the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the object as it is in itself.
Just to add: along with what has to now be a deductively clear argumentation of the premisses, by me, this is where we are likely to disagree. The sign, cannot, in principle, or practice, represent the object as it is in itself. But I note your post in general and there are many good pointers there insofar as we might bring this debate forward and reach consensus one way or the other. Thanks. ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Any argumentation that has a "gap" cannot be deductively valid. The whole point is to show that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses by spelling them all out, especially the ones that are likely to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in itself" entails that nothing has been demonstrated yet. Which premiss(es) are you omitting? By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, we can reformulate it as follows. 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found (all S is I or F). 2. The Ding an sich can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). 3. Therefore, the Ding an sich cannot be the subject of a meaningful proposition (no D is S). We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E is S). 5. Therefore, the Ding an sich does not exist (no D is E). Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). Which premiss(es) are you denying? Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the non-existence of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the full context. CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141, 1911) Similarly, he wrote the following two years later. CSP: Immanuel Kant, incomparably the greatest philosopher of knowledge that ever was, the great scrutinator of Reality, has in one large part of his chef d’oeuvre a good deal to say about the Ding an sich meaning all that is independent at once of Perspection and of Understanding. He even many times uses the phrase in the plural, possibly as a help to feebler minds. But it seems impossible upon his own principles that any meaning whatever should rightly be attached to the phrase. What we can in some measure know is our universe in such a sense that we cannot mean anything of what may be "beyond." (R 930, 1913) In short, Peirce is merely using different terms to reiterate his agreement with Kant that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience" (CP 6.95, 1903). However, he still disagrees that things in themselves are beyond those limits--note that they demarcate the range of possible experience, not actual experience--and thus reaffirms that Kant's Ding an sich is meaningless. I went through your "essay-lite," but as with many of your long List posts, I frankly had a hard time making heads or tails of it. For example, you say over and over that our concepts of things are not identical to those things, but this is uncontroversial and irrelevant--the sign is not the object, but the sign represents the object, and the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the object as it is in itself. In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the discussion further. Thanks, Jon On Sat, Jun 3, 2023 at 12:32 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie<mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List It is deductively valid if you fill in the gap re thing in itself, which I have done/explained/qualified within the various formalism. It just assumes basic knowledge of that. JAS: "As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry." I don't see how that is possible except as some variety of ideal which Kant, differentially, would not even disagree with (as in stressed objectivity, "fire is hot", and mutual comprehension). Throwing it to an infinite community, what effect does that have? Because the nature of infinity is that it continues. Do you have knowlede of an object as it is in itself after that ideal time? Logically, it seems to me, the key isn't "infinite community" but whether it is necessary to infer the existence of the thing in itself. For if this is necessary, then it matters not if the period of time be finite or infinite. And, again, I side with Peirce in the Welby exerpt. I believe it is necessary. Best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot represent those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot cognize those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie<mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Any argumentation that has a "gap" cannot be deductively valid. The whole point is to show that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses by spelling them all out, especially the ones that are likely to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in itself" entails that nothing has been demonstrated yet. Which premiss(es) are you omitting? By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, we can reformulate it as follows. 1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found (all S is I or F). 2. The Ding an sich can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F). 3. Therefore, the Ding an sich cannot be the subject of a meaningful proposition (no D is S). We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it. 4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E is S). 5. Therefore, the Ding an sich does not exist (no D is E). Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). Which premiss(es) are you denying? Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the non-existence of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the full context. CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141, 1911) Similarly, he wrote the following two years later. CSP: Immanuel Kant, incomparably the greatest philosopher of knowledge that ever was, the great scrutinator of Reality, has in one large part of his chef d’oeuvre a good deal to say about the Ding an sich meaning all that is independent at once of Perspection and of Understanding. He even many times uses the phrase in the plural, possibly as a help to feebler minds. But it seems impossible upon his own principles that any meaning whatever should rightly be attached to the phrase. What we can in some measure know is our universe in such a sense that we cannot mean anything of what may be "beyond." (R 930, 1913) In short, Peirce is merely using different terms to reiterate his agreement with Kant that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience" (CP 6.95, 1903). However, he still disagrees that things in themselves are beyond those limits--note that they demarcate the range of possible experience, not actual experience--and thus reaffirms that Kant's Ding an sich is meaningless. I went through your "essay-lite," but as with many of your long List posts, I frankly had a hard time making heads or tails of it. For example, you say over and over that our concepts of things are not identical to those things, but this is uncontroversial and irrelevant--the sign is not the object, but the sign represents the object, and the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the object as it is in itself. In any case, I honestly believe that simple and direct answers to my two specific questions bolded above would be very helpful for advancing the discussion further. Thanks, Jon On Sat, Jun 3, 2023 at 12:32 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie<mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List It is deductively valid if you fill in the gap re thing in itself, which I have done/explained/qualified within the various formalism. It just assumes basic knowledge of that. JAS: "As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry." I don't see how that is possible except as some variety of ideal which Kant, differentially, would not even disagree with (as in stressed objectivity, "fire is hot", and mutual comprehension). Throwing it to an infinite community, what effect does that have? Because the nature of infinity is that it continues. Do you have knowlede of an object as it is in itself after that ideal time? Logically, it seems to me, the key isn't "infinite community" but whether it is necessary to infer the existence of the thing in itself. For if this is necessary, then it matters not if the period of time be finite or infinite. And, again, I side with Peirce in the Welby exerpt. I believe it is necessary. Best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot represent those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot cognize those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie<mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack
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