List: According to Peirce in this manuscript, each *index* in an assertion denotes one of its *subjects*, either by a word or by "a mere look or gesture" (R 787:19[23], CP 2.338, c. 1895-6). How we distinguish those subjects is somewhat arbitrary.
CSP: Thus, in the assertion, "all men are mortal," we may say that the subject is *every man*, or we may say that it is the *collection of men*, or that *every man* and *some mortal* are the two subjects, or that *everything* is the subject (the predicate being "is either not man or is mortal"), or that *everything* and *humanity* and *mortality* are the three subjects, or a hundred other dispositions. But if it is desired to adopt one constant canonical form, the best rule will be to use a separate index for everything which is indifferent from a logical point of view. That is, in this case to take *everything*, *humanity*, and *mortality* as the indices. (ibid) What Peirce here calls "the best rule" is what he describes more than a decade later as "the proper way in logic," which leaves "the *pure* predicate a mere form of connection" (NEM 3:885, 1908 Dec 5). The basic principle is "to throw into the subject everything that can be removed from the predicate," and then "all that it remains for the predicate to represent is the form of connection between the different subjects as expressed in the propositional *form*" (SS 71, 1908 Dec 14). When we have done this, "we have carried it [the analysis] to its ultimate elements" (SS 72). Consequently, "all men are mortal" becomes "everything either does not possess the character of humanity or possesses the character of mortality." Removing the three indices leaves that which is *not* "indifferent from a logical point of view"; namely, "_____ either does not possess the character of _____ or possesses the character of _____." This is the *icon* in the assertion that signifies its *predicate*. As Peirce notes, "A proposition has properly but a single predicate; but this is frequently compound" (R 787:24[28]). Finally, the *symbol* in the assertion is whatever "gives the listener reason to believe that the speaker endeavors to represent that he feels the compulsion" (ibid). Traditionally it is the *copula*, but after analysis it consists of the words that represent the pure (or continuous) predicates--"either _____ is true or _____ is true," and "_____ possesses the character of _____." Peirce eventually calls such signs "copulatives" or "*Copulants*, which neither describe nor denote their Objects, but merely express universally the logical sequence of these latter upon something otherwise referred to" (EP 2:484, 1908 Dec 25). CSP: The *Copulants* are likewise indispensable and have the property of being *Continuant*. What I mean is that the sign "*A* is red" can be decomposed so as to separate "is red" into a Copulative and a Descriptive, thus: "*A* possesses the character of redness." But if we attempt to analyze "possesses the character" in like manner, we get "*A* possesses the character of the possession of the character of Redness"; and so on *ad infinitum*. So it is, with "*A* implies *B*," "*A* implies its implication of *B*," etc. So with "It rains and hails," "It rains concurrently with hailing," "It rains concurrently with the concurrence of hailing," and so forth. I call all such signs Continuants. They are all Copulants and are the only *pure* Copulants. These signs *cannot be explicated*: they must convey Familiar universal elementary relations of logic. We do not derive these notions from observation, nor by any sense of being opposed, but from our own reason. (EP 2:485) Put another way, the subjects of an assertion are "whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite" (NEM 3:885). However, we cannot observe or experience "universal elementary relations of logic," so we cannot *indicate* them to someone else. Instead, "the only way of directly communicating" them "is by means of an icon" (R 787:23[27], CP 2.278). Regards, Jon S. On Sat, Jun 13, 2020 at 10:02 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > List: > > Since a couple of you have expressed interest, attached is my complete > transcription of R 787 > <https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/search.php?search=%21collection846> > (c. 1895-6), along with the two pages of RS 787(s). The latter are marked > as 6 and 7 in the upper-right corner, and there are no pages marked 8 and > 9, but it could be that they were simply discarded; page 7 concludes with > the end of one paragraph and page 10 starts with the beginning of another, > which plausibly could have come next. I have indicated all the page breaks > in the manuscript and the paragraph breaks in CP where applicable. > > Pages 1-4 are about the nature of mathematics and echo other writings by > Peirce on that topic from the 1890s. Pages 5-7 include the paragraph about > "scientific intelligence" that Gary F. recently quoted > <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00160.html> and > suggest a rudimentary classification of the sciences--listing only > mathematics, logic, metaphysics, and the special sciences. Pages 10-17 > focus on logic, generalizing it to encompass both speculative grammar and > speculative rhetoric. Pages 18-29, including CP 2.332-229 and 2.278-280, > provide a detailed analysis of assertions. Pages 29-35, including CP > 1.564-567 and 2.340-341, seek to correct some errors that Peirce > acknowledges in his previous treatments of signs, especially "On a List of > New Categories" (1867). Finally, pages 36-49, including CP 2.342-356, at > last address the subject stated in the title, "That Categorical and > Hypothetical Propositions are one in essence." > > There are a number of interesting passages that we could discuss, but for > now I will stick to the thread topic as originally prompted by Robert's > quote from CP 2.278. Again, the context of that sentence is a detailed > analysis of assertions, and Peirce sets the stage as follows. > > CSP: The assertion consists in the furnishing of evidence by the speaker > to the listener that the speaker believes something, that is, finds a > certain idea to be definitively compulsory on a certain occasion. There > ought therefore to be three parts in every assertion, a sign of the > occasion of the compulsion, a sign of the enforced idea, and a sign > evidential of the compulsion affecting the speaker in so far as he > identifies himself with the scientific intelligence. (R 787:15-16[19-20], > CP 2.335) > > > The text proceeds over the next ten pages to identify these three parts > respectively as indices denoting the subjects, an icon signifying the > predicate--which is the kind of idea that can *only* be communicated by > means of an icon--and a symbol (such as the copula) serving as the > "asserting verb" (25[29]). Along the way, Peirce anticipates some key > logical developments in his later writings--most notably (for me), throwing > everything possible into the subject, leaving only pure or continuous > predicates, sometimes (as in existential graphs) conveyed strictly by the > syntax. More to come on all that. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
