Helmut, List: I agree that Peirce's three *categories* are associated with different correlates in different contexts based on their different relations with each other, not rigidly and absolutely assigned once and for all. For example, a sign is the 1st correlate of the genuine triadic relation of representing, 2nd in the order of determination, and a 3rd by virtue of mediating between its object and interpretant. That is why Gary R.'s six categorial vectors are so helpful for analyzing various situations ( https://cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm). However, Peirce's three *universes *are a specific logical and metaphysical application of his categories, encompassing whatever might serve as dynamical objects of signs.
In logic, possibility and necessity are not *predicates *any more than existence/actuality. Instead, they are *modalities*, which is why axioms must be added to classical logic to incorporate them, one of which is called T--if a proposition is necessarily true, then it is actually true. In the Gamma part of Existential Graphs, anything within a solid cut within a broken cut is asserted to be *possibly *true, while anything within a broken cut within a solid cut is asserted to be *necessarily *true. However, when Peirce ultimately abandoned cuts altogether in favor of shading, he needed a new notation for such graphs--"I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals" (R 500:3, 1911). Unfortunately, he never spelled out what he had in mind, but my newly published paper describes a plausible candidate ( https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00026). Nominalism is the doctrine that existence/actuality is the *only *real mode of being--there are no real possibilities (1ns) and no real generals (3ns), only particular individuals (2ns). This is why I suggested that the tendency to treat "exists" and "is real" as practically synonymous in modern vernacular might be a symptom of lingering nominalism. Given Peirce's remark suggesting that "all Atheists are Nominalists" (SWS:283, 1909), he evidently holds that scholastic realism--the doctrine that there *are *real possibilities and real generals, as well as real existents, which is integral to pragmaticism--entails theism. After all, this follows from his position that only God as *Ens necessarium* can serve as the "rational explanation" that "logic requires" for "the co-reality of the three universes," which together contain "all that could ever be observed of Ideas, Occurrences, or *Logoi*" (R 339:[293r&295r], 1908). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Oct 26, 2024 at 9:49 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > but i think, that the categories are not labels eternally stuck to things, > but roles, things play in certain situations / semioses. If something is a > possibility or a necessity in one situation, it may be an existent in > another. And, though existing is not a predicate, but possible and > necessary are. For example, if you write "A" in a sheet of assertion, you > say, that A exists. But you may substitute A with A = B is possible, or A = > B is necessary. Suddenly the possibility or necessity of B exists. And > reacts with other things, because, if B is possible, and somebody asks: > "B?", you answer: "Maybe". If B is necessary, and somebody asks: "B?", you > answer: "Yes". So possibility and necessity react with the answerer. > Doesn´t necessity imply existence? Existence doesn´t imply necessity, > because something may exist without necessary reason (causa efficiens), but > e.g. by chance, purely contingent. So, if God is necessary ("Ens > necessitans"), I think, he exists too. I don´t think, my view is > nominalistic, I think, nominalism only would be to call the said "maybe" of > possibility a "yes", e.g. to say, that, because God is possible, he exists. > I wouldn´t say so. But with necessity I would. > > Best regards, Helmut >
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