Hello John, Mary, all, I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz.
Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are identical. In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general laws that govern such individuals. A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide. We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these differences in their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we need to consider different kinds of "things" that we might try to individuate, such as a rock, a human person or God. Contrast the attempts of these philosophers to clarify the grounds for individuating such various things as individuals, as compared to the grounds for understanding something—such as a law of causality--to be a real universal that governs actual individual objects. Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz: Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a general class without exception. CP 2.370 How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each? --Jeff ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of John F Sowa <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 9:01 AM To: Mary Libertin <[email protected]> Cc: Peirce-L <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Mary, Thanks for citing that book. Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues. After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"? For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications. John ________________________________________ From: "Mary Libertin" <[email protected]> Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM John, Peirce-list For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion. * * Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
