke > > Op 23 mei 2020 om 19:27 schreef Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>: > > As a side note - there's an interesting paper, by Lucia Santaella-Braga, > on 'Methodeutics; the liveliest branch of semiotics'. in Semiotica > 124[-3/4]. 1999. p 377-395, in which, among other things [she's reviewing a > book by Liszka] she outlines the full nature of the Interpretants, moving > into an examination of 8.344-76, where she rejects that the terms of ' > immediate, dynamical and logical/final are synonymous with 'emotional, > energetic and logical. > > See also 'Semiotica' 1996, 'Semiotics in times of maturity. Semiotica 108 > [1/2]; 129-155 where she discusses them in detail. > > Edwina >
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