Jack and Jon, I believe that the two of you are talking past one another. I also suspect that a major reason for the disagreement is that Kant and Peirce had very different criteria for what it means to know something. By knowing, Kant meant absolutely total knowledge of something, not just its appearances at the surface. But Peirce was first and foremost a scientist, who understood that scientific knowledge is acquired by years or even centuries of collaborative research by an untold number of scientists.
The following quotation summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. ________. "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else... This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, - a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it. Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities which they represent, would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but noumena or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental action which is set in motion by sensation". [CP 8.12-13, emphasis Peirce's] John ---------------------------------------- From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <[email protected]> I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. Jack ---------------------------------------- From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a necessary inference, i.e., a deductive conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the existence of anything strictly by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is not deductive at all, it is abductive/retroductive--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually explain anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. (CP 1.405, EP 1:, 1887-8) Again, for Peirce, asserting that it is impossible to cognize/represent/know something as it is in itself is straightforwardly blocking the way of inquiry. Moreover, a person as an existent is not a predicate, but a subject--that to which propositions can attribute predicates. Likewise, if the thing-in-itself were to exist, then it would be a subject to which propositions could attribute predicates; but as Peirce observes, "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). In other words, there is no logical justification for asserting the existence of something to which we cannot determinately attribute any predicates whatsoever. As for the "unknown known" or "known unknown" ... CSP: A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy. The nominalists in giving their adherence to that doctrine which is really held by all philosophers of all stripes, namely, that experience is all we know, understand experience in their nominalistic sense as the mere first impressions of sense. These "first impressions of sense" are hypothetical creations of nominalistic metaphysics: I for one deny their existence. But anyway even if they exist, it is not in them that experience consists. By experience must be understood the entire mental product. (CP 6.492, c. 1896) Peirce clarifies later, "But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538, 1899). Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jun 5, 2023 at 11:09 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <[email protected]> wrote: Jon, Just with respect to "inference": I just wish to say, in advance of what I think will be a slow creep, on my part, toward a methodological break down of an already confirmed thesis (as it stands to me, but necessary for its confirmation is not understood by others or accepted) that my use of inference/infer is correct. I infer it, the thing in itself exists, but as it is in itself, as to its qualities re cognition, I cannot cognize it even as I do. My imagination of it is not what it is, but merely my analytical attempt, foolhardy, as it must be, to imagine it. That is, I know that Socrates existed. I do not know what he looked like but I might imagine such a man. I do not pretend my imagining of Socrates is what Socrates, the actual man, appeared in physical characteristic. But that I have an imagining of such a man, and know it to be incorrect, and also know that such a man existed, to which some "truthful" quality pertained, this is no contradiction at all. Thus, I infer that Socrates existed whilst also inferring that my representation of Socrates, in image, is not what Socrates, the man, actually looked like. More accurately, then: People operate upon this structural basis quite frequently. I'm sure I have read of this very means in Peirce. And yet, I cannot point you precisely to it, as it were, which is, diagrammatically, a micro-variety of the same phenomena. However, consider this: I hear of a person - predicate 1 - and something they've done/something qualitatively associated with them - predicate 2. I do not know the first predicate at all - the person - but am very familiar with the second predicate - the quality which is "something" they've done or is "something associated with them". Now, let's pretend the second predicate is "died/death". Thus, I may justly infer a conclusion, which is both inductive and deductive and have it stand entirely valid despite absolutely no knowledge of the first predicate. Insofar as "naturally occurring propositions" go, then, limited/no exposure to the first predicate beyond formal acquaintance, that it represents "a person", but quite a lot of exposure with/to the second predicate, which here is the quality of "death/died" is such, sui generis, that my inference corresponds to UnknownKnown wherein my attempts to imagine the Unknown, are entirely fallible And such is a logical truism: that the unknown may exist, and frequently does, (ordinally here), as in the above scenario where I have never met the first person, but I may still imagine that person via whatever images, as result of Collateral Experience, are present to my mind as means of furnishing. Yet, such images, I know, simultaneously, are not, at all, what that person, the unknown-but-really-extant "predicate", actually is/looks-like. It is Schopenhauer who posits the Known Unknown within the Kantian context of the thing in itself. He deviates, I have to recall here as it is ten years since I have read Schopenhauer, from my understanding of Kant, but that UnknownKnown, or KnownUnknown, is something, which, experientially, you find in Peirce (as Peirce explaining things as they are in representational terms - within his schema: is it abduction? the term is not important to me here, but what it refers to, as it were, is a rather true phenomena). At any rate, to infer that the thing in itself necessarily exists but that all cognitions of it are not it, beyond the mere fact that it exists, is not as contradictory as it may seem. Best Jack
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