Gary F., List
 
So, in short: Dissociation, prescission, discrimination is imagining, supposing, representing one thing without the other. But how were these two things originally combined? I guess, as we are talking about phaneroscopy / phenomenology, that the only required combination is, that the two things appear together as one phenomenon (?).
 
Best, Helmut
 
 29. Juni 2021 um 14:39 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:
 

Helmut, list,

I think it’s important to discriminate between logical processes, or kinds of argument (deduction, induction, abduction), and “kinds of separation” (dissociation, prescission, discrimination), which are pre-logical in the sense that no reasoning is involved, just a kind of imagination/perception of possibilities. A couple of paragraphs from Peirce’s 1903 “Syllabus” might be helpful here. Both are from EP2:270 (but I’m skipping one paragraph between them).

CSP: [[ In order to understand logic, it is necessary to get as clear notions as possible of these three categories and to gain the ability to recognize them in the different conceptions with which logic deals. Although all three are ubiquitous, yet certain kinds of separations may be effected upon them. There are three distinct kinds of separation in thought. They correspond to the three categories. Separation of Firstness, or Primal Separation, called Dissociation, consists in imagining one of the two separands without the other. It may be complete or incomplete. Separation of Secondness, or Secundal Separation, called Precission, consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other. Thus, we cannot imagine a sensuous quality without some degree of vividness. But we usually suppose that redness, as it is in red things, has no vividness; and it would certainly be impossible to demonstrate that everything red must have a degree of vividness. Separation of Thirdness, or Tertial Separation, called discrimination, consists in representing one of the two separands without representing the other. If A can be prescinded from, i.e. supposed without, B, then B can, at least, be discriminated from A. ]]

[[ It is possible to prescind Firstness from Secondness. We can suppose a being whose whole life consists in one unvarying feeling of redness. But it is impossible to prescind Secondness from Firstness. For to suppose two things is to suppose two units; and however colorless and indefinite an object may be, it is something, and therein has Firstness, even if it has nothing recognizable as a quality. Everything must have some non-relative element; and this is its Firstness. So likewise it is possible to prescind Secondness from Thirdness. But Thirdness without Secondness would be absurd. ]]

As for involution and evolution, I would say they are neither kinds of argument nor kinds of separation, but kinds of logical relation.

Gary f.

From: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Sent: 28-Jun-21 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

 

Gary F., List

 

Prescission is not reciprocal. Is the reciprocal process of prescission dissociation, and vice versa? Dissociation to me seems like involvement (involution?), and prescission like evolvement (evolution?). In other words, dissociation seems like deductively focussing on an aspect: There is a color, color requires a space for it, so there is a space. There is a melody, melodies are made of sounds, so there is sound. Prescission then would be a by determination necessary evolution: There is space, space is there for something filling it, I can only see something if it has a color, so there should be color. There is a sound, a sound alone is obsolete, has no meaning. So there should be other sound(s), a melody. So dissociation is analytical, and prescission is creative. But not creative in the sense of arbitrary abduction (guessing), but determinated, necessary abduction. But from what comes the determination and necessity? De Tienne says, it comes from the predecessor. The predecessor contains a meaning, which anticipates its own unfolding, its own elaboration. That means, the intentionality of abstraction originates not in the person that does it, but in the object itself. Though this object may require a person (or another source of mind) to do the abstraction / prescission.

 

Best

Helmut

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