List: A couple of months ago ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-08/msg00075.html), I mentioned that Peirce commented on Anselm's ontological argument for the reality of God in one of his earliest writings, his sixth Lowell Lecture in 1866 (W 1:446-448). I have been pondering further what he presented there as the strongest point in its favor.
CSP: In defence of the argument, it may be said that the distinction of *being thought* and *really being* does not exist in the case of deity. ... That an ideal of a God is required to bring our general conceptions to unity is admitted on all hands. And that ideal God would not be such unless it were regarded as having existence and therefore it constitutes a hypothesis of a real God and as this hypothesis is required in every state of Cognition, its truth is constituted thereby. These statements prompt several questions in my mind. 1. What exactly does Peirce mean by "bring our general conceptions to unity"? 2. In what sense is "an ideal of a God" *required* for this, such that "a hypothesis of a real God ... is required in every state of Cognition"? 3. Was this really uncontroversial in the mid-19th century, i.e., "admitted on all hands"? 4. Even if so, is it still uncontroversial today? (I suspect not.) So far, I have not been able to find any other text by Peirce or anyone else where the exact phrase quoted in #1 appears. However, he does use similar expressions within the next couple of years in "A New List of Categories" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," as follows. CSP: This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it. (CP 1.545, EP 1:1, 1867) CSP: The unity to which the understanding reduces impressions is the unity of a proposition. This unity consists in the connection of the predicate with the subject; and, therefore, that which is implied in the copula, or the conception of *being*, is that which completes the work of conceptions of reducing the manifold to unity. The copula (or rather the verb which is copula in one of its senses) means either *actually is* or *would be*, as in the two propositions, "There *is* no griffin," and "A griffin *is* a winged quadruped." The conception of *being* contains only that junction of predicate to subject wherein these two verbs agree. (CP 1.547, EP 1:2, 1867) CSP: The function of hypothesis is to substitute for a great series of predicates forming no unity in themselves, a single one (or small number) which involves them all, together (perhaps) with an indefinite number of others. It is, therefore, also a reduction of a manifold to unity. (CP 5.276, EP 1:34, 1868) These all seem to be consistent with the 1866 passage, and the second one strikes me as invoking (without saying so) the distinction between the two kinds of definitions that we have discussed previously--in a *nominal *definition, the copula only means *would be*, while in a *real *definition, it also means *actually is*. I would greatly appreciate any insights that others can offer toward answering my four questions in light of these additional remarks and any others that are relevant, whether in Peirce's own writings or elsewhere. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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