Gary, list, GF: That’s why we can prescind Firstness from Secondness (or Thirdness), but we can’t prescind Secondness from Firstness, because Secondness is not logically possible without Firstness. And that’s why there must be more to the phaneron than what we call reality, even though phaneroscopy (unlike mathematics) is a positive science, and indeed the first of the positive sciences.
Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of consciousness? That we can metaphorically arrive at ideas of firstness, Secondness, and so on, but always from the vantage point of thirdness? I might have this wrong, but if not it would seem to suggest a kind of feedback loop in attempts to prescind Secondness from Thirdness or Firstness from Secondness. Reading Jon Alan Schmidt's article, Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time, I was wondering whether it is possible to prescind "time" from "thought"? I'm thinking of this in synechist terms (i.e., "Time is no exception; in fact, it is 'the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum' (Peirce in JAS 2020: 12). The problem being that surely "time" is, in phenomenological terms, "thought"? Kant makes time the precondition for the possibility of existence (or something along those lines) which seems to merely reify its a priori status (along with space). And whilst we can take time and space as a priori categories, it doesn't seem to me that we can "literally" do this - that is, time and space are a priori for no one even though we suppose they must, logically, be a priori for everyone. We know it/each only through experience so that whilst we can suppose that time/space exist prior to our experience of it as such, such judgement must still be made from within that experiential prism. So, in essence, how can we usefully prescind one from the other when the two are either mutually constitutive (dialectical) or a kind of monadic firstness to which we have no real access (except through consciousness which is always at the level of mediation - of Thirdness)? Also, if we say there is "more to the phaneron than what we call reality", are we also not moving in the direction of Kant's "thing as such" or thing in and of itself? Again, absolute novice here but I do know that Peirce in general seems opposed to traditional "metaphysics" and "metaphysicians" which an attribution of there being "more to the phaneron than... reality" would suggest. This may just be a long-winded way of saying that there may be value in disregarding too rigidly defined conceptions of temporality. Thanks Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 9:08 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8 *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Helmut, list, HR: So, in short: Dissociation, prescission, discrimination is imagining, supposing, representing one thing without the other. GF: That’s a bit too short, in the case of prescission, which Peirce says is supposing *a state of things* in which one element is present without the other, *the one being logically possible without the other*. That’s not the same as just supposing one thing without the other. When we suppose the existence of apples without oranges, we’re not supposing a whole state of things, a whole universe, which is what we’re doing when we prescind Firstness from the other elements. If we’re considering an ingredient of the phaneron, we can prescind its Firstness from the rest of it, or from the rest of the whole phaneron, because it is logically possible that this quale (First) is all there is, that there is nothing else for it to be other than. That is not possible in reality because Secondness and Thirdness are there too, in any real phenomenon. That’s why we can prescind Firstness from Secondness (or Thirdness), but we can’t prescind Secondness from Firstness, because Secondness is not logically possible without Firstness. And that’s why there must be more to the phaneron than what we call reality, even though phaneroscopy (unlike mathematics) is a positive science, and indeed the first of the positive sciences. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> Sent: 29-Jun-21 13:13 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8 Gary F., List So, in short: Dissociation, prescission, discrimination is imagining, supposing, representing one thing without the other. But how were these two things originally combined? I guess, as we are talking about phaneroscopy / phenomenology, that the only required combination is, that the two things appear together as one phenomenon (?). Best, Helmut 29. Juni 2021 um 14:39 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: Helmut, list, I think it’s important to discriminate between logical processes, or kinds of argument (deduction, induction, abduction), and “kinds of separation” (dissociation, prescission, discrimination), which are pre-logical in the sense that no reasoning is involved, just a kind of imagination/perception of possibilities. A couple of paragraphs from Peirce’s 1903 “Syllabus” might be helpful here. Both are from EP2:270 (but I’m skipping one paragraph between them). CSP: [[ In order to understand logic, it is necessary to get as clear notions as possible of these three categories and to gain the ability to recognize them in the different conceptions with which logic deals. Although all three are ubiquitous, yet certain kinds of separations may be effected upon them. There are three distinct kinds of separation in thought. They correspond to the three categories. Separation of Firstness, or Primal Separation, called Dissociation, consists in imagining one of the two separands without the other. It may be complete or incomplete. Separation of Secondness, or Secundal Separation, called Precission, consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other. Thus, we cannot imagine a sensuous quality without some degree of vividness. But we usually suppose that redness, as it is in red things, has no vividness; and it would certainly be impossible to demonstrate that everything red must have a degree of vividness. Separation of Thirdness, or Tertial Separation, called discrimination, consists in representing one of the two separands without representing the other. If A can be prescinded from, i.e. supposed without, B, then B can, at least, be discriminated from A. ]] [[ It is possible to prescind Firstness from Secondness. We can suppose a being whose whole life consists in one unvarying feeling of redness. But it is impossible to prescind Secondness from Firstness. For to suppose two things is to suppose two units; and however colorless and indefinite an object may be, it is something, and therein has Firstness, even if it has nothing recognizable as a quality. Everything must have some non-relative element; and this is its Firstness. So likewise it is possible to prescind Secondness from Thirdness. But Thirdness without Secondness would be absurd. ]] As for involution and evolution, I would say they are neither kinds of argument nor kinds of separation, but kinds of logical relation. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> Sent: 28-Jun-21 10:46 To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8 Gary F., List Prescission is not reciprocal. Is the reciprocal process of prescission dissociation, and vice versa? Dissociation to me seems like involvement (involution?), and prescission like evolvement (evolution?). In other words, dissociation seems like deductively focussing on an aspect: There is a color, color requires a space for it, so there is a space. There is a melody, melodies are made of sounds, so there is sound. Prescission then would be a by determination necessary evolution: There is space, space is there for something filling it, I can only see something if it has a color, so there should be color. There is a sound, a sound alone is obsolete, has no meaning. So there should be other sound(s), a melody. So dissociation is analytical, and prescission is creative. But not creative in the sense of arbitrary abduction (guessing), but determinated, necessary abduction. But from what comes the determination and necessity? De Tienne says, it comes from the predecessor. The predecessor contains a meaning, which anticipates its own unfolding, its own elaboration. That means, the intentionality of abstraction originates not in the person that does it, but in the object itself. Though this object may require a person (or another source of mind) to do the abstraction / prescission. Best Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
