John, List: JFS: The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line.
Actually, Peirce *does not* use the word "paper" in the "red pencil" passage of R 514, he uses the word "sheet." However, this is just a quibble--I now recognize that every individual page in the R L376 approach could have a red line drawn just inside its edges, with different postulates in its margin and thus different graphs within its red line. I also heartily agree that the postulates in the margin *govern *the graphs inside the red line, which is why I continue to disagree with this subsequent statement. JFS: But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent--in the sense that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the phemic sheet. In the RLT example, what is written outside the "lightly drawn oval" *does not* govern what is written inside the oval, at least not in the same sense. After all, what is written outside the oval is not a *proposition *at all, so it cannot be a postulate or express a special understanding between the utterer and interpreter. It is merely a *rheme*, and its blank is filled by the proposition written inside the oval. As far as I know, this is a *completely different* notation from anything that Peirce presents in his other writings about EGs, and he uses it in RLT only as a step toward explaining the cut for negation. JFS: I strongly recommend three slides--29, 30, and 31. If you don't read all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the text of those three. I already did so, after you provided the link in your earlier post. I agree that the RLT example is consistent with what you say about metalanguage, but it is still *not *equivalent to the "red pencil" operation in R 514 nor the "many papers" concept in R L376. Moreover, it is misleading to state on slide 30, "A shaded oval negates the nested EG. Without shading, the EG expresses a proposition that is neither asserted nor negated." As you know very well, Peirce did not introduce shading for negation until 1911. Up until then, *any *oval--except the one-of-a-kind RLT example, where a rheme is attached to it--negates the nested EG. Again, the sole reason that Peirce expresses for needing to add a Delta part to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which for him are propositions involving possibility and necessity. The synthesis that I am now contemplating would satisfy that one criterion by combining the graphs scribed in R 339:[340r] with the "red pencil" improvement in R 514 and the "many papers" concept in R L376. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 24, 2024 at 6:12 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Please note the phrase "a special understanding between utterer and > interpreter" in the excerpt below. And note that different "papers" of the > phemic sheet may have different special understandings. Although Peirce > did not coin the term 'metalanguage', that is the word that has been used > for such texts from the 1930s to today. Since the word 'metalanguage' is > far more widely used than 'special understandings', Peirce's ethics of > terminology would require us to adopt that term for the special > understandings that determine the interpretation of any paper of the phemic > sheet. > > The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with > postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Note > that R514 also contains a draft of the EG specifications that he uses in > every MS from June 1911 to November 1913. It is quite likely that Peirce > would have used the R514 conventions to specify the metalanguage. Since he > didn't finish L376, we can only guess what notation he might have chosen > for his "papers". The best guess is the notation for "papers" in R514. > But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent -- in the sense > that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in > either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the > phemic sheet. > > In my previous notes, I included many references, each of which includes > many more references. For simplicity, I recommend the slides of > https://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf starting at slide 14, which begins with > a short review of EG notation and continues with applications of EGs for > representing the semantics of natural languages. > > I strongly recommend three slides -- 29, 30, and 31. If you don't read > all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the > text of those three. Slide 31 shows how different metalanguage can state > whether a diagram is interpreted as actual (a fact in current time), > possible (modal), or wished (another kind of modality that may also be > called intentional). > > In slide 31, the diagram is drawn as a kind of cartoon. But it could also > have been drawn as an EG on a phemic sheet. In fact, the commentary about > the cartoon in slide 31 could also have been stated in three different > "papers" of a phemic sheet. That would be a good illustration of what > Peirce was saying in L376. > > In fact, note Peirce's own example of the sentence "Sometimes it snows." > That's a good example by somebody who is writing a letter in December. > One paper might be actual at one time, other papers might be possible at > other times, and some paper might be wished for Christmas. He may have > been laying out a large phemic sheet of such papers when he slipped. > Nobody knows. But it's possible. > > John > > _________________________________ > > From L376: > > All thought, which is the process of forming, under self-control, an > intellectual habit, requires two functionaries; an utterer and an > interpreter, and though these two functionaries may live in one brain, they > are nevertheless two. In order to distinguish the actual performance of an > assertion, though it be altogether a mental act, from a mere representation > or appearance, the difference between a mere idea jotted down on a bit of > paper, from an affidavit made before a notary, for which the utterer is > substantially responsible, I provide my system with a phemic sheet, which > is a surface upon which the utterer and interpreter will, by force of a > voluntary and actually contracted habit, recognize that whatever is scribed > upon it and is interpretable as an assertion is to be recognized as an > assertion, although it may refer to a mere idea as its subject. If "snows" > is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in the universe to which > a special understanding between utterer and interpreter has made the > special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to relate, it > sometime does snow. For they two may conceive that the "phemic sheet" > embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention > at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions > between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate > to one subject and part to another. >
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