Robert, Gary F., List: I was intrigued by Robert's quote from CP 2.278 and wanted to take a look at its context. It turns out that this is one of those places where unfortunately the arrangement of the material by the CP editors is highly misleading.
- 2.278-280 is from R 787 (c. 1895-6), "That Categorical and Hypothetical Propositions are one in essence, with some connected matters." - 2.274-277 and 2.283-284 are from R 478 (1903), the "Syllabus" for the Lowell Lectures. - 2.281 is from R 404 (1894), "The Art of Reasoning. Chapter II. What Is a Sign?" - 2.282 is from R 595 (1895), "Short Logic." Although the notes indicate that 2.278-280 actually comes after 2.332-339 in R 787, they fail to mention that Peirce wrote four additional paragraphs between them that are omitted, along with at least 15 pages prior to 2.332. There are two more omitted paragraphs after 2.280, which are followed by 1.564-567, then another omitted paragraph, and finally 2.340-356. Two manuscript pages originally missing from R 787 turned up later as R 787(s), and I was delighted to discover that they include an interesting passage about "scientific intelligence" that Gary F. quoted in a post <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00160.html> a few weeks ago, citing NEM 4:ix-x where Carolyn Eisele attributes it to an "unidentified fragment." I am now preparing a complete transcription to restore the original flow of the entire text of R 787 for further study, but for now, here is the whole paragraph that concludes with 2.278. CSP: An idea is called up when an idea sufficiently like it is called up. A representation of an idea is nothing but a sign that calls up another idea. When one mind desires to communicate an idea to another, he embodies his idea by making an outward perceptible image which directly calls up a like idea; and another mind perceiving that image gets a like idea. Two persons may agree upon a conventional sign which shall call up to them an idea it would not call up to anybody else. But in framing the convention they must have resorted to the primitive diagrammatic method of embodying the idea in an outward form, a picture. Remembering what *likeness* consists in, namely, in the natural attraction of ideas apart from habitual outward associations, I call those signs which stand for their likeness to them *icons*. Accordingly, I say that the only way of directly communicating an idea is by means of an icon; and every indirect method of communicating an idea must depend for its establishment upon the use of an icon. Hence, every assertion must contain an icon or set of icons, or else must contain signs whose meaning is only explicable by icons. The idea which the set of icons (or the equivalent of a set of icons) contained in an assertion signifies may be termed the *predicate* of the assertion. (R 787:22-23[26-27]) The unpublished paragraphs preceding this one reveal that what Peirce means here by "an idea" is "a dream without a habitat" (R 787:20[24]), seemingly anticipating the first of his "three Universes of Experience" that "comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a name within that mind" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908). He adds that "Every idea ... is more or less vague," such that "An idea cannot accurately be said to have any identity ... Ideas have no *hic et nunc*, no *hecceity*, by which they could be *this* and *that* independently of their likeness to one another ... The vagueness of every idea deprives it of absolute identity even with itself" (R 787:21[25]). It is an idea in *this *sense that according to Peirce can only be communicated "by means of an icon"; namely, "the *predicate *of the assertion." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 2:40 PM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> wrote: > I agree with you. The stakes seem minor to me; In fact, I subtitled my > book "L'Algébre des Signes" with "Scientific Essay according to Charles > Sanders Peirce" and I made it clear in my introduction that given the state > in which Peirce's work is presented ("The Peircian Continent" very well > described by Jean-Marie Chevallier) it was an illusion of achieving a > perfect harmony with all his writings. By gathering the thesaurus of 76 > definitions of the sign my conviction was definitively established. > However, I have to justify the "according to Charles Sanders Peirce." > That's why at every moment and whenever it is possible I show that what I > assert is what Peirce said. Hence an important selection of quotes to > support my posture. And you understandt that I choose texts rather > mathematics and more precisely algebraics (CP 2.279) that others avoid > carefully, hence a false image of the works of Peirce (what John Sowa > rightly proclaims). > > > > But Peirce taught us that" The only way of directly communicating an idea > is by means of an icon; and every indirect method of communicating an idea > must depend for its establishment upon the use of an icon. " (C.P. 2.278) > what , in addition, is a necessity that we can reads in the lattice. > > > > I have an icon-metaphor that allows to understand at a glance the posture > I have just described: > > [image: Une image contenant carte, texte Description générée > automatiquement] > > The hypoicône (CP 2.227) define the representation of my personal > approach in the "Peircian continent" by a parallelism in the creation of a > straight line of a linear regression, a basic technique of statistics that > was learned in the first of many scientific courses. In this image the dots > are accumulations of Peirce's texts relating to the semiotics themes and > the straight line is the path I strive to trace. Initially we have only > points defined by their coordinates. Then we asks the problem: is there a > straight line that passes close to all these points? The aim is to test > whether the observed "vague" variations, given the inevitable errors on the > measurements, would be roughly represented by a straight line. The equation > of this straight line would be then the simple model of proportionality > between the two measured variables. It is obtained by imposing that the > sum of the squares of the distances of the points to the right that one > seeks must be as small as possible. > > I constantly have this image in mind ... > > Best regards, > [image: moindres carrés.jpg] > Le jeu. 11 juin 2020 à 14:54, <g...@gnusystems.ca> a écrit : > >> Robert and Auke, >> >> I don’t think anyone questions the reality of a pool of information, >> published or not, which is not the “private property” of individual owners >> but is (or should be) a resource available to all members of a culture. If >> we want to discuss its role in cultural semiosis, why not use an >> established term such as “knowledge commons”? (See for instance Hess and >> Ostrom (2007), *Understanding Knowledge as a Commons*.) Peirce had to >> define his peculiar term *commens* precisely because it was (and is) >> *not* in common use. Appropriating Peirce’s technical term to evoke the >> broader concept of the *commons* invites confusion by reading into >> Peirce a conception that is only vaguely related to the context of his >> argument. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> > -- > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty > <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty?fbclid=IwAR0N4S-t_avO38YlBYcj_-a2YYcsNvl6joIhTkajX0lMQhV8CXRQjQeXXxQ> > semiotiquedure.online ; semioticadura.online ; hardsemiotics.online >
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