Jon, Jack, List, Jon, do you think that the "Blackboard" analogy that appears near the conclusion of the 1898 lecture series (published as "Reasoning and the Logic of Things") has any bearing on your outline argument?
We discussed this a while back as Peirce's suggesting the 'conditions' (but no word quite captures his meaning here) 'before' Time was, 'before' the putative Big Bang. In that analogy the blackboard represents "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions," "a continuum of possible points." (I have called this an ur-continuity.) There are no points on this blackboard" until some discontinuities (lines representing 1ns in Peirce's illustration) are produced by chance. At "first" (although, again Time is not yet) some of these lines, these Firstnesses, spontaneously disappear. But some 'stick' because of what Peirce calls "a generalizing tendency," a tendency: CSP ". . .which must have its origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality. Continuity, which as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general." Peirce calls this a "Platonic world" of systems of limitless possibilities before any actual world has come into existence. Only some of these possibilities will form the 'system' which will eventuate in our Universe coming into being (it seems to be implied that other Universes are possible). I have tended to think of all this as representing the 'conditions before' the Big Bang. I believe this may have bearing on your outline as well as Jack's question. Would you care to comment on it in relation to the NA and your outline? Or, if you think it has no direct relation (although personally I think it has) perhaps you would comment on the meaning of the Blackboard example itself apart from the NA. I might say more myself, but I'm about to board a plane in a couple of hours and, in fact, depended on the editors' introduction to RLT for the brief quotations I provided. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 9:29 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jack, List: > > JRKC: If we accept as provisional the thesis of the "big bang", then > surely a universe determined by an object which is external to it (the big > bang implies both existence and coming into existence, or prior to > existence) is already implied within this thesis? > > > The argumentation has nothing whatsoever to do with the "big bang" thesis. > For one thing, the latter did not receive its contemporary formulation > until decades after Peirce's death, so he was never in a position to > comment on it directly. However, it is predicated on the *assumption *that > the laws of nature as currently understood have remained essentially > unchanged since very soon after that initiating event. By contrast, Peirce > consistently maintains that our existing universe had no *definite *beginning, > and that the laws of nature have always been *evolving*. He attributes > this to the *ongoing *creative activity of God. > > JRKC: I ask because surely semeiotic and phenomenology can only be > logically accurate with reference to a particular mode of > existence/experience which most would concede is either determined a priori > by physical (physics) conditions or else is commensurate with those > conditions? > > > The point of my #7 is that by definition, every sign is determined by an > object other than itself, so something that is *not *so determined is *not > *properly called a sign. Accordingly, the easiest way to *avoid *the > conclusion that the entire universe is determined by an object other than > itself is to *deny *that the entire universe is a sign. However, > according to Peirce, it is a theorem of semeiotic--unfortunately, I have > not yet found any passage where he provides an explicit proof--that any > system of connected signs constitutes one sign. Therefore, if the entire > universe is *not *a sign as a whole, then it also cannot be composed > *exclusively > *of signs; and in that case, we need a different explanatory hypothesis > for its intelligibility. > > JRKC: Or perhaps better stated: the antecedent implies the subsequent but > the subsequent need not imply, or affect, the antecedent. > > > Right, that is why the object is unaffected by the sign, while the sign is > unaffected by the interpretant. "The object and the interpretant are thus > merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other > consequent of the sign" (EP 2:410, 1907). "In its relation to the Object, > the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object > is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining > unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign > is *active*, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby > affected" (EP 2:544n22, 1906). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 9:03 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > >> Or perhaps better stated: the antecedent implies the subsequent but the >> subsequent need not imply, or affect, the antecedent. A definition I've >> lifted from Peirce but which, on the face of it, would seem to correspond >> with JAS's overall point (the antecedent considered as a kind of monadic >> possibility engenders subsequent states which subsequent states cannot >> necessarily alter the antecedent conditions from which they emerge even if >> said conditions, or traces of them, remain present in the current state, >> defined as "subsequent to" that which necessarily precedes them). >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> >> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> >> *Sent:* Friday, September 24, 2021 2:45 PM >> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; Gary Richmond < >> gary.richm...@gmail.com>; tabor...@primus.ca <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: An Argumentation for the >> Reality of God >> >> Jon, Gary, Edwina, List, >> >> I'm uncertain as to the argument - haven't really considered it fully - >> but this point does seem rather important insofar as if it isn't correct, >> it must nonetheless be addressed. >> >> JAS: 7. Hence, * if the entire universe constitutes one sign, then it is >> determined by an object that is external to the universe*, independent >> of the universe, and unaffected by the universe. >> >> If we accept as provisional the thesis of the "big bang", then surely a >> universe determined by an object which is external to it (the big bang >> implies both existence and coming into existence, or prior to existence) is >> already implied within this thesis? >> >> Not necessarily Peircean but isn't it also possible, or certain, that the >> physics we know today were not those which existed in the immediate >> aftermath of the big bang (and prior to it, no one has any idea). I ask >> because surely semeiotic and phenomenology can only be logically accurate >> with reference to a particular mode of existence/experience which most >> would concede is either determined a priori by physical (physics) >> conditions or else is commensurate with those conditions? >> >> best >> >> Jack >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
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