Jack, List: I appreciate the latest attempt at simplification, but it is still not a deductively valid argumentation. In fact, its conclusion is an incorrect *definition*.
JRKC: 13. Elemental qualities, in the absence of human (or, all organic) experience, must exist in themselves. 14. This is what Kant calls the “thing in itself”. On the contrary, this is *not *what Kant calls the "thing in itself." #13 is not controversial at all, as long as we are using "exist" in the logical sense of belonging to a universe of discourse; from the metaphysical standpoint, qualities have their *being *in themselves (1ns), but they do not *exist *except as embodied in things (2ns). Moreover, we agree that cognition (and representation in general) is always *mediation *such that things with their embodied qualities can and do exist without ever *actually *being cognized; again, the *real *is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks *about it*, and the *external *is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks *about anything*. We further agree that no cognition or other sign of an external thing is *identical *to that thing. In short, no one is disputing that external things *exist *independently of mediation or human cognitive processes, but at issue is whether external things and/or some of their embodied qualities are *incognizable*, i.e., impossible to *represent *by means of mediation (semiosis) including human cognitive processes. You still have not provided a series of premisses from which *that *conclusion follows necessarily, like I did by reformulating and formalizing Peirce's straightforward proof that the *Ding an sich* is nonsensical (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2023-06/msg00016.html). Instead, you seem to be *assuming *that whatever is *independent *of any representation of it is *incapable *of being represented at all, thus begging the question. JRKC: I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. These remarks reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Peircean semeiotic. Strictly speaking, it is true that nothing *serves *as a dynamical object unless/until it *actually *determines a sign (such as a cognition) to represent it. Nevertheless, whatever logically exists, in *any *of the three Universes of Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908), is *capable* of being represented and thus a *potential *dynamical object for a sign. Again, the problematic concept here is not so much the thing-in-itself as the *incognizable *thing-in-itself, the claim that something can exist yet be *impossible *to cognize/represent. For both Kant and Peirce, metaphysics depends on logic for principles, not the other way around. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 6, 2023 at 7:18 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > > Jon, list, > > I present a very brief draft, once more - albeit much neater than perhaps > it has been before - which demonstrates the necessary inference of the > thing in itself which cannot, in any respect, be cognized. I know not how > to make it more simple than this (though I am trying - and facing the > problem, in micro-form, perhaps, that Kant had with his Prolegomena). That > is, the more complicated version no one can understand (Critique) but > surely this simple version everyone must understand. The premises follow > each other, I have checked them dozens of ways, differentially, and the > primary points - semantic - are all sound. > > Whether one accepts this as proof or not is not up to me, as I, too, used > to think the thing in itself was utter nonsense. But, in all honesty, I > cannot see how it is now other than necessary given the logical situation > (minus Peirce, for the moment, whom I bring back in at a later date - > comments from yourself, Helmut, some private correspondence, and J Sowa > have been very helpful in allowing me to understand the primary > objections). If they are not met here, within this draft, it is only > because I am literally cutting paper upon the chopping board and going > through hundreds of thousands of words to try and find the best means of > articulation. > > Best > > Jack > >
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