Jon Alen,
You cite: CSP: I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) and continue: The immediate interpretant is "the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily called the meaning of the sign" (CP 4.536, 1906). For a term, this is simply its definition, and someone who is not acquainted with the system of signs to which the term belongs will be unable to get any idea signified by it. Since propositions and arguments involve terms, the same is true for those classes of signs, as well. Even knowledge of definitions may not be adequate by itself to understand terms as they are being employed in a particular context, something that I have personally experienced when reading explanations in the peculiar lingo of mathematical category theory. -- But also look at this: 1909 leter to Welby I understand the [Immediate Interpretant] to be the total unanalyzed effect that the Sign is calculated to produce; and I have been accustomed to identify this with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a mind, without any reflection upon it. [...] My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. [—] The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-interpretant I guess that here we find a reason why Pierce began to distinguish the intended from the effectual interpretant. The relevant part: " I have been accustomed to identify this with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a mind". This need not be the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the sign. Just recall my example of my friend with a stroke arguing. In both cases 1. following the argument 2. take the argument as a sign for recovery (which means a divergence of the intention) one could rightfully claim that the immediate interpretant in both cases is an example of 'right understanding'. The sign uttered has both possibilities for entering in a process of semiosis. You write: Since "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906), every sign is part of some system of signs. -- Here you nicely illustrate our different viewpoints. You write: every sign is part of some system of signs I write: every sign in actu is part of a process of semiosis. as a result you try to understand the system, I the process of interpretation. JAS: One difference that I have with Peirce is that I consider the written and spoken versions of the same language to be two distinct systems of signs. -- This is an interesting point. I entertained the same idea as you did until I recognized that we may distinguish legisigns in two classes. 1. legisigns by comparison: the sinsign icons belong to a family either of visual or auditive signs 2. legisigns by convention. legisigns of two families (visual and auditive) are conjoined and recognaized as the same type. The bridge is furnished by the very same symbol called forth by either of the signs, i.e. the spoken and written forms of horse. best, Auke > Op 25 mei 2020 om 2:47 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, List: > > > > > AvB: I do not even need to read te second and third > alinea of your post ... And to be frank I think it is better to leave your > 'explanation' in the 2nd and 3th alinea undiscussed in all detail. > > > > > > Okay, but those two paragraphs are quite relevant to my overall theory of > semeiosis and forthcoming analysis of an example for comparison with Robert > Marty's parable. > > > > > JAS: The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type > possibly could signify within the system of signs to which it belongs ... > > > > > > > > > > AvB: Do you claim this (within, etc) to be Peirce's > addition? > > > > > > As I have repeatedly stated, my speculative grammar is not identical to > Peirce's, but I believe that it is still recognizably Peircean. In this > case, I have in mind the following passage. > > > > > CSP: I do not mean by "collateral observation" > acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. > It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the > Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) > > > > > > The immediate interpretant is "the interpretant as it is revealed in the > right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily called the meaning > of the sign" (CP 4.536, 1906). For a term, this is simply its definition, > and someone who is not acquainted with the system of signs to which the term > belongs will be unable to get any idea signified by it. Since propositions > and arguments involve terms, the same is true for those classes of signs, as > well. Even knowledge of definitions may not be adequate by itself to > understand terms as they are being employed in a particular context, > something that I have personally experienced when reading explanations in the > peculiar lingo of mathematical category theory. > > > > > AvB: How do you delineate this system for any given sign? > > > > > > Since "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906), every sign is > part of some system of signs. The most obvious examples are human languages, > such as English and French. One difference that I have with Peirce is that I > consider the written and spoken versions of the same language to be two > distinct systems of signs. A type is "a definitely significant Form" (CP > 4.537, 1906), and the form of the type "man" as written is very different > from the form of the type "man" as spoken, even though they are equivalent in > meaning and isomorphic in the sense that each written letter corresponds to a > certain spoken sound. "Homme" is yet another type of the same sign, although > it presumably has slightly different connotations within French; and in this > case, the written form has three letters (h, extra m, e) that have no spoken > counterparts. > > > > > AvB: The dynamical interpretant that eventually follows > a sign, is this one of the possibilities contained in the immediate > interpretant, or can it be altogether different? > > > > > > Any actual interpretant is obviously a possible interpretant, but in my > view the immediate interpretant pertains to a general sign type while each > dynamical interpretant pertains to an individual sign token. One reason why > misinterpretations happen is because a token can determine someone to a > dynamical interpretant that is not within the corresponding type's immediate > interpretant. For example, if I say out loud in German, "Hier ist ein Gift," > the English translation is, "Here is