Helmut, List: Different kinds of possibility can be addressed with different formal systems of modal logic--alethic, deontic, doxastic, dynamic, epistemic, temporal, etc. For example, deontic logic defines possibility as *permissibility *and necessity as *obligation*, which is why its alternativeness/accessibility relation is merely serial and not reflexive--every obligation is permissible, but not every obligation is actually fulfilled, i.e., people can (and do) behave in ways that are *not * permissible.
It is a fundamental principle of Peirce's Existential Graphs (EGs) that the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse *as already agreed upon* by the utterer (or graphist) who scribes discrete EGs on them and the interpreter who reads them. In other words, the underlying assumption is that both are genuine inquirers who are sincerely seeking the truth together. If the utterer scribes the EG for "A thinks that B," then this is true within that universe of discourse--it has nothing to do with what A *claims *to think, only what A *really does *think, unless the utterer instead scribes "A claims that A thinks that B." By the way, since B designates a proposition instead of a name for a general concept, the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "thinking," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around B, preferably spelled out as a Beta EG ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Likewise, the Gamma EG for "A claims that A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "claiming," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" as just described, except that A is not repeated; instead, the one heavy line is branched and extended to "thinking." Here are those Gamma EGs, substituting "C is a good girl" for B. [image: image.png] As far as I know, the only place in Peirce's writings where he discusses a specific role for God in EGs is R 280 (c. 1905). In three different drafts, he states the following. CSP: The Graphist is really Plastic Nature, or the Artifex of Nature; and the special permissions are the experiences given to the interpreter of Nature, to the man, to which he is at liberty to attend, or not to attend at all, or to attend and immediately put out of sight, as he will. CSP: The sheet of assertion is the mirror of the interpreter’s mind, and through that it is the sign of what the Graphist authorizes. Now the graphist, as the author of truth (for we have seen that falsity is what he forbids and truth what he permits) and source of all the interpreter’s knowledge must be recognized as being either Plastic Nature or the Artifex of Nature. The universe is simply the collective whole of all things to the assertion of whose existence the Graphist interposes no veto, or extends a positive permission. CSP: We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to the "Plastic Nature" of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature. Again, everything that is asserted on the sheet is true, in this case because the one scribing all the EGs is "the author of truth"--either God the Creator himself or what Peirce describes elsewhere (referencing Cudworth) as "a blind agent intermediate between God and the world" (R 870, 1901). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 12:15 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > List, > > I put a new name to this, because I am not inside the discussion, just > want to mention a problem I have with the topic. First, there are different > types of possibility: Is it not definite but possible about the past or > about the future, is it due to limited knowledge or to different options of > decision, and so on. All in all it is the same problem as with > metalanguage, like "A says B": Who heard him/her saying so?, and "A thinks, > that B": Who knows how, what A thinks? Like with possibility: Who or what > group of people regards it merely for possible instead of true, and might > there not exist somebody, e.g. God or "the universe", who knows, whether it > is true or false? > > For example, if you have an EG with the term "A thinks, that B", it is > written on the so called blank sheet, which shows the universe of > discourse. If this discourse is that of a certain group of people, none of > these people except A has access to what A thinks. So to write "A thinks" , > if in words or as a symbol, on this sheet, is not justified. Because maybe > A is a liar, and thinks the opposite of what he/she claims to think. > > It may seem possible to circumvene this problem, by e.g. saying: This > certain group of discoursers consists of both theists and atheists, so we > now incude God or the universe (according to belief) into the universe of > discourse. Both God and the universe should know, what A thinks. But then > there still is a problem, when it is about possibility in the future. I > vaguely remember a quantum physicist, was it Newman, who spoke of hidden > variables, and also somebody with "B", who claimed, that everything, even > the farthest future, can be precalculated. I dont think so, but it shows, > that a possibility about the future cannot be proved to be a mere > possibility. Therefore it is not justified to write it on a blank sheet, I > guess. That is, because I think, that not only atheists, but also theists > don´t have a clear concept about what the universe or God knows about the > future, and what not. Maybe some theists say, that God knows everything > about the future too, but then His job would be quite boring and futile, > and there would be no need e.g. for angels. You dont need a post office, if > no message would be able to change the future. So, if this deterministic > view is right, then possibility does not exist, and if it is false (of > course it is), possibility cannot be proved to be one. > > Best regards, helmut >
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