Jack, List: JRKC: Is the basic point that if the universe is a sign, then the initial object of that sign must have existed prior to, or in external relation to, the universe (as sign)?
The basic point is that the (dynamical) object of *any *sign is necessarily external to, independent of, and unaffected by *that *sign. As John Sowa has suggested, anything spatial and temporal belongs to Peirce's *second *Universe of Experience, "that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908) or "that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last analysis, consist in their reactions" (EP 2:479, 1908). God is *not *this kind of object, so in Peirce's careful terminology, God is *real *but does not *exist*. Moreover, in accordance with "the pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium*," a "disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time" (CP 6.490, 1908). Since time itself is part of our existing universe, the (dynamical) object of *this *sign must be outside of time altogether--one of the traditional attributes of God. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 11:18 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Edwina, John, List: > > Thanks, I take both of your comments on board. > > Edwina - not sure if you want to go into it all, but is your > interpretation then inherently dialectical in a way which John's isn't? Or > have I misread your statement as supporting lines of mutually constitutive > directionality (not necessarily restricted by what we think of as temporal > distinctions)? And are you using hierarchical in the sense of nested or > embedded discourse/priority? It's interesting. > > John - yep, I know the big bang thesis occurs many decades after Peirce, > was just wondering about your argument in relation to universal beginnings. > I do like the concept of a universe without a definite beginning with laws > of nature that are/have been always evolving. Is the basic point that if > the universe is a sign, then the initial object of that sign must have > existed prior to, or in external relation to, the universe (as sign)? Or > that the initial object must be of a different order than the universe > insofar as it would have to be external to the universe considered as a > sign in Peircean semeiotic? > > Cheers > > Jack > >
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