a poison"; but an English-speaker who > does not know German might think that I am saying, "Here is a gift." The > potentially deadly error is misidentifying the system of signs to which the > utterance belongs, and thus the type that the token embodies. The final > interpretant of the proposition is the true belief (habit of conduct) > regarding what I am really holding, which involves the correct association > (habit of feeling) of "Gift" in German with what "poison" means in English. > > This is one reason why I find it problematic to claim that the immediate > interpretant logically determines the dynamical interpretant, even though > there is a sense in which the immediate interpretant of a type temporally > precedes each dynamical interpretant of one of its tokens. Moreover, systems > of signs are not static; they are constantly evolving, such that the forms > (e.g., spellings or pronunciations) and definitions of terms change over > time, with archaic ones dropping out and new ones being introduced. > Dictionary definitions tell us how each word (as a type) is being used (as > tokens) and understood (as dynamical interpretants) within a particular > system of signs at a particular time in history, so in that sense it seems to > be a collection of dynamical interpretants that both logically determines and > temporally precedes the immediate interpretant. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 4:15 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: > > > > > > Jon Alen, > > > > I do not even need to read te second and third alinea of your post. > > Of course Short is right in this view. But that is trivial and not in > > conflict with my statement. It simply follows from the difference in > > viewpoint: type vs process. > > > > And to be frank I think it is better to leave your 'explanation' in > > the 2nd and 3th alinea undiscussed in all detail. I restrict myself to the > > first sentence, look at the boldened text. > > > > The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could > > signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, > > > > Question 1: Do you claim this (within, etc) to be Peirces > > addition? > > > > Question 2: How do you delineate this system for any given sign? > > > > Question 3: The dynamical interpretant that eventually follows a > > sign, is this one of the possibilities contained in the immediate > > interpretant, or can it be altogether different? > > > > Best, > > > > Auke > > > > Op 24 mei 2020 om 2:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt > > <jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com >: Auke, List: > > > > I agree that the relationship between the immediate/dynamical/final > > interpretants and emotional/energetic/logical interpretants has been the > > subject of considerable and ongoing debate. As we discussed recently, I > > subscribe to the view that the two sets of terms are orthogonal to each > > other, as follows. > > > > The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could > > signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical > > interpretant is whatever a sign token actually does signify on an > > individual occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself > > necessarily would signify under ideal circumstances. An emotional > > interpretant is one that is in the universe of possibles as a feeling, an > > energetic interpretant is one that is in the universe of existents as an > > exertion, and a logical interpretant is one that is in the universe of > > necessitants as a further sign (cf. CP 4.536, 1906). Hence the immediate > > interpretant is a range of possible feelings, exertions, or signs; the > > dynamical interpretant is an actual feeling, exertion, or sign; and the > > final interpretant is a habit of feeling (association), a habit of conduct > > (belief), or a habit-change (persuasion). > > > > Every energetic interpretant (2ns) involves an emotional > > interpretant (1ns), and every logical interpretant (3ns) involves both an > > energetic interpretant (2ns) and an emotional interpretant (1ns). An > > iconic sign (1ns) can only determine an emotional interpretant (1ns) , > > while only a symbolic sign (3ns) can determine a logical interpretant > > (3ns), although it might determine merely an energetic interpretant (2ns) > > and/or an emotional interpretant (1ns). Likewise, an indexical sign (2ns) > > can determine an energetic interpretant (2ns) but might determine merely an > > emotional interpretant (1ns). A sign that determines merely an emotional > > interpretant (1ns) can only be a term (1ns), while a proposition (2ns) > > always determines at least an energetic interpretant (2ns) and an argument > > (3ns) always determines a logical interpretant (3ns). > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran > > Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 12:51 PM < a.bree...@chello.nl > > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: > > > > Edwina, list, > > > > That is a debated issue. Bergman did summarize the main positions: > > Fitzgerald, Short and Zeman. > > > > In my opinion the logical interpretant of the emotional, energetic, > > logical sequence is a placeholder for the other triplet. Van Driel was the > > first to write this, but without argumentation and alas in a Dutch language > > dissertation. The energetic in my opinion must also be looked at as a > > placeholder for the icon (mental interpretant) and sinsign (the here and > > now of the icon) aspect respectively. i didn't however find direct > > evidence for this. > > > > Auke > > > > Op 23 mei 2020 om 19:27 schreef Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca > > mailto:tabor...@primus.ca >: > > > > As a side note - there's an interesting paper, by Lucia > > Santaella-Braga, on 'Methodeutics; the liveliest branch of semiotics'. in > > Semiotica 124[-3/4]. 1999. p 377-395, in which, among other things [she's > > reviewing a book by Liszka] she outlines the full nature of the > > Interpretants, moving into an examination of 8.344-76, where she rejects > > that the terms of ' immediate, dynamical and logical/final are synonymous > > with 'emotional, energetic and logical. > > > > See also 'Semiotica' 1996, 'Semiotics in times of maturity. > > Semiotica 108 [1/2]; 129-155 where she discusses them in detail. > > > > Edwina > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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